MACV-SOG / Special Operation Group

SOA

2010-10-20T09:39:00.000-07:00

BOTT, RUSSELL PETER "PETE"

2010-06-09T12:16:00.001-07:00

BOTT, RUSSELL PETER "PETE"

Name:	Russell Peter "Pete" Bott
Rank/Branch:	Master Sergeant/US Army
Unit:	Detachment B-52 DELTA, 5th Special Forces Group 1st Special Forces


Date of Birth:	05 September 1936 (North Easton, MA)
Home of Record:	Worchester, MA
Date of Loss:	02 December 1966
Country of Loss:	Laos
Loss Coordinates:	165048N 1063158E (XD634633) Click coordinates to view (4) maps
Status in 1973:	Missing In Action
Category:	2
Aircraft/Vehicle/Ground:	Ground
Other Personnel In Incident:	Willie E. Stark; Daniel A. Sulander and Irby Dyer III (missing)

REMARKS:
SYNOPSIS: When North Vietnam began to increase its military strength in South Vietnam, NVA and Viet Cong troops again intruded on neutral Laos for sanctuary, as the Viet Minh had done during the war with the French some years before. This border road was used by the Communists to transport weapons, supplies and troops from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, and was frequently no more than a path cut through the jungle covered mountains. US forces used all assets available to them to stop this flow of men and supplies from moving south into the war zone.
Oscar Eight was the code name given to a sector of eastern Laos located in rugged jungle covered mountains approximately 25 miles northwest of the infamous A Shau Valley, Saravane Province, Laos. The area encompassed the junction of Highway 92, which was a primary north-south artery of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and Highway 922, which branched off and ran directly east where it crossed into South Vietnam at a strategic point near the northern edge of the A Shau Valley. Oscar Eight was also located at the southeastern end of a large and narrow jungle covered valley that had two primary roads running through it, one on each side of the valley. Highway 92 ran along the west side and Highway 919 along the east. A power line ran parallel to Highway 92 and sometimes crossed it. In addition to the roads and power line, the Hoi An River also flowed through the valley passing the road junction roughly 1 mile west of it.
More American aircraft were downed in this sector than any other place in Laos. This was because burrowed deep in the hills of Oscar Eight was North Vietnamese General Vo Bam's 559th Transportation Group's forward headquarters. It was also the Ho Chi Minh Trail's control center and contained the largest NVA storage facility outside of North Vietnam.
On 29 November 1966, SFC Willie E. Stark, team leader; then SSgt. Russell P. "Pete" Bott, assistant team leader; and four Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) "strikers" comprised a 6-man reconnaissance team, call sign "RT Viper." The team was to be inserted into the jungle covered mountains along the border in extreme western Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam. Their mission was to gather intelligence concerning enemy troops and supplies being moved along one of several arteries of the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. However, because of poor weather conditions at the time the team was inserted, it was inadvertently dropped into eastern Laos, far west of its intended landing zone (LZ). Weather conditions in the entire region did not improve until mid-December.
Shortly after being inserted, the team was ambushed by elements of the 325B NVA Division. Over the next two days a running gun battle ensued as RT Viper moved toward the northeast in an attempt to break contact. Late on the second day, Pete Bott made radio contact with Lt. John Flanagan, pilot; and Tommy Tucker, observer; who comprised the crew of the onsite Forward Air Control (FAC) aircraft, call sign "Snake." SSgt. Bott reported he was down to one grenade and one magazine of ammunition. He also stated that several of the Vietnamese team members were dead or wounded, and that Willie Stark had sustained wounds to his chest and leg, but was alive. SSgt. Bott requested an immediate emergency extraction. At the same time Pete Bott stated he ordered the two surviving strikers to escape and evade (E&E), he was staying with SFC Stark and would destroy the radio since he believed capture was imminent.
The team's location was in heavily forested mountains located just south of a large populated valley laced with a variety of trails through the entire region. Further, this sector was also considered to be in the northern portion of Oscar Eight, approximately 2 miles west of the Lao/South Vietnamese border, 2 miles east of Route 92, 4 miles west of the Lao/South Vietnamese border, 11 miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam, 20 miles northeast of Tchepone, Savannakhet Province, Laos. This location was also 25 miles northwest of Khe Sanh and 55 miles northwest of the A Shau Valley, South Vietnam.
At 1000 hours on 2 December 1966, seven UH-1D Huey helicopters had already been scrambled from the 281st Assault Helicopter Company stationed at Khe Sanh, for the extraction attempt and were orbiting nearby. All of the helicopters were assigned to the 281st Assault Helicopter Company. WO1 Daniel A. Sulander, aircraft commander; WO1 Donald Harrison, pilot; SP4 William J. Bodzick, crewchief; SP4 Lee J. Boudreaux, Jr., door gunner; comprised the crew of the lead extraction aircraft (serial # 65-10088). Sgt. Irby Dyer III, a Special Forces medic from Detachment B-52, was also onboard the lead helicopter to care for the wounded on the return flight.
The Huey's aircrew located RT Viper near Route 1036 and initiated their approach. As the Huey neared the team's position, it came under intense ground fire. In spite of this, the Huey successfully landed in a small clearing near RT Viper's position. The crew of an accompanying gunship observed one of the Vietnamese strikers run toward the helicopter. As intense enemy ground fire drove the gunship off, the extraction helicopter took off toward the south-southwest, instantly go out of control, and descend in a nose-low attitude. They continued to watch in horror as it crashed into the village of Ban Taha roughly 250 meters away from RT Viper's position, burst into flames and continued to burn for approximately 15 minutes. An immediate search of the crash site was impossible because of the loss location and the intense NVA ground fire. In addition to the extraction helicopter being shot down, two gunships working the area sustained battle damage, but were able to return to base.
Concentrated and accurate hostile fire, along with bad weather, severely hampered rescue efforts until 10 December 1966. At that time a search and recovery (SAR) team was inserted into the battle site. They photographed the wreckage and the bodies of the crew, which had been horribly mutilated. The bodies also appeared to have been booby-trapped by the communists. It addition, numerous boot prints were seen around the aircraft wreckage. Only the helicopter's tail boom was recovered. At this time the SAR personnel concluded their mission, all five men on the Huey, including Irby Dyer and Daniel Sulander, were listed Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered.
On 11, 12 and 13 December 1966, the crash site was subjected to heavy American air strikes. On 15 December, another recovery team reached the crash site and retrieved all the partial remains that could be found and took them to a US mortuary for examination. Those remains were later identified as the Huey's pilot, crewchief and door gunner. Each man was returned to his family for burial.
Of the four South Vietnamese strikers assigned to RT Viper, two were killed and two successfully made their way back to American forces. The escaping strikers heard no shots emanating from the American's location as they continued to E&E NVA troops. However, both of the survivors reported clearly hearing North Vietnamese soldiers yell, "Here you are! We've been looking for you! Tie his hands, we'll take him this way."
Sometime afterward, SFC Norman Doney, the Operations Sergeant for B-52 headquarters at Khe Sanh, overheard the Intelligence Sergeant on the "52 Desk" reviewing recently collected intelligence about SSgt. Bott. SFC Doney states that it was reported that Pete Bott was seen with his arms tied behind his back being lead through a village 3 days after being captured. There was no mention of Willie Stark, or his fate, in this report. When the formal search effort was terminated for Willie Stark and Pete Bott, both men were reported as Missing in Action.
For every insertion like this one that was detected and stopped, dozens of others safely slipped past NVA lines to strike a wide range of targets and collect vital information. The number of reconnaissance missions conducted by Special Forces teams in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were part of the most sustained American campaign of raiding, sabotage and intelligence-gathering waged on foreign soil in US military history.
Willie Stark, Pete Bott, Irby Dyer and Daniel Sulander are among nearly 600 Americans who disappeared in Laos. Many of these men were known to be alive on the ground. The Laotians admitted holding "tens of tens" of American Prisoners of War, but these men were never negotiated for either by direct negotiation between our countries or through the Paris Peace Accords that ended the War in Vietnam since Laos was not a party to that agreement.
If Daniel Sulander and Irby Dyer died in the Huey's loss as reported, they have a right to have their remains returned to their families if at all possible. Likewise, if Willie Stark died of his wounds, he also has a right to be returned. For Pete Bott and Willie Stark, as well as for other Americans who remain unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, their fate could be quite different. Either way there is no doubt the Vietnamese know what happened and could return them or their remains any time they had the desire to do so.
Since the end of the Vietnam War well over 21,000 reports of American prisoners, missing and otherwise unaccounted for have been received by our government. Many of these reports document LIVE America Prisoners of War remaining captive throughout Southeast Asia TODAY.
American military men were called upon to fly and fight in many dangerous circumstances, and they were prepared to be wounded, killed or captured. It probably never occurred to them that they could be abandoned by the country they so proudly served.

Spike Team Delaware at FOB 4, Kontum, Apr 68-Nov 68

2010-06-09T12:15:00.000-07:00

By Gene Williams

Spike Team Delaware at FOB 2, Kontum,
Apr 68-Nov 68

I was at Duke University in the early 60?s; Jack at Stetson. To buy some time, grow up a bit and for a whole complex series of the above reasons, I elected to drop out of school. I joined the army in January 1965 as a volunteer, volunteered for Airborne, volunteered for Special Forces, finally volunteered for my first tour in Vietnam (July 66-July 67 in the Central Highlands at a small Special Forces “A” camp located at the Rhade Montagnard town of Ban Don. I went to Germany in August 67 just as my twin brother Jack, who had also joined Special Forces about six months after me, shipped out for the war. In February 68 as the Tet Offensive crashed into the headlines, I again volunteered to return to Vietnam. Following is a summary of this second tour before I got back to Tuscaloosa.

(* = see footnotes)

I arrived in Vietnam from the 10th SFG (Special Forces Group) in Germany for my second combat tour in March ‘68 and after some delay (*1) was assigned in April to (Forward Operational Base) FOB-2 of a Special Forces special unit called “Command and Control North” (CCN) based in Kontum in the II Corps area, The Central Highlands (*2). A personnel sergeant in Danang gave me this post because Jack was then based with a Special Forces “A” camp called Dak Pek, part of a net of camps controlled by a “B” camp based also in Kontum. CCN was running reconnaissance and raids over the border into Cambodia and Laos and in the north into North Vietnam itself to gather intelligence on and if possible disrupt huge concentrations of North Vietnamese regulars in these base areas and interdict their supply line, the “Ho Chi Minh Trail.”

I was put onto RT (Reconnaissance Team) “Delaware” (*3) as the deputy commander. Delaware was commanded by a SSG (he was called the “1-0” -one-zero) (*4). The #2 was called “One-one” (“1-1”). Another American sergeant served as the “one-two” (radio operator) (*5). The team had some 9 Montagnard troops, mostly from the Jarai tribe. My first duty? - to be the catcher on the FOB2 fast-pitch softball team which was leaving that day in an old refurbished French Renault armored car to play B-24, the Special Forces B-team across the river (*6). The opposing pitcher? Turned out to be twin brother Jack in for a day from his A-camp (I hit him pretty well that day as memory serves).

Within 72 hours of my arrival a U.S. convoy was ambushed between Kontum and Pleiku and a portion of our team on very short notice was put into the mountains along the Cambodian-Vietnam frontier, west of the highway to try to find the ambushers (*7). We succeeded in doing this, lying all night while squads of the ambushing unit passed within 10 yards of our position on their way to the rendezvous point. On this mission I learned again the incredible power of adrenalin; under stress powers of hearing and smelling can become enormously enhanced; I could smell the NVA squads long before they passed in front of us. Adrenalin is terribly addictive (*8). Incidentally, I actually got out of the army while I was on this mission and came back to camp a civilian; I had forgotten to extend my enlistment.

As soon as we got back and I had extended (Jack and I planned to get out of the Army at the same time) (*9) the “1-0” of the team was transferred to Danang and at his recommendation I was made “1-0.” Before he left he fired the interpreter so essentially I was a new, virtually unknown face to most of the Montagnard team members (only four had accompanied us on the first mission above). (*10)

The second phase of the Tet Offensive was underway and the FOB was running recon operations at full tilt. Within 5 days of our return we were helicoptered (“lifted” or “inserted”) into a mountainous area north of Ben Het near the Laotian frontier where we were to monitor an infiltration route. Ben Het was a small Special Forces “A” camp 7 km from the junction of the Laos, Cambodian and Vietnam borders, right at the end of the “Ho Chi Minh” trail (known as highway 96 to us); my twin brother was temporarily assigned to the camp. B-52’s planned to pulverize the area; there was a reported NVA tank regiment preparing to attack Ben Het and intelligence wanted to know whether the enemy was reinforcing or withdrawing troops from the area during the strikes. We left in the Choppers with myself as “1-0,” the radio operator (combination “1-1”/”1-2”) (*11) and five Montagnard team members who had not been with us on my first mission. (*12) On the way to the LZ (landing zone) for the insert we flew directly over Ben Het; I was able to talk to Jack on the radio briefly as we went in.

We were inserted into very rugged terrain and almost immediately ran into trouble. The second slick refused to land on the LZ and our team members had to jump in from about 10 feet up. The other American badly sprained his ankle and couldn’t move far--we had to remain near the LZ and call in a medevac the next morning. It didn’t arrive until around 1630 hours. The replacement American radio operator was newly arrived in country and, with a .38 revolver in a western holster held on by a black tooled leather cartridge filled belt, quite obviously knew next to nothing about operations in Vietnam; but he proved solid enough. (*13) Anyway, we had already lost 24 hours by the time we were able to leave the LZ area. The only recompense was the picturesque; in investigating suspicious noises near our hiding place, I found 12 wild elephants bathing in the mountain stream.

We bivouacked that night part way up the mountain and the next day made it to the summit by ascending some very difficult climbs. (*14) The trail we were to watch was in the river valley on the other side of the mountain. We were halfway down the ridges on the other side when night fell and we went into RON (an overnight hiding place called “rendezvous overnight”). About 2200 hours, I heard movement just in front of me and deduced it was a team member relieving himself who had lost his way back to his blanket. He struck a match and simultaneously a CAR-15 fired, the bullet passing about 2 inches above my nose. The Montagnard team leader had shot his own man in the leg, thinking no doubt (in light of later events) it was me. The next morning we climbed back to the top of the mountain where we waited another 7 hours for a med-evac to lift the wounded man out on a rope (between enormous branches of triple canopy jungle). (This man later became the Indigenous team leader of Delaware).

After the med-evac we hurried down the mountain, moving some 3 kms (a long distance for recon teams in mountains) in 3 hours. We had brought supplies for 5 days and this was already our fourth night. We arrived in the vicinity of the trail and set up in a very secure RON. All that night we listened to the B-52’s pounding the huge jungle quadrangle with “arclights” (bombing runs). Ben Het was some 20 km to the south. The huge bomb sticks came down with a thundering howl, a noise something like standing next to the tracks as a gigantic steam locomotive approaches or hearing a giant plane nose over and head straight down to earth; then the ground would start shuddering like an earthquake and the clouds would be lit by huge flashes, like the old Bessamer furnaces in Birmingham, even though we were a good 8 km from the nearest bomb. (Jack told me later that the bombers caught the NVA tank battalions and annihilated them).

The next day we watched the trail and towards evening myself and two Montagnards forded the river (about 50 meters wide, running clean and swift with many rapids) and investigated the far side. There was no sign of any activity along the trail; we were looking for tanks and were carrying “Light Anti-Tank Weapons” (rockets or “LAWs”) just in case. (*15)

The following day we were scheduled to be extracted (pulled out of the area). Around noon, however, we were told by radio to remain where we were another five days. This precipitated a very tense scene. The Montagnard team leader refused to stay, mutinied and drew weapons on the two Americans. The other Montagnards, a total of 5 men, backed him. (*16) Finally working through the interpreter I got them to leave behind all their heavy weapons, the claymore mines, LAWs, etc., and to take off. Choppers came to extract the two Americans around 1800 hours. The next day they found the team some 10 kms away and extracted them on “strings” (ropes lowered from the helicopters with “D” rings to hook onto using a mountain rappelling harness) (*17). They were sent to prison I believe. (*18)

In the post-action report it was obvious what had happened. To Montagnards war is a very personal thing. Their team leader (the former American 1-0) had suddenly shipped out firing the interpreter who was de-facto head of the group. Without time for me to get to know the team, we were put into the field into very difficult terrain. The mission was extended 5 days, apparently arbitrarily, because someone at the FOB never understood that we had moved 7 kms over the top of a 4,000 foot mountain essentially in one and one-half days because of the casualties. And finally the indigenous team leader was half-crazy and may have borne a grudge against Americans; I am convinced, for instance, that he shot his own man during the third evening because he thought it was me. (*19)

I then reconstituted the team using the four men who hadn’t gone into the field as a base, hiring five more and training them. They came from five different tribal groups and were a diverse and interesting lot with a lot of combat experience. The most fascinating of them was a young Rhade named Y Yuk Ayun. Yuk was 18 years old and was a sorcerer who could foretell the future. We came to believe his predictions by the way, another story for another time.

Anyway, after some three weeks training (*20) we went into a mountainous area east of Kontum where we were nearly hunted down by our own spotter planes. Someone forgot to tell people we were there and when a plane drew AA from the area, dozens flew in to try to find the guns. They were obviously ready to shoot anything that moved on the ground so we lay low under triple canopy for several hours. Incidentally the S-3 for the operation was SFC Fred Zabitosky, a CMH winner who had been shot up very badly in Laos 5 months previously. We did find a base camp, large well maintained, thatched bamboo cottages on stilts, built into the side of incredibly jungled hills, the only access to them being via a stream bed, bicycles stashed under the floors; totally quiet, totally deserted, utterly still, absolutely beautiful, green on green on green, bamboo and towering jungle, totally stocked and ready for its owners to return. (*21) .

Then, three days after our return we went into “X-3” (Xray three), a quadrangle in Laos along highway 96 to mine the road. (The Laos and Cambodian operational areas were divided into target quadrangles, some 8 km on a side. These were given grid coordinate names such as X-1,2,3, etc, H-1,2,3 etc. The higher the number, the further into Laos and Cambodia the target area). (*22). I was still feeling quite upset about the desertion of my team so after making the ops plans, I asked a SFC, who supposedly had had much experience in Thailand and who talked a good game, to head the mission as “1-0.” I also had a new radio an, Jimmy Marshall, an ex-pitcher for the Pirates organization and part Seminole Indian.

We took off carrying four 26 lbs anti-tank mines meant for the road. The Insert went smoothly, the two slicks fluttering down like giant dragonflies while below us the gunships made swooping “X’s” over the LZ. From my viewpoint, standing on the chopper runner on the last slick, the LZ was incredibly green with new grass, lincoln green surrounded by black-green jungle, a whole world of green--the rains were just starting, and then we were down in a small short grass clearing in Laos between towering jungled mountains, sudden silence after the thumping, whine of the choppers.

Within 30 minutes it became obvious that the SFC didn’t know what he was doing and would likely get us killed. Fortunately he caught malaria and was med-evaced after one day. (*23).

X-3 was a very hot area; no team had ever survived there longer than 36 hours. The last to try had been run out in 27 hours with the death of the American “1-0.” (He got out of his own sling (on the end of the evacuation chopper’s ropes) to give it to one of his men who showed up late on the LZ. The team that later retrieved his body reported he had tried to bury his maps and code books before he died. He won a Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) and may have been proposed for a CMH. The team sent to retrieve his body lasted less than 24 hours in the area.) (*24).

During the first night we were awakened by tremendous booms. It was artillery firing and since we were 30 Kms from our nearest fire base (around Ben Het) it wasn’t ours! A very loud boom would be followed shortly by a more muted one. I reported two guns firing, one close by and one further away. We were ordered to chase the artillery the next day but after the medevac of the SFC, abandoned it to go back on the mining mission. Later that evening, as the artillery continued to fire, we were awakened again by what appeared to be a spotlight. We grabbed arms and prepared to fight. After about 30 seconds of high tension we realized it was the moon rising over the mountain summit, by far the brightest moon I have ever seen!

The next day we got the SFC lifted out by “strings” (ropes), under fire as it turned out, a very fortuitous happening. He was a sad case; he just didn’t know what he was doing; he was long on talk, short on knowledge. Jimmy Marshall won the bronze star in this short action. We then took off for the road after first losing the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) pursuers and trackers. I had read all the after-action reports about this section and knew that every day a NVA company or battalion swept the trail for 1,000 meters on either side of the road around 0800 hrs and again at 1600 hrs and had planned the mission accordingly. We holed up 1,200 meters from the road on the side of a mountain until 1700 hrs, then went for the road following a newly broken elephant track for part of the way. At one point Yuk (who the Montagnards said couldn’t be killed), acting as point-man, had us stop for 20 minutes for no apparent reason. When he motioned us onwards we found a machine gun emplacement 100 meters on with sand still falling into the holes where the tripod had been.

We arrived within 30 meters of the trail about 2000 hrs just as it got dark and bivouacked. We mined the trail at 0400 hrs, Jimmy Marshall booby-trapping the mines with “mousetraps” (devices designed to trigger the mine if someone tried to dig them up) in the dark. (*25). Just as it began to get light we left the area and pulled back some 2 kms where we found a decent LZ from which to be extracted. (*26). About 1000 hrs while waiting for the choppers we heard a mine go off. A “FAC” (Forward Air Controller, a small spotter plane who directed the large air strikes and generally watched over us) later said he saw a huge hole in the road but no armored vehicle. We assumed someone had tried to dig a mine up and had paid the price.

It seemed pretty evident that the balloon was about to go up. Within another 45 minutes we heard a toe popper we had put down on a trail we had used go off about 400 meters from our position. There was whispering in the undergrowth below us. When the choppers arrived we were lifted out on strings (four ropes per chopper/three lifts), the last two lifts drawing very heavy fire from the NVA regulars hunting us. Dangling 70 feet below the last slick (*27) I could see the whole hill and jungle go up in smoke as everything in the air starting with old A-1 Spads, pounded the area. (and I was told later that a B-52 flight called in to ask if they could help); Must have been a lot of opportunities for promotion in that particular NVA unit guarding the trail. (*28) We had some people grazed and holes in various items of equipment but nobody was hurt. Several of the choppers had windscreens shot up.

I was pretty proud of the whole operation, the first successful mining operation by the FOB in two years. When the commendation came down though, who do you think was commended? Yep, the SFC who was medevaced.

During the next few weeks there was a break in the weather as the rains began to come in earnest and we did a lot of training. I also thought up an idea for making a special unit patch for RT Delaware. I proposed a design to the team, a shield with three broad stripes, three lightning flashes across it and in the middle a blue circle with a skull with a green beret on it with them a choice between red-green-black background stripes or one with the old Hollenzernum colors red, yellow and black. They chose the red- green-black as I knew they would. Of course these were the colors of the FULRO flag (long before they became fashionable as an expression of Africanness in America). FULRO was the Montagnard independence movement. No, I wasn’t pushing the movement but was well aware of it as all second tour Special Forces soldiers in Vietnam were and had had numerous contact with FULRO members during my first tour 1966-67 at Ban Don, an A-camp near Ban Me Thout. I had 20 patches hand-embroidered by a Vietnamese lady in Kontum for I think 400 piasters (about 3 dollars) each. I have one, Jimmy Marshall has one, all 9 Montagnard members have one and the other eight I gave to my successor, SSG L.M. Dove in November ‘68 for his use with the team. (There are several examples of these hand made RT patches in the definitive edition of patches of the Vietnam war; I’ll try to get this patch into the next edition.) (*29).

After our return the team had five days off so I took the opportunity to take a short trip up to Ben Het to see Jack. I hitched a ride on a chopper out of the FOB to an airstrip north of Kontum where the old Dak To Special Forces camp was located (there were ferocious battles fought around Dak To in 1967; the 173rd Airborne got especially chewed up in one battle made famous as ?Hamburger Hill?). From the airstrip I tried to hook up with a convoy going to Ben Het but It was during the annual “siege” of the camp and the road was blocked. I went back and hung out by a giant chopper refueling point, talking to each gunner as they came in to refuel. The air looked like spring in Alabama with dragon files, choppers humming by the hundreds, the thumps of their rotors mixed with the smell of rain and aviation fuel and always the color green--dark, light, yellowish, blackish--with overhead scudding dark gray and black clouds, and a pervading sense of melancholy. The aviation fuel smell, the thumping sound of a Huey and the smell of drying new-poured concrete and air conditioning is very evocative to this day. I finally managed to hitch a ride on a chopper to Ben Het where I spent the night. A year later back in the States at the University of Alabama with Jack, we read in the papers during the May-June ‘69 siege of Ben Het that “nobody was getting into or out of Ben Het except for one Green Beret sergeant who hopped off a chopper saying he had come to visit his twin brother.” Hummm.... this story seems to have circulated for a year.

We prepared for several missions during this time including one wire-tapping mission into Cambodia and flew up to Dak To and sat on the launch air strip at least 16 times during June and July without being able to get over the mountains along the border because of cloud cover.

Then in mid-July ‘68 we went into H-3 (Hotel 3) target area, another very “hot” area along highway 96, again on a mining mission.

A word on my thinking on these reconnaissance mission: First, I always read every word of every report we received on my target area--signals intercept, debriefings from previous missions, aerial photography, etc., and did a thorough map study. In addition, the more missions we went on the more we employed classic army patrolling techniques. These were distilled from a long history of warfare and from a large body of very practical knowledge; they are worthwhile. (*30).

However, I also, designed a few strategic ideas into my mission planning which may have kept my men alive and let us accomplish our missions. Some of my “hot shot” colleagues were exasperating, bragging over beer about how many areas they had been shot out of (and how many decorations they had gotten for this). My feeling was that we were reconnaissance teams with only an occasional “active” mission. We were to look and observe, not to shoot. If we made physical contact with the enemy, had a fire fight, got people shot up, it meant the mission was not accomplished and that the “1-0” had failed somehow. It’s ironic, however, that many of the “1-0”’s who were rewarded were those who got the publicity from their mistakes--men killed, missions incomplete.

Anyway, I divided the recon missions into two types, “active” and “passive.” An active mission, a general area reconnaissance, required us to “GO WHERE HE IS” (the enemy); that is patrol the most likely base areas until contact was made. Passive missions required us to go to a particular point and to make sure that any initiation of any contact with the NVA was on our terms. These included point reconnaissance missions such as watching a particular trail or road, putting mines on a road, snatching a prisoner, tapping a wire, etc. Here the object was to avoid all contact until you got to the point you selected. Thus we were required to “GO WHERE HE ISN’T” while walking into the area. In my mining missions, I, therefore, decided to walk the sides of the mountains, reasoning that trails and base camps were likely to be on the ridge tops and in the stream bottoms.

Secondly, we went into an area as far away as possible from the target and walked in. (*31). Once on the ground we really were hard to find. I also relied heavily on the FACs for LZ selection. They were flying that area daily and knew which areas were hot. We always discussed the LZ at length but in the end after telling them what I was looking for I would usually defer to them. The toughest part of the mission was getting off the helicopters. If this could be done, your odds improved dramatically. Anyway, my system worked; we never lost a man and completed every mission we went on, an exemplary record and one continued by my successor.

The mining mission in H-3 was like the others only this time we planned to put down four anti-vehicle mines and two anti-tank mines arranged like this:

x = anti-vehicle mine

O = anti-tank mine

- - - - )- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - river bank - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

____(__________________________________________________

x x

O Highway 96 O

x x

_scty__________________________________________________ scty

//// ) ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

/// ( ///////////////////////////////// road cut //////////////////////////////

// ) /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

/ ( ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

small access command 1-0

gully

This was to insure that if a tank came along we’d get it without alerting him by letting him run over the truck mines. If a truck came along, he would hit the truck mines after passing over a tank mine, which might insure its survival during the subsequent sweep. I planned to do as before; go into an LZ several kms away from the Ho Chi Minh Trail, walk mountain sides into the road area, go down to the road at dusk, RON there, mine the road at 0400 hrs and be out of the area by 0800. The target files noted an active foot trail running along a ridge top near the road. We were going to go over a ridge near the trail on our way out and I decided if possible to mine the trail with toe poppers (small anti-personnel mines) as an added mission benefit.

One other thing, on mining missions the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Highway 96) in this area of Laos/Cambodia followed river beds heading east into the tri-border area and directly towards Ben Het. It was usually dug into mountain slopes bordering the river. Given this it was quite possible to arrive at the road and find yourself perched on top of a 10 foot embankment making easy access to/from the road impossible. To handle this, I always planned to go to the road at a point where it crossed a small stream tumbling into the river. This would insure no embankment and a quick exit point in the event of trouble. (*32). Also, I wanted the river to be as close as possible to the road to prevent the possibility of there being a base camp on the other side of the road. This bit of pre-planning always worked.

This mission started out like clockwork (the team was starting to get really good, we could almost read each others? minds). We left the FOB at 0700 and flew to the launch site at Dak To. At 1000 hrs, we went into the LZ located in a series of open prairies in a stream bottom about 3 km from the road. We moved off the LZ immediately into the mountains, passing through an old NVA base camp built in the heavy jungle on the steep lower slopes bordering the stream valley (I photographed a NVA grave there dated 1964). We moved 2 kms (a very fast pace) along mountain sides to the first RON some 1,000 meters from the road.

It poured steadily all night but we managed to get some sleep; then stayed hidden all the next day, listening to shouts of NVA soldiers using the high speed trail about 400 meters from our RON. At 1600 hrs we went for the road, crossing another trail on the ridge directly above the road and in a driving rain bivouacked on the side of the mountain not more than 30 meters from the Ho Chi Minh Trail just as night came on. At 0400 hrs we mined the road, Jimmy Marshall booby-trapping the mines with mouse traps, sitting in the middle of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the dark and rain and mud playing with 26 lbs of C-4 as if it was a teddy bear, twice the mouse traps snapped on his coat hanger safety wire as he dug the mines in--Some Partner!!

We got out of the area in 30 minutes and walking mountain sides came near to our first RON by 1000 hrs. I then decided to mine the foot trail. I left Jimmy with 4 team members and took six with me 500 meters along the ridge crest to the trail I’d read about. It was farther away than we thought but we found it. It was broad and worn smooth, passing along the ridge crest leading up from the main road (and probably a base camp) under triple canopy jungle. I put out security and started to dig in the toe-poppers.

Then Yuk, the left security, caught my attention. He was looking at me and pointing up the trail. I was angry because the trail had been further away than expected and paid him no heed. He shrugged, smiled, shouldered his weapon (a silenced Sten gun) and began firing. (*33). He had spotted a NVA patrol coming up the trail but did not use the agreed upon signal (hand over forehead) to warn me. Yuk claimed he dropped three or four of the NVA. However, none of the rest of us knew what he was doing because of the silencer until the NVA returned fire.

All hell broke loose for 30 seconds with automatic fire coming hot and heavy from both sides. I ran through a magazine, dropped the second out of the CAR-15 while looking to put off the safety, pitched a grenade in the general direction where I saw smoke rising from bushes and then it was all over. The NVA ran, crashing down the mountainsides like bulls. You could hear them breaking timber for 400 meters down the mountain.

We got out as quickly as possible. (The choppers had been alerted by Jimmy -- the AK-47 bullets were passing over our heads but were breaking bamboo around Jimmy and the rest of the team further back, leading him to shout into the radio that a .50 cal was firing at us). We broke clean, doubled over two ridges to free ourselves from trackers and were picked up neatly three hours later. A very good feeling and successful mission but one which came near to grief because of ambition and impatience. Good lesson.

One other thing came out of this mission. On the X-3 operation I had heard artillery firing over our heads west into Laos, one loud boom followed by a softer boom. Back at the FOB in Kontum I started listening to American 175’s firing from a 4th Infantry camp 4 kms down the road. When the shells passed directly overhead I’d hear a loud crash (from the shell breaking the sound barrier I suppose), then afterwards the more muted sound of the gun itself firing. I realized this was what I had heard and by reviewing the azimuth I had drawn on the more muted artillery sound in X-3, I got at least the direction in which the NVA gun (or guns) lay. From the sound of the various artillery pieces I heard and from the distance it was firing, I figured it had to be a Soviet designed 130 mm gun. Why it was firing west back into Laos over our heads as we lay in X-3 I never knew.

Well, during this mission in H-3, I again heard two guns firing, again towards the west in Laos but no shells were passing overhead this time; I was due south of them. Upon my return to the FOB I drew the two azimuths on a map (one north trending out of H-3 and one east out of X-3) and pinpointed the guns’ probable location. I later talked the Colonel into sending a mission to look for them. He sent my team with Jimmy Marshall and another friend as team leader (Mike Williams) five days before I left country in late October ‘68. They found the guns and counter-battery fire from 175’s around Ben Het, firing at extreme range, ignited over 100 secondary explosions. The team arrived back in the FOB after being chased out of the area 3 hours before I got onto the chopper to leave for home. Made me feel pretty darn good, even if I only S-3’d the operation.

In early August a RT from the FOB was put into H-1 just across the Laos border in a very mountainous area carrying the usual 5 days of supplies. Then the rains and clouds came in and no one could get over the Ammanite Cordillera to them for 14 days. The last word sent from the team was that they were out of supplies and were climbing the mountains along the border looking for an American unit that supposedly was in position nearby (it turned out to be 40 kms away!). Then their radio batteries gave out.

After two weeks when the clouds began to clear Delaware was given the mission of going to look for them or what was left of them. Six of us went in, Jimmy, myself and 4 Mountagnards loaded down with as much ammo as we could carry including extra M-79’s and a M-60 machine gun. We cleared out of the Dak To launch site around 1400 hrs, passing directly over Ben Het toward the jungled border ridges, still swathed in wisps of mist and fog from the rains. As the choppers crossed the border, a red pencil flare came up through the trees. It was the missing team. Down went the ropes; We rappelled into the triple canopy and there was the team sitting on a high speed infiltration trail, starving and pitiful and just generally unable to take care of themselves. (*34). Jimmy blew some trees down and we all were pulled out on strings an hour later. God knows how that other team survived for that length of time just sitting there. (*35).

On the way out the interpreter’s harness came undone for some reason (*36) and he started to fall out. I wrapped my fist around the knot and managed to hold it closed dangling at 3,000 feet altitude until the chopper could land us at Ben Het. Jimmy was carrying the radio as always and, therefore, was sagging lower on his rope. The chopper pilot bounced him along the runway while we had a very nice landing, thank you. Incidentally, Jimmy Marshall was an ex-baseball pitcher. He had a great fastball; He loved grenades and could throw one an incredible distance. When he emptied his pack after the mission, I found he was carrying 26 grenades in addition to his PRC-25 radio. No wonder he was always riding lower than we were!

I then managed to sneak away to see Jack again who had gone back to Dak Pek from his temporary duty in Ben Het, hitching a ride to the camp with a FAC. It was incredible. We flew for 45 minutes between mountain ridges following the Dak Poco river, a swirling, rapid strewn mountain river and suddenly there it was set in a huge bowl surrounded by 8,000 mountains, green upon green upon blue upon mauve upon purple. Surely Shangri-la must look something like this from the air. The floor of the bowl was covered with small hills and the camp was built on 7 of them. Six years of labor had turned the hills into honeycomb of tunnels. The site was so isolated and it took so much labor just to climb out of the valley that it basically just protected the people living in the dale itself. It was an amazingly beautiful setting but Jack can tell more about it.

In late August Delaware was tabbed to go in on a 10 day operation, get down to the junction of the Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk trails (where Highway 110 coming north out of Cambodia carrying supplies to the NVA coming through Cambodian ports joins Highway 96 going south through Laos and both turn east to Vietnam) and sit there to monitor NVA road traffic. We flew up to Dak To for 11 straight days and sat on the runway but every day the mission was rained out. I was scheduled to go to Bangkok on R&R. Finally, after talking to the meteorologist I left on leave with the assurance the weather wouldn’t break for another week. But, in Danang before leaving for Bangkok, I heard my team had just been inserted with Jimmy in command. I was so mad I could hardly enjoy my leave. Jimmy did a great job. They got to the road junction, sat there for six days counting NVA stragglers coming back from the battles in Vietnam (third stage of the Tet offensive) then got out without losing a man. Jimmy was debriefed by the commanding general of military intelligence in Vietnam himself (he tried to intimidate Jimmy but Jimmy backed him down with facts) and won a second bronze star. (Note: Jimmy was flown to Ton Son Nut to meet the LTG.) Jimmy gave me some credit for training him and we were both proud of our team that did the work. Great mission.

In early October, I turned the tables on Jimmy, leaving him behind because the Colonel wanted me to train two new men, a newly arrived SSG and a Lieutenant who had been serving in our “Hornet Force” (a platoon sized reaction force). Delaware flew further into Laos than any RT team had ever gone, nearly 45 kms from Ben Het. We were to get down to Highway 110 and report on the condition of the road. The lieutenant was the 1-2 and the SSG the 1-1. As usual we went into the area a good distance from the road and made it to the vicinity of the road on the second day walking very steep mountain sides. As we neared the road we hit some NVA trackers who scared us off by banging on bamboo clackers, apparently signaling each other. (This was something I don’t understand to this day; why didn’t they just shoot us?). We cleared out meaning to try to get onto the road at another place.

That night two grenades went off within 200 meters of our RON as the NVA apparently looked for our hiding place. There was not a sound of a bird in the area...always a danger sign. The next day we followed the mountain slopes above the road for a kilometer then tried to get onto the road again. This time we got to within 30 meters before the bamboo clacking started up again. We pulled back and called in an airstrike which cleared the area. (the first strike came in so close to us it singed our clothing; we had to ask them to hold off on follow-up while we ran further up the mountain).

The next day we were to be pulled out. We tried the road again and this time actually got down onto it and walked for a kilometer along it taking pictures and tossing out various bits of propaganda (annotated NVA booklets, letters supposedly written from the front, etc.) and some booby trapped ammunition.

The lieutenant was frankly a dilettante. He had been serving in the Hornet Force, a unit of notorious unreliability. That day his buddy, another lieutenant, was to leave for home and he was worried about making the going-away party. After we got off the road and were headed for a LZ he fired a round at a bush then called in the choppers saying we were under fire. He expected all my men to start firing and running around like his Hornet Force people. My men, to their credit were disciplined. The front three (me included) went to ground, the back five came on line with the SSG and maneuvered to free the front men. The lieutenant just stood there stone upright with his weapon smoking, then started berating one of my men because he hadn’t “returned fire.” I felt like returning fire...at him...for pulling a stunt like that 200 meters from the Ho Chi Minh Trail! He did make it back in time for his party; he did not get a RT job.

I was scheduled to leave Vietnam the last week in October 1968. Jimmy and another friend (Mike Williams) led the mission to look for the guns as I mentioned earlier. The Colonel wouldn’t let me go because of the short time remaining in my tour. In addition, I had found a good man, SSG L.M. Dove, to take over the team, had brought him into the team two weeks before my departure, let him work with the team, talked tactics, my theory of operations, generally trained him, etc., so that the men knew and trusted him. He accompanied this operation as 1-1. I wasn’t going to have a reoccurrence of what had happened to me in May. (*37). Jimmy Marshall left Vietnam two weeks after I did. Dove led the team until at least the following May or June when he transferred to become a FAC rider. He told me in a letter that Delaware had gone on some 10 more missions, again completed them all and had not lost a man. Summer ‘69 was the last word I had of them. (*38).

I feel that Delaware RT had a record second to none and am proud to have been associated with them.

On my way out of country I spent several hours in DaNang FOB with a high school friend also in Special Forces. Two weeks later at home I found he had been killed. (*39).

I mustered out of the Army in Fort Lewis Washington, took a flight to Atlanta, then a four engine turboprop into Tuscaloosa airport. On the plane were four Tuscaloosa boys returning from basic training in New Jersey. One was asking another whether he would kiss the ground when he got off the plane--A large crowd was there to meet them in the dark. I stepped off the plane behind them wearing (for the last time) my jump boots, green dress uniform, green beret and war decorations; one of the crowd shook my hand saying a little embarrassed--not knowing who I was, “welcome back,” and then I was with my family. It was November 4, 1968. Jack had preceded me by two days; We were both home in time to watch Richard Nixon’s election.

NOTE

RT DELAWARE HISTORY, Apr-Nov 1968: Notes and errata:

By: Gene Williams (dated 27 Sep 2006).

Notes: I wrote the history of RT Delaware on 17 June 1985 for Col. Cecil Smith, US Army (Ret), whom I had met at the Memorial Day SFA gathering in Arlington, Virginia. The internet was unknown at the time and I wrote the story from memory. Here are a few additional notes which add to the story somewhat. I’ve added them as footnotes to keep the original as authentic as possible:

(Note 1: All arrivals at 5th SFG in Nha Trang, no matter what their experience, were being put through a week’s “training” in Nha Trang by this time in the war. I met a bunch of buddies at the NCO club, including Louis Ira (Lonnie) Holmes, a medic in from 46th Company, (now one of the chief surgeons at USC hospital), with whom I had ridden motorcycles at Ft. Bragg. Abba was pop group of the day and its music was blasting from the sound system. All of us were told to wait for a week at 5th SFG Hqs for the course to start. Well, we weren’t stupid. Knowing what awaited us had we stayed on the base, 4 or 5 of us bugged out and ensconced ourselves in a hotel in Nha Trang by the South China Sea. We showed up 8 hours before the course was to start)

(note 2: MACVSOG was reorganized in November 1968. FOB2 at Kontum up to that time was under CCN. After November 68 it became CCC with its Hqs based in FOB2

(note 3: also known as “Spike Team” or “ST”)

(note 4: The 1-0 of Delaware when I arrived was SSG Terry Dahling. See his website www.tadahling.com for his experiences with the team and for information on the death of RT Delaware 1-0 SFC Linwood Martin on 22 March 1968).

(note 5: At the time the 1-2 was SP4 Richards; he had been wounded during the Tet offensive in Nha Trang in January

(note 6: I’m told this was a “White” armored car with a Renault engine).

(note 7: Dahling was 1-0, I was 1-1 and Richards 1-2. There was no outbrief; I didn’t even know where we had landed but figured it out on the map segments from the lay of the land during the mission. I carried a .22 cal silenced pistol for some reason. 30 years later I found out with Dahling had been through with the team with the death of Linwood Martin. It’s sobering)

(note 8: We were pulled out on strings. I had scrounged a BAR belt to use as my harness; all of us tried to do so; it was far more comfortable than the standard pistol belt. I had my hand-made Randall Knife on the back portion of the belt. The belt broke in mid-flight and the knife fell 3,000’. Randall sent me a replacement by express APO mail.)

(note 9: I went to Nha Trang to extend; the office for the paperwork was closed when I got there; on the door stuck with a steak knife was a hand written note in “Ozark style” hand lettering addressed to the SFC who ran the office, “I kum hyar to re-up; You ain’t hyar..next time I see you I gonna kik you”)

(Note 10: The interpreter was known as “Johnny.” He had been once wounded in the face and as a result always work a steel pot..the only soldier I ever saw at the FOB to do this. I was never sure about the reasons for firing “Johnny.” I had a feeling the interpreter wanted to follow Terry Dahling…I think this might be true; I understand that he wound up with Terry at the Yard camp later on.)

(note 11: Sp4 Richards. Richards was 1-1; 1-2 for the operation. After he was medevaced, I never saw him again. I don’t know whether he was sent to a hospital or what happened to him.)

(note 12: One of these was a brand new indig interpreter, a very intelligent Rhade who I felt subsequently was trapped into treason).

(note 13: I never saw the replacement 11-12 with the cartridge belt and revolver again after this mission.)

(note 14: To climb from the LZ area to the top of the ridge, we had to go about 200m outside of our ops quadrangle; I reported our position with precision reasoning that hqs would look at the map and figure out we really couldn’t scale a 500’ shear rock cliff just to accommodate a line on the map. Wrong! We received a screaming radio message to get back within our ops area..we already were at the summit of the ridge by that time, though, and were within our map area again.)

(note 15: We had been led to believe this trail was an extension of the Ho Chih Minh road complex, which might be use by Tanks. In fact, however, it was just a high speed foot trail. There was no way any motorized vehicules could have used this path.)

(Note 16: As I said, the new interpreter was probably coerced into this mutiny.)

(note 17: McGuire rigs had a harness at the end of each rope to get into, 4 ropes per chopper. On this extraction 4 ropes went down, 5 Montagnards came out; we had worked on how to do this just before going on the mission. It involved one Yard putting on a rappelling harness and hooking himself into the ring on one of the McGuire rigs; one rope would then support two persons.)

(Note 18: I got off the chopper soaking wet from wading through a river to the LZ we’d selected, carrying 4 LAWs, claymores, etc; and was immediately conducted to an “interrogation.” It resembled a court martial of some sort. I was put in a chair, still wet, with a circle of hostile officers in a semi-circle around me to “go over the mission.” I felt it was something like a “Star Chamber.” I felt as the procedure began that I was already judged to be guilty of something or another. As the questioning proceeded, however, it became clear none of the persons present had read the radio dispatches from the mission. They hadn’t even understood the problem of the two casualties, which had inhibited our movements, causing 3 days of delay, etc. At the end of the interrogation, I mentioned Montagnard psychology, the personal loyalty they build up towards a leader – as detailed on Bernard Fall’s book “Hell in a Very Small Place” and recommended that new 1-0’s be introduced to the team well before their first mission. I went over the history of the mission using a map and the radio situation reports. Then it was all over. I assume this “Star Chamber” “acquitted” me. This would be a great scene for any novel on SOG by the way.)

(note 19: See Terry Dahling’s account of the fight which killed Linwood Martin 6 weeks previously - about which I knew nothing at the time; this might explain the hostility to outsiders felt by the team.)

(note 20: The team was scheduled for jump training; they got in one jump..then the rest of the jumps were cancelled so they never got their wings. We also conducted two short training reconnaissance ops in the area; the second was a night mission. The RT Company had a new C/O, Capt. Ernesto Gayola. Gayola was Cuban and had been at Bay of Pigs. He really knew the book on ground reconnaissance. He accompanied us on both training missions and I learned a great deal from him as he recounted, almost by rote, how to cross a trail, etc. He didn’t know much about Army protocol, but he was a tough and charismatic man and a committed anti-communist. Several years later I came to understand he likely was working for US Intelligence using his position at FOB2 as “cover.” He was quite a remarkable man.)

(note 21: The original final training mission was to watch a trail in a mountainous area southeast of Kontum. It was changed by someone at the last minute..I don’t think Zabitowsky was even aware of the change of plans. I had a 1st Lt. with me as 11 to “be an advisor.” Well, we screwed up; We left our long PRC-25 radio antenna behind when we went in and thus couldn’t talk to the Facs. When the sky filled up with Facs looking for something, we were in deep kimshee. As the 5 Facs above us kept turning on their wings looking and looking, the Lt. kept trying to signal them with a mirror; I finally had to tell him to cease and desist…those guys were surely looking for something, they likely weren’t aware we were in the area, and it appeared they would shoot first and ask questions later. We just stayed hidden under triple canopy and ultimately they went away. After our return I found out a Fac in the area had been shot at by some NVA AAA. The 3 stocked long houses we found were in a very inaccessible area. To this day I worry that my report of them wasn’t acted on or was ignored.)

(Note 22: I did a lot of research planning on the X-3 mission and discussed past attempts by the FOB to mine the trail; the FOB had tried everything, from landing by the trail and quickly emplacing a mine to more traditional ops; the intel sgt said nothing seemed to have worked so I opted to go for a very traditional long-range patrol effort).

(note 23: I may have been too hard on this SFC in the original story; I went to Nha Trang after the mission and visited him in the hospital; he indeed had a very bad case of malaria…probably had it before leaving on the mission. I never saw him again and assumed he was medevaced from RVN.)

(note 24: 15 years after writing this account, with the advent of the internet, I now realize that I was talking about the death of John Kedenburg, CMH. The “Bright Light” team was RT Illinois. I read the after-action reports on both the Kedenburg mission and the Bright Light before going into X-3.)

(note 25: There was a NVA bunker located right by the road in the tiny gully, which we used to access the road; I don’t know whether it was for defense of the road or simply a place to take refuge; I think the former. We put a toe popper in the bottom step of the bunker before leaving the area. To get to the road we went over a high ridge, very narrow but relatively flat on top. I had marked every radio intercept point on my map with a “lightening bolt.” We got to one intercept point and the area was littered with yellow bomblets from an airstrike; one of the yards came carrying one to me which cause a major pucker. Down the other side we passed a know truck park which had been bombed and bombed. Craters were everywhere. We holed up in brush before finding the elephant track).

(note 26: We were low on water by the time we left the road; Just in case we had to run, I filled a canteen just in case from a bomb crater putting purification tablets into the red mud-colored water; when I sip from it an hour later, a couple of dead leaches wound up in the mouth).

(note 27: I’ve been corrected; the lengths of the McGuire Rig ropes were 150’)

(note 28: In two weeks this NVA unit had engaged Kedenburg’s RT, the Bright Light of RT Illinois and RT Delaware and each time got hammered from the air).

(note 29: There are a lot of “Delaware” patches on the internet which I never saw in Vietnam; these patches may have been some sort of “official-unofficial” patch issued to the team by Macvsog. However, if so, it was after my time with the team. I never saw any team member wear any patch. Dahling never mentioned a patch to me. Thus, to my knowledge we had no patch until I designed one.)

(note 30: See comments on Capt. Ernesto Gayola above)

(note 31: I adopted this strategy after extensive talks with S-2 on past FOB2 attempts at mining the road).

(note 32: Still, care had to be taken when approaching the road by a gully; see the X-3 mission comments on the NVA bunker guarding a gully).

(note 33: RT teams sometimes carried the silenced Sten gun on prisoner snatch missions; the silenced sten gun can be seen on the internet; I don’t remember why I had Yuk carry the weapon on this mission; it’s the only mission we took it on. Perhaps I hoped we could add to the mission by ambushing this trail).

(note 34: We rappelled down McGuire rig ropes; one team member got tangled up in a tree with a knot on his D ring; I had to cut the McGuire Rig rope which led to a lot of bitching by the guys who had to re-rig the chopper.)

(Note 35: SFC James McGlon told me in 2001 that there were several teams stranded in Laos by the weather at this time; this team was first to be pulled out because it had been out the longest.)

(note 36: We had put on rappelling harnesses to permit us to hook into the Mcguire rigs quickly rather than getting into the seats themselves..the interpreter hadn’t fastened his harness correctly)

(note 37: Upon reflection this is in error; Dove went on a “shakedown” familiarization mission with RT Illinois or RT Ohio (I forget which); the Delaware mission which found the guns was led by Mike Williams, assigned as 1-0 of Delaware for this mission only away from his normal team, with Jimmy as 1-2 and possibly a 3rd newcomer being given a familiarization mission. I had a great deal of respect for Mike Williams; he was quiet and modest and very good in the field. He once expressed some disgust at a silver star being handed out for political reasons at the FOB, an opinion I shared.).

(Note 38: Luke Dove may have transferred to the Facs as early as January or February; his place as 1-0 of Delaware may have been taken by Fitzgerald).

(Note 39: see the references in the “in memoriam” section to Richard “Dickie” Golding, murdered in Kontum by an ARVN ranger on 22 Nov 68. I attended his memorial service at the 1st Baptist Church in Gainesville, Florida, 1st week of December 1968).

Colonel Robert L. Howard MOH / The Drop

2010-04-17T23:31:00.000-07:00

First Flight Squadron

2010-04-14T13:00:00.000-07:00

Cliff/Tom/Ray: Gentlemen - Good Morning.

Attached find a picture that I received from a member of First Flight Squadron, (Roger Gibson) that supported 5th SFGp and MACVSOG in Vietnam. They are conducting a Reunion at the Orleans Hotel/Casino in April 2010 and are attempting to contact the CWO who assisted them in supporting us in order for him to join them.
I would appreciate it if you could place this picture on your respective nets and query folks to ascertain the whereabouts of CWO Jaznick (sic sp) and either have them contact me, or go directly to Roger.
Ray: Request you provide Roger a copy of our SOA Membership Application and Criteria for Membership. I understand in talking to Charles that First Flight is already on the SOA approved list, but with limitation on time, date, and area of support. He will pass to those eligible for SOA membership.
Regards,

Clyde,
I enjoyed talking with you today and appreciate you returning my call. I will contact the Nevada State Tax people as you suggested. Attached is the picture of most of the officers assigned to First Flight. Some were on duty somewhere when this November 1968 picture was taken. The officer in question is third from the right, second row. The only one in the Army uniform. He was a CWO and I believe his last name was Jaznick. This was taken on the roof of our villa in Nha Trang.
The Special Operations Command official magazine "Tip Of The Spear" can be seen at www.socom.mil.
The article on first Flight is on page 34, titled. "Vietnam's Most Secret Squadron". Let me know if you are unable to download it and I'll get you a copy. I would think that these people would be interested in joining your unit.
Talk to you later, Roger Gibson

Colonel Robert L. Howard MOH

2009-12-24T15:53:00.001-08:00

Capt. Robert Howard is awarded the Medal of Honor by Pres. Richard Nixon at the White House - 2 March 1971

Name:

Col. Robert Lewis Howard, Retired US Army

Died:

Wednesday, December 23, 2009, in in Waco

Col. Robert L. Howard, Retired US Army, 70, of Waco and formerly of San Antonio, and who at the time of his death was the most decorated American soldier, passed away Wednesday, December 23, 2009 in Waco.

Full military honors are pending and will be held at Arlington National Cemetery in Washington, D.C., and will be announced by OakCrest Funeral Home of Waco. His flag draped casket will be in state from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. Wednesday, December 30 and Thursday, December 31 at the funeral home.

Col. Howard grew up in Opelika, Alabama and enlisted in the US Army in 1956 at the age of 17. He retired as a full Colonel in 1992 after 36 years of service.

During Vietnam, he served in the US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) and spent most of his five tours in the super-secret MACV-SOG.

Col. Howard was nominated three times for the Medal of Honor, his first nomination being downgraded to the DSC.

His second and third nominations were simultaneous for two separate actions and the Medal of Honor was awarded for the first of them and was presented to him by President Richard M. Nixon at the White House in 1971.

The other nomination was downgraded to the Silver Star.

Col. Howard was wounded 14 times in 54 months of combat duty in Vietnam and was awarded 8 Purple Hearts.

Col. Howard is survived by his children, Denicia Howard of Florida, Melissa Gentsch and husband, Asst. Chief of Police Frank Gentsch of Waco, Rosslyn Howard of California and Robert Howard, Jr. and wife, Tori of California; and his grandchildren, Victoria Batey and husband, Luke of Denton, Holley Gentsch of Waco, Trey Howard of California, Isabella Gentsch of Waco and George Harris of Florida.

This site is dedicated to Robert L. Howard, one of America's most decorated soldiers. He served five tours in Vietnam and is the only soldier in our nation's history to be nominated for the Congressional Medal of Honor three times for three separate actions within a thirteen month period. Although it can only be awarded once to an individual, men who served with him said he deserved all three. He received a direct appointment from Master Sergeant to 1st Lieutenant in 1969, and was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Richard M. Nixon at the White House in 1971. His other awards for valor include the Distinguished Service Cross - our nation's second highest award, the Silver Star - the third highest award, and numerous lesser decorations including eight Purple Hearts. He received his decorations for valor for actions while serving as an NCO (Sergeant First Class).

Robert L. Howard grew up in Opelika, Alabama and enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1956 at age seventeen. He retired as a full Colonel in 1992 after 36 years service. During Vietnam, he served in the U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) and spent most of his five tours in the super-secret MACV-SOG (Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observations Group) also known as Special Operations Group, which ran classified cross-border operations into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. These men carried out some of the most daring and dangerous missions ever conducted by the U.S. military. The understrength sixty-man recon company at Kontum in which he served was the Vietnam War's most highly decorated unit of its size with five Medals of Honor. It was for his actions while serving on a mission to rescue a fellow soldier in Cambodia, that he was submitted for the Medal of Honor the third time for his extraordinary heroism.

Robert L. Howard is said to be our nation's most decorated soldier from the Vietnam War. He was the last Vietnam Special Forces Medal of Honor recipient still on active duty when he retired on Sept. 29, 1992. His story is told in John Plaster's excellent book, SOG The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam.

It is important for future generations that we remember our military heroes and the great sacrifices they have made for us in the name of Freedom.

Click to Enlarge

Service Schedule

Visitation Date:

Wednesday, December 30, 2009

Visitation Time:

9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Visitation Location:

OakCrest Funeral Home [Map]

Visitation Date:

Thursday, December 31, 2009

Visitation Time:

9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Visitation Location:

OakCrest Funeral Home [Map]

Service Date:

Monday, February 22, 2010

Service Time:

11:00 a.m.

Service Location:

Pending

Burial Date:

Monday, February 22, 2010

Burial Location:

Arlington National Cemetery

HOWARD, ROBERT L.

Rank and organization: First Lieutenant, U.S. Army, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces. Place and date: Republic of Vietnam, 30 December 1968. Entered service at: Montgomery, Ala. Born: 11 July 1939, Opelika, Ala. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. 1st Lt. Howard (then Sfc .), distinguished himself while serving as platoon sergeant of an American-Vietnamese platoon which was on a mission to rescue a missing American soldier in enemy controlled territory in the Republic of Vietnam. The platoon had left its helicopter landing zone and was moving out on its mission when it was attacked by an estimated 2-company force. During the initial engagement, 1st Lt. Howard was wounded and his weapon destroyed by a grenade explosion. 1st Lt. Howard saw his platoon leader had been wounded seriously and was exposed to fire. Although unable to walk, and weaponless, 1st Lt. Howard unhesitatingly crawled through a hail of fire to retrieve his wounded leader. As 1st Lt. Howard was administering first aid and removing the officer's equipment, an enemy bullet struck 1 of the ammunition pouches on the lieutenant's belt, detonating several magazines of ammunition. 1st Lt. Howard momentarily sought cover and then realizing that he must rejoin the platoon, which had been disorganized by the enemy attack, he again began dragging the seriously wounded officer toward the platoon area. Through his outstanding example of indomitable courage and bravery, 1st Lt. Howard was able to rally the platoon into an organized defense force. With complete disregard for his safety, 1st Lt. Howard crawled from position to position, administering first aid to the wounded, giving encouragement to the defenders and directing their fire on the encircling enemy. For 3 1/2 hours 1st Lt. Howard's small force and supporting aircraft successfully repulsed enemy attacks and finally were in sufficient control to permit the landing of rescue helicopters. 1st Lt. Howard personally supervised the loading of his men and did not leave the bullet-swept landing zone until all were aboard safely. 1st Lt. Howard's gallantry in action, his complete devotion to the welfare of his men at the risk of his life were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit on himself, his unit, and the U.S. Army.

Hero didn't forget the GIs of today

By Scott Huddleston - Express-News

Retired Army Col. Robert L. Howard, a Medal of Honor recipient who retired in San Antonio and was one of the most highly decorated soldiers from the Vietnam War, died Wednesday.

Howard, 70, died about noon at a hospice in Waco, where he'd been for about three weeks, suffering from pancreatic cancer, said Benito Guerrero, a close friend, Vietnam veteran and retired sergeant major.

Howard, a larger-than-life figure on the national military scene, appeared at many patriotic events in San Antonio and helped honor the wounded by attending Purple Heart ceremonies.

At his suggestion, the local Blue Star Mothers of America chapter began holding an annual ceremony in late December to remember the troops serving overseas.

“He said, ‘Don't forget the troops at Christmas.' He was very adamant about that,” said Chris Peche, who in 2004 helped organize the annual event, now held each year at the Alamo.

In April, Howard traveled, as he often did, to Iraq and Afghanistan to talk to U.S. troops about service. Just two months ago, he visited troops in Germany, Bosnia and Kosovo.

Howard, born July 11, 1939, grew up in Opelika, Ala., and served in the Army from 1956 to 1992. After retiring at Fort Sam Houston, he decided to stay in San Antonio.

Howard, who served five tours of Vietnam, was a sergeant first class in the Army's Special Forces on Dec. 30, 1968, when he rallied a badly shot-up platoon against an estimated 250 enemy troops in Vietnam.

Despite being unable to walk because of injuries from grenade blasts, he coordinated a strong counterattack while aiding the wounded and was the last man to board a helicopter, according to military records.

He was nominated for the Medal of Honor, the highest honor for valor, three times during a 13-month period. His long list of awards also included the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star and eight Purple Hearts.

At an annual convention for Medal of Honor recipients in Chicago in September, Howard said he and others wore the medal not to honor themselves, but for all U.S. troops past and present, including “those who stood beside us and for those who did not come home,” according to the Associated Press.

He also had been an advocate for troops missing in action. He told a Senate panel in 1986 that he believed there still were Americans, possibly more than 100, living in captivity in Southeast Asia.

Guerrero said Howard told him Sunday that military recruiters should give more waivers to young men “who've gone astray,” because they would “do better if given a second chance.”

“He cared about people, especially soldiers, and he loved his country,” Guerrero said.

Retired Maj. Gen. Alfred Valenzuela said he's been asked by the Pentagon and White House to coordinate funeral arrangements with Howard's family. He said he wasn't aware of any service-related connection to Howard's death.

While Howard's military record speaks for itself, Valenzuela said San Antonians need to know he served others while he lived here, whether working as a caseworker with the Veterans Affairs Department or speaking to teenagers about staying away from gangs.

“His forte was giving back. To him, it was never about Bob Howard. It was about helping others,” Valenzuela said.

Howard is survived by three grown children, including a daughter living in Waco, Valenzuela said. A memorial service in San Antonio and burial at Arlington National Cemetery are planned.

Peche said she feels a loss that's not only local and national, but also deeply personal.

“He was an extraordinary soul that I was blessed to know, not only because of our common support of our deployed troops, but also as a friend,” she said.

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Medal of Honor
Distinguished Service Cross
Silver Star
Bronze Star for Valor, 3d Oak Leaf Cluster
Purple Heart, 8th Award, 7th Oak Leaf Cluster
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit, 3d Oak Leaf Cluster
Bronze Star for Meritorious Achievement
Air Medal for Valor, 2d Oak Leaf Cluster
Army Commendation Medal for Valor, 3d Oak Leaf Cluster
Air Medal for Aerial Flights
Army Meritorious Service Medal, 2d Oak Leaf Cluster
Army Commendation Medal for Meritorious Achievement, 2d Oak Leaf Cluster
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Good Conduct Medal 4th Award
National Defense Service Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal
PNCO Ribbon W/2 device
Army Overseas Ribbon
Army Service Ribbon
Expeditionary Medal, 2d Oak Leaf Cluster
Vietnam Service Medal
Vietnam Campaign Medal with 60 device
Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star
Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Silver Star
Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Bronze Star
Vietnam Honor Medal 2d Award
Vietnamese Wound Medal
Vietnamese Civil Action Medal 2d Award
Army Presidential Unit Citation, 1st Oak Leaf Cluster
Navy Valorous Unit Citation
Army Meritorious Unit Citation
Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm, 1st Oak Leaf Cluster
Republic of Korea Samil Medal
Combat Infantryman's Badge
Aircraft Crewman's Badge
MForces Qualification Tab
Thai Master Parachute Wings
Vietnamese Master Parachute Badge
French Parachutist Badge
Korean Master Parachute Badge
Thai Balloonist Badge
aster Parachute Badge
Pathfinder Badge
Air Assault Badge
Expert Infantryman's Badge
Vietnamese Ranger Badge
Army Ranger Tab
Special

SVN Heros

2009-12-16T15:45:00.000-08:00

South Vietnam Did Not Lack Heroes:

General Nguyen Van Hieu

We are about to touch upon a nagging hidden spot a deep resentment which started since the days in March, April 1975 caused by the loss of country and dwellings, the existence of an expatriated, of humiliation that could not be restored, and that one could not find an explanation Why? Because of whom?! Then, each individual had to draw from his/her one own personal situation, a rationalization of his own in responding to these stern questions. Why did it come to this? Why must one bear this tragic situation? Then we all kind of console one another in accepting that this is common suffering that the Vietnamese people as a whole have to embrace. But in this tragedy that the country was contemplating at the moment of agony, there was one man, a whole family that had to endure the resentment earlier and deeper, sooner than when South Vietnam collapsed: General Nguyen Van Hieus family the General who was cut down at the same time the nation lapsed into total annihilation.

We are going to relive the unjust fate of the General and the unfortunate destiny of the Nation April 8, 1975 Thirty years ago, when South Vietnam collapsed, and also the day our Loyal, Courageous Soldier was harmed by dark devilish elements.

I. The Beginning of a Saga

In 1949, when the Red Army was about to take control of the entire China, young Nguyen Van Hieu who had just reached twenty years old, left Shanghai with his family, from the French concession to repatriate to Saigon. From there, he moved up to Hanoi, because his father, Mr. Nguyen Van Huong, a high ranking official in the security and national intelligence at its formation phase in the fifties, was nominated Deputy Director of Northern Security. With the wide connections and position of his father in the political milieu, coupled with a high level of education (student in technology at Aurore University run by the French Jesuits) and his proficiency in English, French and Chinese, young Nguyen Van Hieu would have no difficulty and plenty of opportunity to pursue high level of education in advanced institutions in Europe and United States, a general trend in the beginning of mid 20th century (after WWII); furthermore, the amount of students applying to study overseas were very low at that time. Nevertheless, he chose to follow a different direction, an uncertain path, more dangerous � the military career of a combat soldier. In 1950, he entered Class 3 of the Dalat Inter-arms Military Academy, one of the first classes after the Military Academy was transferred from Dap Da (Hue) up to Dalat to form the leadership cadre of the National Army. Such was the army with its officers that would carry out the heavy burden of a war between Nationalists and Communists that lasted three decades with a tragic outcome on April 30, 1975. Young Nguyen Van Hieu � General Nguyen Van Hieu, indeed went through the war that devastated the country without respite, and ended up at the same time as the unfortunate destiny of his country. We have the task of recounting the entire journey of his combat life � the General who lived, fought and died with the destiny of the country � for, the next generation�s history of the nation must reckon one great fact: the Soldier of the Republic of Vietnam was the entity that had performed the task of Defending the Nation and Protecting the People, despite the destiny of the country which was entering its decadent phase, with the lot unjustly imparted to the soldiers through the defeat on April 30, 1975.

General Hieu epitomized the stoical attitude and unselfish spirit of an ARVN soldier. His death, although was a tragic ending, nevertheless equally shed further light on an extremely noble heroic figure.

The military career path of Soldier Nguyen Van Hieu commenced with first uncertain steps that were not smooth by all means, although our 3rd Class Cadet of Dalat Inter-arms Military Academy possessed all the excellent abilities necessary to accomplish the training program with the highest scores. He was the officer cadet who had the highest scores in academic subjects, the highest scores in military subjects, equally the highest scores in behavior (c�te d�amour) due to his amenability, his modesty, his helpfulness toward classmates, his respect toward rules and principles � a model suitable of a military life; in other words, young men whose mind and body were molded in view of becoming Commanders who would lead troops into the battlefield; men such as De Gaulle, De Lattre, Bigeard of the French Army, Montgomery of theBritish Army, Rommel, the Fox of the German Army, or the Great Soldier of the American Army, McArthur. Lieutenant Nguyen Van Hieu graduated 2nd of his Class, relinquishing the honor of 1st Rank to Lieutenant Bui Dzinh, because Emperor Bao Dai had expressed his desire of having a cadet originated from Center Vietnam to hold that position of honor. Lieutenant Nguyen Van Hieu did not hold grudge � he was confident of his own abilities � with the confidence of a Combatant coupled with the self-respect of an Oriental Scholar. His exceptional later life would prove the veracity of these high qualities of this beginning phase.

The next misfortune was caused by tuberculosis due to catching cold during a physical exercise conducted under the rain (another caused might also be hereditary since his mother also had died of tuberculosis). This might be the reason for our young lieutenant to slump into depression when he listened to a classmate, Captain Lu Lan, recounting his military feats in Quang Tri battlefield (which had allowed this classmate to be on a fast track in term of promotion to the rank of captain). �Look, I am a handicapped know, I wonder what my future will turn out to be?� But this feeling of depression at the bedside in Lanessan Hospital (Hanoi) was only temporary, and Lieutenant Hieu, unlike the majority of soldiers who contracted tuberculosis � since military career demanded physical stamina, and furthermore at the beginning of the second half 20th Century, the anti-dote to this disease was still rare � often times seized the pretext for an honorary discharge. In the contrary, after a period of convalescence, he went to the South, and continued his military career with a renewed attitude and a new position as a general staff officer under Chief of Staff, Colonel Tran Van Don, as a G3 officer (Operational Center, Training � the most important section in the general staff organization of all modern armies), Captain Nguyen Van Hieu�s skills were allowed to blossom entirely, in preparation for later positions of high command and general staff. For this reason, when Colonel Tran Van Don was promoted to Major General and was assigned I Corps Commander (Military Region I, from Quang Tri to Quang Ngai), he brought with him this excellent general staff officer to Danang. In 1971, when this general staff officer was summoned to appear on the floor of Congress to be questioned about the defeat in the withdrawal out of Snoul City (Kampuchea), Senator Tran Van Don, Chairman of the committee overseeing the Defense Department at the Senate, had this statement to say: �If the ARVN had more generals as competent as General Hieu, Vietnam would not have been lost�. It goes without saying that this statement was not a mere subjective endorsement but was based on proven facts. Let us examine some typical military exploits to back up this assessment.

II. In the Midst of Battlefield

Even though military historians have divergent opinions (even American officials, scholars who had unjustified prejudgment toward the Army of the Republic of Vietnam), nevertheless all had to agree one thing: General Do Cao Tri was the best tactician of the army of South Vietnam, of the entire Vietnam (if one compares him with the generals of North Vietnam); and not so much less than the famous generals of allied armies. But perhaps, the majority of them would lack in accuracy in not finding out one of the reasons behind the military exploits of famous General Do Cao Tri. This reason existed since the days he held the position of 1st Infantry Division Commander (before the 11/11/1963 coup), when he entrusted Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Hieu the position of 1st Division Chief of Staff. The close relationship between these two fine combatants lasted a decade (60-70), and only ended when General Tri died in a helicopter accident on 2/23/1971, before he was about to leave the position of III Corps Commander (Bien Hoa) to go to Danang to replace General Hoang Xuan Lam at the moment the battle in Laos (Operation Lam Son 719) was in critical situation. General Do Cao Tri only consented to accept the Command of I Military Region if the person who replaced him as III Corps Commander had to be (and nobody else): General Nguyen Van Hieu, 5th Infantry Division Commander (Binh Duong) � the attack spearhead that had created the Binh Tay Victory � the Campaign that defeated the Southern Central Command starting at the end of 1969. Something deeper than military task must have been the link that jointed these two exceptional military geniuses together. The following military feats will be the clear explanation for this excellent collaboration between a fearless commander and an outstanding chief of staff. It also rectifies one thing: General Do Cao Tri had never been someone who �discriminated Southerner-Northerner� as rumor believed; on the contrary, he was the one that �protected� General Hieu to the end. Similarly, General Hieu could only fulfill his thorny task in the Anti-corruption Committee, if he was not backed up by a Southerner � a pure Southerner Official who loved, respected, protected him: Mr. Tran Van Huong.

Do Xa
Do Xa stronghold of the communist force nested in the mountainous area at the junction of the two Provinces of Kontum and Quang Nghia, according to the regional determination of the Republic of Vietnam; or it belonged to the operational zone of Communist Battle Fronts B3 and B5. It ss the most treacherous area of the Annamite Mountains right at peak Ngoc Linh, (8,524ft), dominating the entire Lower Laos region, leading down to the delta of the coastal region of Center Vietnam belonging to the two Provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, and it constituted also the path leading to Kontum, Pleiku of the Western Highlands. It was put under the command of General Nguyen Don and was an impenetrable area since the Indochina war time of 1945-1954. During the 2nd Indochina War (1960-1975), since he was appointed I Corps Commander (Danang), General Tri intended to �visit� this forbidden location, but he did not have sufficient force to launch a big operation (especially lacking tactical air support and troop transport helicopters); furthermore, social political unrest during the entire year of 1963 forced him to abandon the idea to clear up Do Xa stronghold. In 1/1964, General Tri took over the command of II Military Region, the �sticking bone� of Do Xa came back as a challenge, and this time he decided to act, although the majority of this operational area was set in the area of Quang Ngai Province (belonging to I Military Region). Colonel Nguyen Van Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff, was entrusted the task of designing and executinf the operation which was put under the command of I Corps Commander, Major General Do Cao Tri and Colonel Lu Lan, Operational Deputy Commander. The operational force was divided into two groups: Group A comprise three Rangers battalions under the command of Major Son Thuong; Group B consisted of 50th Infantry Division under the command of Major Phan Trong Chinh which was the main trust of the operation; it was reinforced by 5th Airborn Battalion of Major Ngo Quang Truong. With his wide connection since the days he was in charge of operations in I Corps, Colonel Hieu had established a close relationship with Major Wagner, USMC Advisor to I Corps HQ; and together with Major Wagner, they became the main factors in the coordination of the troop transport plan by helicopters. USMC HMM-364 Squadron with 16 helicopters H34 ferried the troops et debarked them at the same time on the landing zone, reinforced by two AFVN helicopters H34 coming from Danang. They were escorted by five UH-1B armed helicopters belonging to US Army 52nd Aviation Battalion �Dragon Flight� all along the flight and at the Do Xa landing zone (LZ). The operational zone was covered by the observation plane L19 US �Bird Dog�; furthermore Helio Courier STOL plane of Colonel Merchant, from the CIA and Colonel I Corps Senior Advisor circled at 5,000 feet to monitor the entire operation (USMC knew this operation under the name of Sure Win 202). Based on the above-mentioned facts, Operation Quyet Thang 202 was not merely a pure military activity, but was a testing of ARVN�s capabilities after the political turmoil of 1963, and specifically was aimed at assessing the capabilities of high ranking officers that were commanding and executing this operation.

27, 1964 Do Xa campaign was launched. From Quang Ngai airport, where the Operational Forward HQ was set up, 18 helicopters H34 of the first attack wave ferried the entire 5th Airborn Battalion to the battleground. Enemy anti-aircraft batteries were not only positioned around the landing zone, but they were also set up on top-hills along the paths followed by the troop transport helicopters. Let us listen to the account narrated by Captain �Woody� Woodmansee, leader of the helicopter gunships (nowadays a retired US Army Lieutenant General), �On the first pass, low level at about 100 feet, all of my first four Dragon guns were throwing smoke out both sides of the aircraft. I could see tracers criss crossing the valley from both sides (only one out of five rounds were tracers). On one of my passes west to east, I was engaged by a 50 cal. from the south side. There was a stream of tracers passing about 10 feet under my helicopter for at least 10 seconds.� Such was the scene in the air. On the ground, 5th Airborne Battalion was attacked right at the landing zone. Major Ngo Quang Truong deployed all four combat companies and the Command Company to face the enemy. Company Leader Tran Dai Tan Au was killed right at the moment his foot touched ground at the landing zone; the 57 cal. recoilless machine gun of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (normally used to destroy bunkers and tanks) now was transformed into a direct firearm to defend the immediate perimeter of the battalion command post. General Tri personally commanded the battle from the air; the helicopter which carried him, General Lu Lan, General Minh (later AFVN Commander) had to fly at tree top level to avoid anti-aircraft gunfire; but when it returned to Quang Ngai airport, an examination showed that its flanks and bottom were pierced by several bullets. Without feeling any set back, General Tri sent in the rest of Rangers units into the battleground, to join in with the airborne units in an operatinal sweep of this impenetrable stronghold named Do Xa. Just in the second day into the operation, the Rangers only had captured a 30 cal. heavy machine gun, a light machine gun, 11 AR-15 rifles, six submachine guns and 144 individual weapons, 1,000 heavy detonators plus a great amount of grenades, mines, ammunition, documents and military equipment. At the end of the operation, the total amounts of weapons counted two additional 52 mm caliber machine guns, one 30 mm caliber machine gun, 69 individual weapons with 62 enemies killed and 17 captured. The operation ended exactly a month later, on May 27 with 50th Infantry Regiment of Major Phan Trong Chinh having swept the entire Do Xa area while Airborne and Rangers units forming peripheral blocking positions which interdicted enemy forces to escape into the western mountainous areas or toward south of Highlands.

The amount of weapons captured and the enemies killed did not constitute a major military victory, but from a political standpoint, it had proved one thing: After the political turmoil (1963-64) in which the whole army had been swirled in by some individual military leaders who wanted to snatch the power of the nation according a trend which championed �Military authority with the power of the gun� in vogue all over the world (Nasser in Egypt, Pak Chung Hy in South Korea, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and nearby in the Indochina region, Captain Kong Le in Laos, etc), the ARVN had regained combat strength; it was capable of conducting big operations at regimental and divisional levels when general staff officers and commanders received adequate supports, in particular when they were given full authority in the deployment of troops based on battlefield�s reality rather than on a display with a political agenda. An evidence which supports this interpretation lies on Operation Phi Hoa with hundreds of troop transport helicopters (the biggest troop transport by helicopters, mobilizing helicopters from the entire Southeast Asia) and with the involvement of four airborne battalions being dropped at once in the Ho Bo sanctuary (Binh Duong) in the end of August, 1964. This operation did not produce the anticipated desire. Or on this same Do Xa battleground, General Nguyen Khanh and his Chief of Staff Ngo Dzu, once had failed before they swapped positions with General Do Cao Tri and Chief of Staff Nguyen Van Hieu respectively. Finally, all had shown that Operation 202 of II Corps into Do Xa was a well designed plan, responding to the situation and demand of the battlefield, was commanded and executed by competent strategists and tacticians with determination: Attacking with a sure win, not as troop display betting on soldiers� lives. Furthermore, one detail needs to be mentioned: airborne, rangers and infantry units in Do Xa battle, all were commanded by officers originated from airborne branch: General Do Cao Tri, Majors Phan Trong Chinh, Ngo Quang Truong, Son Thuong � But all had relied on Colonel Nguyen Van Hieu�s planning and strategic skills. This is also the purpose of this task which is although belated, nevertheless essential that we must do today toward a Soldier who had died in the hand of a regime composed of immoral, corrupt, power hungry, blood sucking leaders. The following will prove this Common Suffering will lead to the painful collapse of April 30, 1975.

1965. National Route 19, An Khe Pass � National Route 14, Duc Co; Pleime

07:00 pm June 24, 1954, only less than six month later (June 20, 1954) the Geneva Accord would be signed, ending the First Indochina war. But on Mang Yang Pass, at Kilometer 15th, on National Route 19 linking Pleiku (Highlands Military Capital) with Qui Nhon (the most important seaport of Center Vietnam), an infernal scene was unfolding. 803rd Regiment NVA attempted to annihilate the entire Korea Regiment of the French Expeditionary Army, a unit whose feat was to stop the human waves of the Communist Red Army on the Korea battlefield in 1952, along with US 2nd Infantry Division. That was why soldiers of this regiment still wore on their shoulders the insignia boring a White Star with the Head of an Indian of this famous unit. But now, in 1964, it was An Khe Pass of the Vietnam War and no more the Korea peninsula of 1953. The remaining combatants of the 100th Mobile Task Force (of which the Korea Regiment was the assault element, the pride of the task force) were trying to regroup after being decimated by a six hour close combat with Communist units. In reality, they had endured six month of devastation since they got involved in this Highlands battleground. Night time came down quickly although the sky of this mountainous region in June was enlightened by illuminated grenade explosions thrown by soldiers to destroy artillery batteries, to burn up equipment, to use up heavy machine guns in preparation of an escape of the encirclement by 803rd Regiment NVA. (Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy. Schoken Books - New York, 1972 pp 214-220). To put it bluntly, the battle of An Khe Pass on National Route 19, with the total annihilation of 100th Mobile Group, was only the tactical aspect of an overall strategic plan: To isolate the Highlands, to occupy the route linking North-South, west of Annamite Mountains, along Route 14 down to Ban Me Thuat, to the upper end of Dong Nai River, and the eastern region of South Vietnam. This battle plan of 1954 would later be repeated in the years 1974-75 before the lost of South Vietnam with the Highlands territories leaving open, caused by the ill-fate refugee flow along Provincial Route 7 from Pleiku to Tuy Hoa of II Corps with the entire territorial force of this military region. But 1965 in the Highlands was different. Let us see how Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff had lived and fought in the Highlands.

In 1965, North Communists launched a campaign aiming at slicing Viet Nam in two pieces, from Highlands down the coastal region along Route 19 by defeating the ARVN in a conventional warfare. At this point, we have to use �North Communists� because the forces that participated were regular units belonging to B3 and B5 battlefronts, commanded by the North Vietnam Military General Directorate with a facsimile of 1954 Dong Xuan campaign as described previously. National Route 19 and Mang Yang Pass once more were inflamed. On February 20, 1965, Forward Operational Outpost #1 of a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Company on Route 19, west of Mang Yang Pass, was attacked after a Regional Force Company was ambushed while moving from Pleiku back to a camp at Mang Yang Pass. Both the Regional Force Company and the CIDG Camp were not capable of facing the Communist regular forces, because these units were equipped with the lattest models of Russian weapons: AK machine gun, RPD grenade-launchers, and improved replica of anti-tank rockets RPG2. Meanwhile, the CIDG, Regional Forces, or ARVN units like Paratroopers, Rangers, Marine Corps, (in 1965, 66, 67�) still used antiquated weapons from WWII such as Garant, Carbin M1, etc. The battles along Route 19, on the two western and southern sides of Mang Yang Pass repeated the typical tactics applied (and applied with success) by the Communist side � �Attack the Post and Ambush the Relief Column�. However, after two days of fierce fighting, CIDG #1 (West of Mang Yang Pass) and CIDG #2 Camp (East of Mang Yang Pass) still held with the help of rotational supports; they also received relief from a Rangers Battalion garrisoned at An Khe (50 kms East of Mang Yang Pass) which constituted a reserved force. The Special Force Command Post in Pleiku had also created CIDG companies specialized in helicopter intervention groups using Eagle Tactics when needed. Athough caught off guard by helilifted troop transport tactics, with close firepower supports provided by US armed helicopter gunships, AFVN Skyraiders and B27, enemy anti-aircraft system was very sophisticated and efficient, causing great damages to CIDG, Rangers and Eagle flight units. By February 24, the situation reached a critical point: Forward Operational Camp #2 of CIDG (with an addition element of Rangers stuck behind) needed to be evacuated because they could no more sustain the pressure of continuous mortar pounding coming from 83mm mortars positioned tightly around the camp. Among the 220 soldiers that needed to be evacuated was a wounded 9 month old baby, the sole survivor among the passengers of a civilian bus going from Qui Nhon to Pleiku that had been massacred the day before when the vehicle entered the enemy artillery grid.

Colonel Chief of Staff Nguyen Van Hieu and US II Corps Senior Advisor, after two days monitoring and studying the battlefield reached a common conclusion: enemy forces were regular battalions of Battle Front B3 equipped with modern weapons; they were efficient in mobile firepower and anti-aircraft concentration tactics. This army showed clear signs that it intended to joint force with the army from the delta (Binh Dinh region-Military Zone 5 NVA) to transform An Khe valley (East of Mang Yang Pass, along Route 19) into a huge battleground, aiming at cutting South Vietnam into two pieces as they had done in the 1945-1954 war. And the urgent measure was to pick up immediately the troops encircled in Camp #2 before it would be engulfed. General Nguyen Huu Co, the newly appointed Corps Commander, agreed in principle but raised a dilemna: lack of sufficient firepower to cover the area in support of the helicopter operation aiming at picking up the troops at Camp #2; furthermore, the network of enemy 82 mm mortars around the camp would create a pool of flames at the landing zone (within the camp). Under such conditions, the helicopter operation would become a suicidal attempt. Finally, III Corps resorted to adopt General Westmoreland�s decision: to use US F-100s jets together with ARVN A-1E and B57 in close strafing along the two valley sides, while helicopter gunships flew shotgun at mortors positions near the camp, allowing transport helicopters to enter the landing zone to pick up troops. This helicopter operation was designed and executed like a miracle. No one was hurt in the first three lifts, only one helicopter was hit and one soldier were wounded in the last lift. Colonel Chief of Staff Nguyen Van Hieu had succeeded a rescue operation designed by him with a smooth coordination between US and VN units, a feat not known by many until these days.

After the relief of CIDG camp, II Corps Command called up the reserved force: 2nd Airborne Task force comprising two Battalions, the 7th and the 8th, was helilifted from Saigon and disembarked at An Khe airport; from here, they launched a sweeping operation along the entire thorny stretch from An Tuc District to Mang Yang Pass. Feeling outsmart, the enemy switched north and attacked K�nack Special Force camp (North of Route 19 to alleviate the pressure exerted by the paratroopers at An Khe valley) with human waves (similar to Red Communist Army�s tactics used at hilltops Pock Chop, T-Bone and Old Baldy in the Korea battle in 1953): two battations gave assault at outpost manned by merely a CIDG platoon. An outpost was overrun, but was retaken by a CIDG counter-attack, supported by paratroopers attacking from the south, which broke the enemy forces around the Force Special camp. At the end of the battle, the enemy withdrew leaving behind 126 dead, numerous 57 mm recoilless batteries, 82 mm mortar-launchers with lots of ammunitions and explosives. But the major accomplishment of the operations was: convoys of trucks escorted to Pleiku instilled a renewed morale in the Highlands. Food and commodities prices dropped 25 to 30 percent, and the population regained sense of security, confidence and hope. Students in Pleiku volunteered in helping soldiers in unloading cargoes and people reverted back to their homesteads. (General Vinh Loc, Military Review, April 1966) However, not many individuals among the population of Pleiku those days were aware that the life they had recuperated was the result of the sacrifice of hundreds, thousands of soldiers � Among them was the Great Soldier, extremely modest, totally dedicated to the army and the country � Colonel Chief of Staff Nguyen Van Hieu. Who among the population of Pleiku knew or heard of Him; even this writer, a young lieutenant belonging to the 7th Airborn Battalion, the unit that cleared the road between An Khe and Mang Yang Pass in March 1965.

After defeating the enemy at the battles on Route 19, II Corps Command launched a campaign to retake Bong Son, Tam Quan (April 1965) with 22nd Infantry Division reinforced by a Marine Corps Brigade in order to counter the enemy�s intention to cut National Route 1 around the tactical area of Quang Ngai-Binh Dinh (belonging to Battle Front B5 NVA) which forced the Communists Command in ARVN Military Region II to revise their plan. And once again, the Hanoi�s leadership reverted back to the battleground along National Route 14 (which linked Pleiku with Ban Me Thuoc to the south, with Kontum to the north, from the raining season to the beginning of the dry season (from April 4 to the end of 1975) with the most seasoned divisions of Battle Front B3: 325th, F10th, 2nd Golden Star Divisions, commanded by competent Generals Vu Lang , Hoang Minh Thao, Chu Huy Man (later, toward the end of the war, in February 1975, Chief of Joint General Staff Van Tien Dung in person commanded the campaign to control the Highlands under the direction of Hanoi General Directorate). Meanwhile, II Corps Command consecutively replaced its Commanders: General Do Cao Tri, Nguyen Huu Co, Vinh Loc successively held the position of II Corps Commander � while only the Chief of Staff remained at the same position. Therefore, we can make the assertion about a fact without being afraid of making an error, of being subjective: It was Colonel Nguyen Van Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff who was the person who dealt continuously and directly against the military command of the North at the Highlands battleground during the entire year of 1965.

Beginning of the rainy season of 1965, along National Route 14, communist forces continuously launched systematic attacks as following: On May 16, Phu Tuc District and Buon Mroc belonging to Phu Bon Province (or Hau Bon, old name Cheo Reo), about 70 kilometers southwest of Pleiku, were attacked; the Regional Forces called the nearby Special Force Camp for help without success because that the Special Force unit was also attacked, both the rescue column and the camp. The situation at Phu Bon deteriorated rapidly, II Corps had to helilift one battalion of 40th Regiment/23rd Division to come to the resue. Phu Bon Province could only communicate and be resupplied by air because Le Bac Bridge on Provincial Route 7 had been damaged. On May 20, the enemy attacked the Regional Force unit that guarded the Pokala Bridge and destroyed this important bridge, cutting off the entire network of outposts, Special Force camps located northwest of Kontum. The situation was getting worst entering May 1, when a delegation of Pleiku Province lead by the Province Chief on an inspection mission at Le Thanh District (30 kilometers west of Pleiku, on the left side of Route 14) was ambushed and the District was overrun early in the same day. II Corps had to deploye Eagle Flight teams to rescue the delegation and dispatch an airborne task force present in the region to rescue Le Thanh District. The situation did not end here, the rescue column met the chief of province�s delegation convoy at a location on National Route 19 (between west Pleiku and the Vietnamese-Kampuchean borders). This was also the ambush location set up by the enemy. Helicopter gunships of US Army 52nd Aviation Battalion from Camp Holloway had to continuously intervene to lend air support and to allow the delegation to withdraw. Two helicopters were shot down; the delegation convoy suffered heavy lost both in human beings and vehicles (including the relief column units); and the survivors disbanded and attempted to get back to Pleiku. Finally, General Vinh Loc, II Corps Commander, had to abandon the old Le Thanh District headquarters and moved it to a nearby location close to National Route 14 (near Pleiku) for easier support. However, he had to hold Duc Co outpost, the fartherst remote outpost of governmental forces situated at the western end of Route 19, facing Kampuchean border.

The situation in the south, at Phu Bon Province was no better, a battalion of 40th Regiment/23rd Infantry Division on its way to Le Bac Bridge to establish security and to repair the bridge fell into an enemy ambush, and was forced to revert back to Phu Tuc District to finally suffer the same fate of encirclement of the entire province. Next Thuan Man District, southwest of the province was also attacked and at rist of being overrun. Again the airborne task force was dispatched to join force with the 40th Regiment in an attempt to rescue the besieged troops. The enemy attacked the mid secion of the airborn and infantry units formation, overran the artillery position and destroyed the convoy transporting ammunition supply to Thuan Man. Airborne battalions had to regroup in self defense for medevac of wounded combatants and for ammunition resupply. II Corps Command was facing with a grim situation which was getting worse and worse with signs of enemy�s determination to conquer the Highlands in the rainy season becoming more obvious, and was forced to request reserved forces from Saigon. A Marine Corps Task Force and an Airborne Task Force were dispatched to Phu Bon in emergency. In no time Cheo Reo airport became the busiest airport in the Viet Nam War. US transport airplanes coordinated by II Corps general staff flew in continuously round the clock to ferry in troops. As soon it touched ground, the second Airborne Task Force hurried up to enter the jungle to deflate the pressure imposed on the task force that was encircled at Thuan Man.

North of Pleiku, Toumorong District at the northest part of Kontum was overrun beginning July. Because it was too remote, and was not an essential military location, II Corps gave the order to retreat to Dakto District (Tan Canh) where the Command Post of 42nd Regiment was located. It was then the turn of Dakto District headquarters to be attacked (july 7); the 42nd Regiment Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lai Van Chu was killed; the US Senior Advisor, Major John R. Black was gravely wounded while commanding the relief column. This situation of the regiment deteriorated after the death of LTC Chu; II Corps hastened to appoint Colonel Dam Van Quy 42nd Regiment Commander; the US Senior Advisor, LTC Thomas Perkins (who had worked with Colonel Quy in the past) was also dispatched up hastely to reinforce the US Advisory Team. A Rangers Battalion and the Marine Corps Task Force newly arriving in the region were helilifted to Tan Canh to join force with 42nd Regiment to block the enemy at the northern part of Kontum.

While the military situation was exploding every single day in the Highlands, in Saigon military turmoils were also swirling rapidly: Military showdown on 9/12/1964, failed coup attempt on 2/19/1965, followed by counter-coup on 5/20. Governmental cabinets raced in and out with Phan Huy Quat, Tran Van Huong; catholics and Buddhists took turned occupying the streets, fighting and transforming Saigon into a battleground no less fierce than the one with guns up in the Highlands. Battles at Special Force Camps Duc Co, Pleime were like the last drop tipping of water out the glass at the same time corps commanders were replaced reflecting the military situation in Saigon. Only Colonel Hieu stayed put in the position of II Corps Chief of Staff by the sides of soldiers who stood fast amist the flames ravaging the mountaineous regions of the Highlands.

Duc Co Camp was located at western end of Route 19, facing the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border. It was under the full pressure exerted by the enemy force of Battle Front B3 after Le Thanh District was overrun (as above-mentioned). By mid July, the camp was tightly encircled and all patrols venturing outside the camp were beaten back in. And although hundreds bombardment missions had been executed around the camp, enemy units conducted perfectly the art of underground warfare and had cleverly set up a network of mortar launchers around the camp, threatening the helicopters landing zone which became unusable. A bold military operation was designed with sophistication and precision by Chief of Staff Nguyen Van Hieu and submitted to II Corps Commander, using 1st Airborne Task Force comprising three Battalions, the 1st, the 3rd and the 5th , first rank assault units of the Airborne Brigade (prior to 12/1965, Airborne Division was not yet created) with the mission to take the earliest possible control of the airstrip (reserved for C123 and Caribou planes) after tactical bombers attacked enemy mortars position around the camp. After succeeding in landing on the airstrip as planned, 1st Airborne Task Force attempted to widen the control perimeter failed, they had to revert back to the airstrip. The challenge faced by II Corps General Staff was that the number of enemy troops engaged in the battle was much much superior to the number of Airborne combatants (merely a task force comprising three battalions which had been severely damaged by battles at Phu Bon, Cheo Reo areas since April); while the enemy force encircling the camp numbered one regiment, which means the enemy had thrown in a division into the battleground. It was no more a matter of battles at battalion, regiment levels with a Special Force Camp as target, but rather a strategic intent of the entire battle of 1965 in the Highlands areas had clearly emerged : Hanoi�s army under the command of General Hoang Minh Thao was determined to take control of the Highlands and then poured down the the coastal area, cutting South Vietnam in two along the axe Pleiku-Binh Dinh (The battle in March 1975 was merely a replica with some adjustments of this battle in 1965). Colonel Hieu submitted a great plan to the Joint General Staff: to request the American troops to replace ARVN units as reserved force and to assume the role of territorial security, allowing them to form an assault task force the size of a division in order to deal with the battleground at Duc Co (military textbook dictates that the attacking force cannot be less than 1/3 of the defending force). The plan was approved by General Wetmoreland and he decided to deploy 173rd Airborne Brigade, with General Stanly R. Larsen as US I Field Force in Pleiku, to replace ARVN units with the task of support and territorial security. This relief allowed II Corps General Staff to establish a Task Force comprising 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment (M41 tanks, M8; Armored Personnel Carriers M113); a Rangers Battalion; Marine Corps Task Force with artillery and territorial artillery support. The rescue column force was put under the command of Brigadier General Cao Hao Hon, 24th Special Zone Commander (north Kontum).

On August 8, the task force entered the area; the forward unit encountered immediate enemy resistance, and one tank was knocked down by a recoilless gun upon veering from Route 14 into Route 19. The enemy adopted close contact tactics clinging close to the relief column to avoid artillery firepower and attacked at its center to cut the task force into isolated pieces. That night, the two rescue column sections regrouped and redistributed troop positions despite the fact the enemy launched a series of attacks and artillery poundings aiming at breaking the rescue plan. At dawn August 9, 1st Airborne Task Force poured out from Duc Co airstrip and attacked down Route 19 toward the east to link with the relief column force in an anvil-hammer tactics. To avoid entrapment between these two attacking forces, the enemy retreated, leaving behind small delaying forces, snipers and mines along their paths. Duc Co battle ended with a heavy loss on the Viet Cong side. The governmental troops took control of the battlefield and the victory boosted the morale of the ARVN troops. They had sustained the worst the enemy could have imposed on them; not only were they able to stand fast, they succeeded also in forcing the enemy to break contact and flee, leaving numerous weapons, dead on the battleground. (Colonel Theodore Mataxis � VC Summer Monsoon Offensive 5/1966). General Westmoreland and the Head of State, Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu came to Duc Co to emphasize the importance of the victory. But Colonel Chief of Staff Nguyen Van Hieu did not get the time to catch his breath; he used the newly liberated camp as the command post to deploy troops in conquering the second objective: Special Force Pleime Camp. He stayed all nights during the rescue mission of Pleime.

Before 10/1965, few people had heard of the name Pleime, a Special Force Camp located west of National Route 14, at a distance of 40 kilometers southwest. But suddenly, Pleime became notorious in the South Vietnam military history because after the defeat in the attack of Duc Co, the enemy had �manipulated the reality � a necessary process after performing a tactical attempt, a political endeavor without consideration of the outcome, defeat or victory�. And with the lesson newly learned from Duc Co, they came up with the following plan: 1/ to encircle Pleime; 2/ to destroy the rescue column; after concentrating troops at Pleime in order to transform it into tactical point that weakened II Corps defense force in Pleiku, and finally 3/ to utilize the remaining regiment still intact to attack Pleiku with a three-prong directions (from north, along Route 14; from east along Route 19, and from southwest, the gate of Duc Co, Pleime). All these tactical moves were entrusted to General Chu Huy Man with 320th Division (Dien Bien Phu Division) comprising three Regiments, the 32nd, the 33rd, and the 66th, ever since the main forces in the Highlands region. In order to defeat the enemy plan, II Corps General Staff designed a counter-attack based on the following premises: 1/If Pleime were to be rescued, the rescue column would unavoidably fall into the ambush on its way to the camp (similar to what had happened when rescueing Phu Tuc, Thuan Man, and recently Duc Co, etc.); the defense of Pleiku would weakened; 2/If Pleime were left alone to its fate, then it would be a damaging blow to the moral of the entire Military Region II. Once more, General Westmoreland took a wise and efficient decision, which was to bring in an Air Cavalry Brigade from An Khe to Pleiku, under the command of General Stanly R. Larsen, to be the defense force of Pleiku, and reserved force of the operation. This brigade also deployed 155 mm and 105 mm artillery batteries to directly support the rescue column task force. This task force comprised 1200 troops placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat, armor, comprising 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Battalion/42nd Regiment; two Rangers Battalions, the 21st and 22nd. The task force was supported by combat engineer and artillery units. Furthermore, there were two Special Force companies belonging 91st Airborne Rangers Battalion (the predecessor of 81st Airborne Rangers) in coordination with Delta Project Tean of Major Charlie A. Beckwith (US Special Force); on 10/20, they jumped in the area close to Camp Pleime, to become the assault force coming out the camp to link with the rescue column units of Lieutenant Colonel Luat as planned from Route 14 which advanced to the camp from the junction of Provincial 6C.

However the rescue plan was not that simple. II Corps General Staff had drawn lessons learned from Duc Co battle in August 8. On 10/23, 22nd Rangers Battalion, instead of being used as element accompanying armored vehicle units of LTC Luat, was dropped by helicopters at a spot south of the ambush location set up by 32nd Regiment/230 Division NVA in an anvil-hammer tactic. Although the battle on the 23rd and 24th had been prepared meticulously (by both sides), the military situation still changed at the most unexpected moment. 635th and 344th Battalions NVA belonging to 32nd Regiment NVA under the command of LTC Nguyen Huu An, from well prepared and camouflaged positions, moved in to attack the rear section of LTC Luat�s rescue column, causing heavy damages and succeeded in pinning down the forward units at 5 kilometers of Camp Pleime. II Corps dispatched artillery forward observers of the US Air Cavalry brigade to assist the relief task force. These forward observers coordinated precise close artillery poundings (from batteries of the US Air Cavalry), creating a carpet unfolding a step ahead of the slow advancing armored vehicles. Furthermore, US F-100, helicopter gunships and AFVN AD1 using precise firing techniques set up a firepower fence protecting the flanks of the relief column. The excellent coordination between counter-ambush tactics, combat skills of soldiers on the battleground, such as the courageous action of the US and ARVN combatants, surging out of the camp, to assault the enemy with flamethrowers resulted in a heroic victory: in the evening of 10/25/1965 the relief task force linked with the camp defenders, ending the siege of Pleiku that the command of B3 Battle Front had planned since Spring 1965. ��The field commander can go to sleep to wait for the news of victory when the campaign starts!!� Marshall Montgomery of the British Royal Armored has so dictated to emphasize the determinant role of organization, general staff planning in big campaign. Duc Co and Pleime had confirmed this determinant role of the preparation in planning, execution, organization, general staff (it is without saying, the realities of the battlefield and the combat skills of the soldiers on the battleground constitute the other important factors). The victory of Pleime had been glorified by General Vinh Loc who made it into the combat and victory symbol of II Corps. II Corps HQ was named Pleime City. But it seemed that not many people (in and outside the army) knew that Colonel Chief of Staff Nguyen Van Hieu practically stayed up all nights and days during the 20th, �the 25th in the command post bunker of Camp Duc Co, to make use of the stronger radio signal network of US Special Force units which allowed easy communication and coordination with American commanders of various branches and units, Air Force, Special Force, Infantry, Air Cavalry during the entire operation.

Applying the principles from military textbooks, II Corps General Staff collaborated closely with US 1st Air Cavalry. Furthermore, an excellent friendship blossomed between two individuals, Colonel Nguyen Van Hieu and Commander Kinnard of US 1st Air Cavalry through the two victories of Duc Co and Pleime. The two sides planned together a pursuit operation going after the fleeing units of 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments NVA to prevent them the chance to catch their breath, as they had always enjoyed in the past since they always held the upper hand on the battlefield. With the quasi unlimited capabilities of helicopters (US 1st Air Cavalry with more 600 helicopters was the first and unique unit that had the biggest tactical mobil capability as compared to all units operating in the entire world), US 1st Air Cavalry dispatched 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion of 7th Regiment/1st Air Cavalry Division in coordination with four ARVN Airborne Battalions into the battleground at Ia Drang Valley, close to the Kampuchean border, the stronghold of Battle Front B3. The ARVN Airborne Battalions were commanded by Airborne Chief of Staff , LTC Ngo Quang Truong with the assistance of a US advisor going by the name of Major Norman Schwarzkopf. With a operational plan well designed, cautious, anticipating all eventualities, and with seasoned paratroopers under the command of competent officers, combined with air cavalry mobility, modern technology, awesome firepowere and full support from US1st Cavalry Division helicopters, the enemy pursuit operation at the tip of Ia Drang River, close to the Kampuchean border in 11/1965, was one of rarest successful joint operations of ARVN and US Army in the entire war since 1960.

1966. Binh Dinh; 1970. Snoul

But General Nguyen Van Hieu was not only competent in strategy; he was also a resourceful commander on the battlefield. The following battles will atteste to his competency.

Binh Dinh was one of the largest provinces in the Center, as well in the entire South Vietnam, with twenty-two districts, and the highest density in term of population (almost one million), but it was also the province which counted the largest communist sympathizers and collaborators. During the 1945-1954 war, it was the capital of Region 5 VC. The French Expeditionary Army was not able to set foot in this region. It only fell into the governmental control after 7/20/1965. In this area, the Communists had the NVA 3 Yellow Stars Division, a Governor and Command Post composed of numerous local battalions, and innumerable guerillas. This network, strengthened through a decade of war in the 50s, had been set in place before the Communists left in 1954. Based on the �search and destroy� adopted by General Westmoreland and the ARVN Joint of General Staff, the province was divided into three regions: the southern region (next to Tuy Hoa/Phu Yen border) comprising the outskirt of Qui Nhon City, Phu Phong, Tuy Phuoc and Van Canh Districts was put under the control of Korean Tiger Division; the mountaineous western region (next to Pleiku/Kontum border) comprising An Khe, Vinh Thanh, An Lao and Hoai An Districts was put under the control of US 1st Cavalry Division, with An Lao sanctuary (stretching along An Lao river, the northern branch of Lai Giang River which poured into the sea at Bong Son/Hoai Nhon, the richest delta area of the Center), and constituted an important rear base of the entire Region 5 NVA; the northern and eastern region (stretching along the coastal area, next to Quang Ngai border), the most populous area comprising Hoai An (Bong Son), Tam Quan, Phu My, Phu Cat Districts was put under the control of ARVN 22nd Infantry Division, under the command of General Nguyen Van Hieu. He was outstanding as a commander in this Region II; and yet he was only a colonel although he was the person who had designed all those victories in 1965 above-mentioned. He held the rank of colonel since 11/1963.

General Hieu took over the command of 22nd Infantry Division in June 1966, and by the end of the year (November), the newly appointed Commander scored a battle victory at Phu Cu Pass (Phu My District). At that time, we, the attached unit (3rd Airborne Task Force-Pnn) established a blockage position on the mountain side, and witnessed our friendly unit (42nd Regiment/22nd Division) joining force with the armored squadron of M113s in sweeping the enemy from National Route 1 into the mountains. The battle unfolded just like a military WWII documentary film. Infantrymen in front line formation followed M113 armored vehicles launched fierce assaults, after a salvo of artillery firing, just like Middle Age�s knights charging in combat. Airborne Task Force Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Khoa Nam observed the battle from the mountain side with binocular. Although he was a man parsimonious in words, he had to utter his admiration: �Colonel Hieu conducts his troops like a seasoned �armor officer�, and combatants of 22nd Division fought as elegantly as our paratroopers.� Those were sincere words from a combatant complimenting another combatant on the battlefield. Not allowing the enemy to recuperate (after the victories of Pleime and Duc Co), now with full authority of a division commander, Colonel Hieu gave order to pursue the enemy to destroy units of 3rd Yellow Star Division NVA, to prove who was the master on this battlefield in Region 5 VC, named �Nam Eo�, a code name the enemy uttered with pride, an impenetrable area that the government of the 1st Republic of Vietnam of President Ngo Dinh Diem had to spend two years (1955-1957) to pacify.

The American-Vietnamese-Korean joint operation started on D-Day with US1st Cavalry Division entering the areas of Hoai An and Vinh Thanh Districts. US Airborne troops discovered numerous treasures, military equipments hidden in secure secret areas (rear bases of Region 5/3rd Division NVA). However, the enemy regular units avoided all contacts, because they realized the overwhelming firepower of the US Air Cavalry. Therefore, at 11:00 pm on D+3 , US 1st Cavalry Division Commanding General came to see General Hieu (promoted to Brigadier General in 11/1966) at 22nd Infantry Division headquarters with a request that 22nd Infantry Division abandoned the plan to attack west of Phu My as previously set, in order to join with 1st Air Cavalry to invade An Lao where he believed 3rd Division NVA was concentrating. Commanding General Kinnard rationalized: �Today, I had a company of Rangers heli-lifted into that area to search and destroy the enemy, but no contact was made. I knew I did wrong in so doing because I stepped in the operational area of the 22nd Division, but due to my eagerness to destroy the enemy, I was forced to do so�. General Hieu had Major Trinh Tieu, his G2 intelligence officer defend his position: �Major General, the Communists were extremely careful in avoiding making contact with the American units because they were afraid of your firepower. I am convinced the 22nd Division will make contact with the 3 Yellow Stars Division at this target.� He added: �I had encountered a Viet Cong guerilla who resided in the mountainous areas west of Phu My district. I had spent a lot of money to feed this guerilla's family. A few days ago, he informed me that numerous units of the 3 Yellow Stars Division rallied at the boundary areas between Phu My and Hoai An districts.� And so General Hieu concluded to General Kinnard: "According to the plan discussed by the three Vietnamese, American, Korean Divisions, our Division will go into our operational area tomorrow, we should not hasten to change our plan too early."

Based on intelligence information provided by G2, General Hieu ordered Lieutenant Colonel Bui Trach Dzan, Commander of 41st Regiment to only use 2 infantry Battalions and the Regiment Command Post unit to enter the operational area early in the morning and when the units reached the designated area around 3:00 p.m., have the units settled down, have the soldiers take their supper and dig extremely solid defensive fox holes. This area was infested with Viet Cong informants. Knowing perfectly that these informants would signal to the Communists to attack our units when they knew the number of our committed units in the operational area, General Hieu made a plan to counter attack them with the force of armored cavalry. General Hieu hid one Infantry Battalion and one Armored Cavalry Squadron at a distance of 10 km away from the operational area, out of enemy sight. At 2:00 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel Bui Trach Dzan radioed back to the headquarters that the enemy began attacking his units. General Hieu gave the order to the Armored Cavalry Squadron and the reserved Battalion to speed into the targeted area and to go behind the enemy line, to encircle the enemy, preventing the enemy from withdrawing and to destroy the enemy. The American 1st Cavalry, finding out that we came into contact with the enemy, sent up helicopters to provide lightning support. Artillery of both Vietnamese and American Divisions fired continuously in support. Luminous rockets launched by the American 1st Cavalry were so bright that night became as clear as day. The Communists' night attack planning was sapped. Thirty minutes later, the Armored Cavalry Squadron and the reserved Battalion arrived at the scene on time, encircled the enemy and killed a lot of them. At 5:00 a.m. the Communists had to leak their wounds, dispersed and withdrew into the jungle, leaving behind 300 KIA lying all over the place, numerous weapons and ammunition scattered all over the operational area. Military experts estimate that for one dead left on the battlefield, the unit should have suffered three times more in human loss. Operation Eagle Claw 800 and other operations at battalion level of this division since General Nguyen Van Hieu held its command (6/1966) had in six months transformed 22nd Division from an average unit to become:

1/The 22d Division spent more time on combat operations than any other division in the country during the period (1966-1967).
2/Time spent supporting pacification amounted to only about 10 percent of the total available battalion days.
3/The 22d Division spent the least time on security.
4/The highest number of contacts per battalion in the Corps were made in this division.

This evaluation pointed out other merits. We conclude with the following thought: If all ARVN Infantry Divisions had as commanders like Generals: Nguyen Viet Thanh, Truong Quang An, Ngo Quang Truong, Nguyen Khoa Nam, Tran Van Hai, Nguyen Van Hieu, a decade sooner; and heroes like Nguyen Viet Can, Le Nguyen Vy, Le Van Hung, Ho Ngoc Can, Nguyen Huu Thong, Dang Phuong Thanh, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, LTC Nguyen Van Long of the Police Force� were promoted sooner to the rank of general and given the task of defending the country, then perhaps the dark day of April 30, 1975 would not have happened. Indeed, this suffering was not the lot of just one individual alone.

General Nguyen Van Hieu�s military leadership skills did not stop at division level with infantry units, but it reached up to corps level with coordination of different army branches. Operation Toan Thang 46 attacked R Central Committee located in the Fish Hook area, northwest Loc Ninh, on the other side of Vietnam-Campuchea. Fish Hook area was the headquarters of 5th Division VC. This unit allegedly belonged to the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Force, but the majority of its cadres were Northerner with its Political Commissiary a pure native of Hanoi, from the lowest level. This structure was implemented entirely since Ba Cap (name unknown, who replaced Chin Chien, a Southerner) received the order from Le Duan to directly run the People Democratic Alliance For Peace since the beginning of 1970 (Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a Vietcong, Johanathan Cape, London, England 1986, p197) in which The South Vietnam Liberation Front and its armed forces were subordinate elements. This area was also the rear base of 70th and 80th Groups which not only supported 5th Division NVA, but also the entire Fish Hook area, comprising Binh Long battleground inside Vietnam.

The operation involved 9th Regiment/5th Infantry Division, comprising 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, and 5th Recon Company. The Regiment was enforced by US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The operation unfolded in five phases: phase 1, attack; phase 2, 3 and 4, search and destroy the enemy; phase 5, withdrawal back to Vietnam. This operation lasted only from May to July, 1970 and its purpose was to test the enemy, to improve and coordinate the general staff network in preparation for more important subsequent operations, also inside Kampuchea aiming at 86th Rear Base, around Snoul city area. On October 14, 1970, III Corps Command gave order to 5th Division to launch operation Toan Thang 8/B/5 with the following forces: 1/ 1st Task Force, comprising 1st Armored Cavalry Squadron as main force; 2/ 9th Task Force, comprising 9th Regiment/5th Division, as secondary force; 3/ 333rd Task Force, comprising 18th Armored Cavalry Squadron and four Rangers battalions. The 5th Division Forward Command Post, established at Loc Ninh, conducted directly the operation and only reverted back to Lai Khe when all involved combat units withdrew out of Kampuchea and returned safely to their base camps on November 1, 1970. Through these two (short-term and recon in force) operations, III Corps and 5th Division Commands were able to established two fundamental facts: 1/ In the phases when ARVN forces advanced, the enemy retreated deep into Kampuchean territories; 2/ When ARVN troops withdrew was when the battlefield became risky because the enemy then set up ambushes to harass the withdrawing troops. Consequently, despite the fact numerous treasures, equipments, weapons and ammunition, foods were destroyed by the above-mentioned two operations, ARVN forces were still unable to dismantle the two main enemy forces, namely 174th and 275th Regiments NVA, and the 5th Division NVA central command and its subsidiary units in the region. Once more, Colonle Hieu proposed to General Tri to change operational concept: instead of search and destroy, we have to lure the enemy into a trap, then zero in to destroy them. Actually, in the operational area of 5th Division, there was the 5th Division NVA with its two Regiments, the 174th and 275th. We use one regiment to lure the enemy; if the enemy attacks with a regiment, we will concentrate one division to counter-attack; if the enemy attacks with its entire division, we will thrown in our three divisions (18th, 25th and 5th) to counter-attack. General Tri approved this bold luring plan �Trick the Tiger down the Mountain� and he started the meticulous preparation plan through the remainder months of 1970. He had 11 position of sensor devices set up around Snoul, and signal monitoring center established in Loc Ninh manned by personnel of G2 Intelligence Bureau round the clock.
On January 4, 1971, the luring plan commenced with 9th Task Force comprising 9th Regiment/5th Division, 74th Ranger Battalion, 1st Armored Cavalry Squadron and 5th Engineer Company, entering the operational area. But remaining clever as always, the enemy avoided all contacts; only two months later did the enemy show signs he is heading toward the trap. But an unexpected event occurred: on February 26, the helicopter carrying General Tri exploded. The Field Commander died at a critical phase of the campaign. On March 8, 1971, the enemy started shelling 9th Task Force positions, one kilometer south west Snoul. At the same period, the Battle of Low Laos, Lam Son 719, was getting bog down. General Nguyen Van Minh replaced General Tri as Corps Commander and approved the continuation of General Hieu�s luring plan, but not wholeheartly, partly because it was not his own, partly because he was not capable of pursuing a plan that would eventually branch out to more complex and unanticipated avenues (It would require the use of the two divisions 18th and 25th in case the enemy concentrate a force the size of a division). All through the three months, both sides were monitoring the battlefield in preparation for a decisive attack. General Hieu ordered 8th Regiment/5ht Division to replace 9th Regiment, a force taking up the name of 8th Task Force, comprising attached units to Rangers and Armored units remaining unchanged. With 5,000 troops, supported by US Air Force, General Hieu spanned out the operational area with the intention of pushing the enemy into the trap. On May 26, 1971, the enemy attacked Snoul, but was rebuffed by the defender troops. On May 27, the enemy switched the attack direction to the west; and on May 29 gave assault at the command center of 8th Task Force with a force the size of a regiment and destroyed a communication network and the control station. General Hieu asked General Minh to send in III Corps reserved force to use superior number in order to squash the enemy as planned. The American Advisors advised General Minh not to act on General Hieu�s request, but rather �to wait until the enemy concentrates much more and then to use B52 to annhilitate them.� General Nguyen Van Hieu refused to accept this tactics, because B52 would kill indiscrimantely both foes and friends. He only asked B52 to bomb along the withdrawal route (Nationale Route 13 from Snoul to Loc Ninh); and the initial plan (use rescue force to counter-attack) that an order should be issued to 8th Task Force to retreat from Snoul. On May 30, 1971, as soon as General Minh washed his hands with an irresponsible statement: �Do as you wish!�, General Hieu boarded his helicopter to fly straight to Snoul where 8th Task Force CP was under direct enemy fire, to give in person the order of withdrawal to all leaders of units involved, after knowing that his request for B52 to support the withdrawal had been rejected by III Corps Command and by the American Adivisors.
Nevertheless, the retreat from Snoul was a success (although 1/3rd of troops lost, and the 8th Regiment Deputy Commander was KIA), because units maintained their formation while withdrawing, and maintained their combat resolve after heavy lost, because commanders and troops were aware that their Division Commander remained close to them during the most dangereous time. The withdrawal also succeeded because it was supported by III Corps Assault Task Force of Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi which attacked from Loc Ninh along National Route 13 toward Snoul. Finally, General Nguyen Van Hieu, after the event was dragged to justify himself for the loss in the battle of Snoul by appearing in front of the Congress.
Withdrawal operation is the most difficult military exercise, because it bears the defeat seed in itself. Military history, western and eastern, ancient and modern, has confirmed this fact through defeats of famous generals and invincible armies. Napoleon withdrew from Russia (1812); Mongolian armies withdrew from Dai Viet (13th Century). And not far off, on the Indochinese battle scene with the dismantling of Charton-Le Page army on Route 4 (1953); 100th Mobile Group (GM 100) on National Route 19 (1954). And recently, in the Battle of Low Laos, Lam Son 719 (February 1971): one Armored Cavalry Squadron, one Ranger Group, one of the best Infantry Divisions in the Army, two general reserved forces (1st Infantry Division, Airborne Division, Marine Corps Division) were used as guinea pigs by �third and fourth classes strategists�, those incompetent and worthless general officers. It goes without saying one should mention those so called �National Ruling Committee Chairman, Military Committee Chairman, National Executive Committee Chairman, National Security Committee Chairman, Defense Minister, Chief of Joint General Staff.� They built their �glory� on our Soldier�s blood and bones, on many Soldiers�.
South Vietnam had really begun to be lost since the so called �tactical retreat� that started on Mars 15, in the Highlands.

III. A Murky Affair
What was the Military Pension Funds? How was it operated?
On July 4, 1972 in the uplifting atmosphere of the entire South Vietnam Military-Civilians defending the country on the battleground, the National Television Station in Saigon fired an augural explosion of a battlefront devoided of bullets but no less fierce: Major General Nguyen Van Hieu, Special Assistant to the Vice President in Charge of Anti-corruption, Special Investigation Committee Secretary General of the Military Pension Funds (MPF) delivered his report after three months of work. The entire South Vietnamese people were filled with hope: both outside and inside enemies were attacked simultaneously. The nation�s fate was passing from a phase of tribulations and sufferings to the phase of glory and easiness. Major General Nguyen Van Hieu was indeed lighting up a candle of Hope to the entire South Vietnam. But unfortunately, only two years later, the Person who put up the light and the country were both terminated. Let us look back at this Pain that has not subsided even with the past thirty years.
Starting January 1968, each rank and file from ARVN regular and regional forces had 100 dong deducted from his monthly paycheck. With about 1 million troops, that amount bulged up in no time to an immense sum that no commercial or industrial entities could emulate. And if this money is only put in savings accounts, with the interests generated given to each soldier when discharged from the army, its initial concept was a plan to be lauded. In such case, there would be no possibility of corruption, and dishonesty in the management of such account. Or if more clever, wiser had been taken, this huge capital had been invested in enterprises, commercial tradings with honesty and good intention, to earn benefit for the investors, the entire troops who were contributing with their sweat and blood in the defense of South Vietnam; then this concept would constitute a hallmark, a source of strong economy, of wealth, of talents which would contributed in strengthening the Soldier and the Republic regime. Unfortunately, things did not occur according to everybody�s wish. Let us go back to General Nguyen Van Hieu�s accusatory report, a task he had to deal all alone in the long and unfortunate night of the country.
1.- Legal Shortcomings:
The Decree Law #10 issued on August 6, 1950 (Under the Royal Regime of Emperor Bao Dai), Article 1- this ordinance explicitly forbids associations to have activities the purpose of which is to "divide up income." And yet the Board of Managers of the Military Pension Funds had used the capital of the Funds to purchase shares of two governmental companies: COGIVINA and SICOVINA; to establish the Industry and Commerce Bank, and to found four new companies: VICCO, VINAVATCO, ICICO and FOPROCO wih a capital of 1, 232, 753, 000. 00 VN dong (nearly 1,3 billion). Because they were not allowed to become members of the Fund in order to sign official certificated registered in the Saigon Notary Public Office, Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Vy (Defense Minister) and others registered in their private capacities. Then, knowing they were acting illegally in the establishment of certificates pertaining to the organization, the parties concerned signed �Transfer Shares Certificates� to the Association with the pledge: �These are Private Certificates� while the original certificates maintained in the Saigon Notary Public Office were still under the names of private individuals. The two legal shortcomings pertaining to the founding and organization of the association above-mentioned were caught by the Prime Minister�s Office which issued Memorandum # 2960 on August 27, 1970 requesting the Defense Ministry to rectifying the organization according to current laws. However, Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy and the Fund Board of Managers continued to operate the Fund based on its unlawful policy, in purchasing additional shares in the Vietnam Textile Company and in founding new companies: VN Industrial Construction Company (VICCO), VN Transportation Company (VINAVATCO), Industrial and Commercial Insurance Company (ICICO), Food Processing Company (FOPROCO).
In wrapping up this presentation regarding the organization and management of the Association, two facts needed to be mentioned: 1/ Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy graduated from Hanoi Law School and French St. Cyr Mililatry Academy; 2/ Soldiers started to contribute 100 dong/month in the Fund since January 1968, but not until May 9, 1969, did the Defense Ministry issued instructions and regulations determining the collection and managing of the money contributed by the entire Army. Due to dishonesty in organization and management as above-mentioned, the Fund obviously exhibits the following flaws: there are huge discrepancies between receipts and expenditures, which cannot be explained. This flaw is stemmed from the different accounting methods adopted in each unit. There are more than 400 units in the entire country (including the central accounting unit) which are not maintaining a transparent bookkeeping (no dates, no signatures of the chief accountant, any pagination etc.)
From these obstacles, the Investigation Committee could only work based on two concrete numbers: the amounts collected from 1968 to 1981; the amount the Fund actually disbursed to members who had been discharged, or to next of kins (of soldiers who had been killed in action, or missing in action).
From a simple and sincere request, the Investigation Committee obtained two total amounts (up to December 31, 1971), but without a plausible explanation even with an open mind and generous understanding.
The actual total amount of receipts from 1968 to 1981: 3, 267, 631, 585. dong
The actual total amount of expenditures:

a/ From 1968 to 1969:: 14, 487, 642 dong
b/ From 1970 to 1971: 293, 287, 047 dong

In summary: In two years (1970-1971) the Fund paid to discharged soldiers, and next of kin of deceased soldiers an mount twenty times the amount of the past two years (1968-1969)!!
2/ Abuses, violations:

However, these legal violations could well be corrected and justified if those who managed the Fund would heed to the voice of conscience. This monitary contribution made by soldiers to the Fund is indeed the price of their blood and their families�. But is has been used in enterprises that benefit individual (and a group of individuals), in the following manner: The building located at 8 Nguyen Hue Street was constructed to be the Industrial Commercial Bank headquarters and offices of four newly found companies as above-mentioned. The decision to construct such building did not come from the Board of Managers of the Fund but from Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy. He is only the Honorary Chairman who does not have the authority over the Board of Managers. This violation was not an unintentional management act and has led to serious consequences.

The Defense Ministry employed army personnel and resources (Engineer Corps/Defense Ministry) to construct a building for an Association (private). It was only one year later that the Investigation Committee approved and validated the decision of the Defense Minister. The Defense Minister signed Decision No. 1815-QP/TCTT/QD (on August 8, 1969), governing formation of three committees named respectively the Works Committee, the Procurement Committee, and the Control Committee. These three committees granted full authority to the Defense Minister in person in the management, decision in all matters: procurement of all the material needed for construction and installation, examination and approval of costs of procurement and installation services, approval of reports of receipt of the material and construction work, examination of records of payment, signing and issuing checks for payment to contractors, etc. Because the power limitation had been determined by these three committees, the defense minister (no matter how consciencious and honest he might be) had violated managerial and financial principles that the Board of Managers had clearly defined: the checks must have the signature of the Cashier, the Secretary General, and the Chairman of the Board of Managers, the former Minister of Defense not being one of them. This violation in the managerial and financial principles translated into the following transaction.

A businesswoman won the bit for the purchase of four (4) elevators to equip the building with a total amount of 79,000,000 dong (56 millions for equipment; 23 millions for installation). She got the intervention from the Defense Ministry (Who was the Defense Minister?) allowing her to import Hitachi elevators at the parallel exchange rate of 275 piasters for one dollar, while the Economy Ministry advised to import preferably Otis elevators (USA) at 118 dong/one dollar. Without spending a penny, without laying out one dollar capital, just acting as an intermediary (between the owner of the building and the importer of the elevators), she gobled the entire profit of 17 millions dong (without taking into account the commission paid to the importer). Then the transaction of thirteen air-conditionners (to equip the building) with a businesswoman (another one) squandered about 19 millions dong to a woman who knew how to talk her way in and out!!

But it was not only the case pertaining to the building of the Industrial Commercial Bank on Nguyen Hue Street. The Board of Managers of the Fund and even its Honorary Chairman, Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy, continuously violated legal points in other cases:

Purchase of a merchandise (2,069 aluminum doors) without proper certificate from Trinh Phuong Binh (through the transaction of VICCO) with the price of 17 millions dong, plus middleman's commission of two soldiers which amounted to 8 million 250 thousands; Binh received 2 millions 290 thousands commission. The end result was that these aluminum doors were discarded in a waste pile because they were not usable. All these had a cause: Binh is the husband of Nguyen Thi Chieu, the Defense Minister�s sister.

VICCO Company of General Le Van Kim (a close friend of the Defense Minister) purchased 650 tons of steel from Hung Nam Company with the price of 9 millions dong, then left them unused; instead of purchasing the steel directly from Lucia Company to avoid paying 3 millions in commission to Hung Nam, because the Director of Hung Nam is Le Thi Thuong, General Kim�s sister.

We might forego these rather insignificant matters (although the loss amounted to tens and hundreds millions) in considering these as only regular bidding transactions (althought with the intention of favoring relatives of the Board of Mangement personnel), but we cannot let go violations against management principle that members of the Board of Managers have raised the degree of abuse to become a policy, a way of action as following:

Special detachment of personnel: a total number of soldiers (350 individuals) have been specially assigned to work at the Industrial Commercial Bank and six other companies managed by the army (as above-mentioned). This action could be tolerated if it did not violate the following points: a/ the Military Code never allows soldiers to be attachedto a private position (even a soldier belonging to Regional Force); b/ a number of attached soldiers received paychecks from the private companies but never reported to the place of work; c/ the attached soldiers still received paychecks from the Defense Ministry�s budget. In summary, the Industrial Commercial Bank and the six companies are the place for draft dodgers being paid with the highest salaries.

But the greatest violation and abuse lies in the management of the fund. Just in the year of 1971, the Industrial Commercial Bank had the following expenditures: a/ personnel�s salaries: 38 millions 119 thousands dong; b/ exterior transaction expenses: 19 millions 431 thousands dong; c/ general purchasing expenses: 25 millions 744 thousands dong. Total: 83, 285,000 dong. Besides this total, there was the sum paid to the Board of Managers: 16, 149, 398.00 dong. Not finish yet, just with Ma Hi, Director of Commission Division, who had the authority as guarantor of the loaner, and for this service he received a commission of 15% if the loan amount (without collateral). Just in one year, Director Ma Hi received from 15 to 30 millions dong official commission (not counting his salary and other benefits). Meanwhile the Military Pension Fund put in the savings account 249,300.000 dong at the Industrial Commercial Bank, which is 99.72% of the capital, for which the Fund only received a very small amount of interest. In summary, one million soldiers contribute their blood money to benefit a small group of individuals comprising the Board of Managers and the personnel system it has established.

Corruption was really a plague. On July 19, 1972, the American Embassy in Saigon sent a report to the State Department in Washington, D.C. with the following content: Vice President Tran Van Huong, during a visit by Ambassador Whitehouse stated: �Corruption is a plague in South Vietnam. He attributed the reason China fell into the hands of Communists the rampant corruption of Tsang Kai Sheik regime. He is convinced that if strong and urgent measures are not taken in South Vietnam, South Vietnam will suffer the same fate.� That was the words of the Chairman of the Anti-corruption Committee to the American Ambassador � A government that controlled the fate of Vietnam � And the corruption in Vietnam was an issue in the coming presidential election in the United States. But when we touch upon the task of General Hieu, we also also touch upon a task which was controlled by a man named President Nguyen Van Thieu. In such case, even with a strong personality as Tran Van Huong, in more than one case, he faced with dilemma; General Hieu remarked: �Vice President Huong did not have a firm attitude. He was wary when it came to go head on against President Thieu and General Quang (Dang Van Quang, political advisor to President Thieu). One day, General Hieu submitted a report about a house representative who had clearly been involved in corruption activities, Huong noted that the legislator was a member of the pro-administration bloc and the day before had had dinner with the President. He advised General Hieu not to pursue this matter!� In another example, General Hieu reported about Colonel Pham Kim Quy, chief of the judicial bloc, national police. According to Hieu, gross corruption in the National Police Immigration Service, a branch of the judicial bloc, has been traced directly to Col Quy, who is known to be close to Presidential Assistant Dang Van Quang. Vice President Huong is also reluctant to pursue this case.�

Corruption did not occur only at the high echelon level, but spread all over, from an officier at a medium level in a combat unit, to an officer with a administrative leadership position. General Hieu commented to an official of the American Embassy: �Colonel Truong was appointed by General Minh, III Corps Commander, as province chief partly in order to ensure his hold over the lucrative lumber trade in Long Khanh.�

Corruption reached down to remote hamlets and villages among the officials in charge of the Phenix Program. The situation was so bad that �General Hieu said he is going down to Rach Gia and Can Tho on September 19 and 20, 1972 to investigate alleged extortions, imprisonments of VC suspects, and then demands of pay-offs in return of the release of the suspects.�

Finally, corruption attacked equally the highest unit: the Agency that performs the Truht of Justice. On September 1, 1972, the National Group of House Representatives issued an accusation: �Huynh Khac Dung, Public Prosecutor General at Saigon Court House was accused of numerous acts of corruption, abuse of power, authoritarism, poor conduct, like acquitting guilty persons and imprisonment of innocents, with intention of earning money dishonestly. Deputy Prosecutor Ly Luu Van Ngo, once jailed for bribery, colluded with Dung in releasing Tran Van Ken, principal in the gasoline thef at Nha Be. It was for sure that Ken did not steal some hundreds or some thousands liters of gasoline to sell it in retail on the market; here is what General Hieu had to say about this matter: �There are indications that the gasoline stolen at Nha Be was transported to Kampuchea and sold it to the NVA!� Without this huge quantity of gasoline stolen from Nha Be storage, enemy tanks originated from the North would be reduced to a pile of useless steel.

General Nguyen Van Hieu felt helpless with a frustration that increased by the day and had to utter: �If we do not correct our mistakes ourselves, the Communists would to it for us.�

At this point, we surely understand why Ngu Tu�s hair turned white after a night worrying about the fate of the country. The Hero has always been the first victim falling into the most desperate and critical situation.

IV. The Death of a Soldier:

1973, General Nguyen Van Hieu returned to the Army, a request submitted by General Pham Quoc Thuan to President Thieu: III Corps needed an outstanding general in order to deal with the military situation which was worsening by the day. General Nguyen Van Hieu was assigned to the position of III Corps Deputy Commander, under General Thuan. The combat capacity of the South Vietnamese Army was entirely hampered by the Paris Agreement signed on January 27, 1973, through a reduction in financial aid imposed by the American Congress, added to the War Powers Act � ratified by the American Congress (1974) cutting all capacity of any president who had the good will of rescueing Vietnam. In September, 1974 President Nixon resigned taking with him all agreements (considered as genuine) with President Thieu; President non elected General Ford succeeded, bearing the load of Vietnam War which was reaching its end with an abysmal financial reduction, 50% each starting from the Pariss Accord. In 1973, 2,1 billions; 1974, down to 1,4 billion; and in the fiscal year intended for 1975: 700 millions! (Henry Kissinger Ending the Vietnam War Simon and Schuster New York, 2003 p493). Before 1973, in the battlefield, an artillery battery (comprising 6 105 mm tubes) of the Vietnamese Army could fire 10 rounds (of 60 shells) to clear a target in preparation for troop landing; now with a reduction in military and economic aids to an allied country, only just �Four (4) shells for a day of operation for each tube).� And one did not have to read the report Foreign Minister Kissing reported to President Ford about the combat support capacity for South Vietnam: �The Air Force reduced 50% activities of 11 combat squadrons; the Navy reduced from 30 to 82 % operational activities; the Infantry had only in reserve � ammunition minimum�� (Kissinger idid p 496). Hanoi also saw the bleeding of South Vietnam through its statistics: �The Artillery was reduced � of its consumed shells; the Air Force had only 1/5 activities left, the amount of airplanes used declined 70%, of helicopters 80%...� (Tạp Ch� Học Tập, H� Nội, 01/1975)�.

Because both sides (American and Communist) knew clearly (and exactly) each other in this issue, in October 1973, the Hanoi Central Party issued Resolution 21 (becoming Resolution 12 of South Vietnam Central Committee) with the determination to achieve �the takeover South Vietnam with force, gaining victory by steps, until the final victory is obtained.� It was not a mere paper: the battle of Phuoc Long exploded on December 12, 1974. It was the first time after the Paris Agreement, one province of South Vietnam was overrun. The American Defense Department took the following measures: 1/ Increase air intelligence over North Vietnam sky; 2/ Change the activity direction of Enperprise Aircraft Carrier Ship from Indian Ocean to Tonkin Gulf; 3/ Dispatch F4 combat jets to Philippines and Thailand, and B52 from the United States to Guam. Foreign Minister Kissinger expressed the following opinion: �Based on my personal experience, when we are timorous we loose. But when we are agressive we always win.� (Kissinger ibid p.505). But all was mere proposition and opinion, because the American Congress was dominated by McGovern�s group. And this senator was determined to revenge his defeat in the presidential election in 1972; and the Pentagon was wary to face the Congress and the media for its involvement in Vietnam. The Enterprise Aircraft Carrier never returned to the Indochina Sea, in the Tonkin Gulf; therefore, in Hanoi, in its end of 1974 meeting of the Politburo, Pham Van Dong emphazied: �Even given money, the United States would dare not take it in order to come back and intervene (in Vietnam).� (Kissinger ibid p507)

On March 10, the Chief of Joint General Staff of the Army of North Vietnam, General Van Tien Dung launched five regular divisions to attack Ban Me Thuot. On March 13, the high ranking officials of the South, so called �president, prime minister, political advisor to the president, chief of joint general staff, met at Cam Ranh to devise a decision: to withdraw the entire II Corps military force from Pleiku to the coastal region along Provincial Route 7 via Phu Bon (Cheo Reo). That route and the different military locations on it that the army and the population of the Highlands had defended and kept every pieces with the price of their blood ten years ago when General Nguyen Van Hieu was still II Corps Chief of Staff, who championed the defense of this part of the country. Its fall triggered a domino affect: March 24, loss of Hue, March 30 loss of Danang, March 31 loss of Nhatrang. And in III Corps, 5th Ranger Group had to abandoned An Loc to retreat to Chon Thanh, and Chon Thanh, which was only merely 50 kilometers from Saigon, started to be shelled by enemy artillery. The III Corps Deputy Commander, Major General Nguyen Van Hieu inherited the battlefiefl heavy load left by three consecutive commanders: General Pham Quoc Thuan, General Du Quoc Dong and General Nguyen Van Toan. Together with the fate of the country, General Hieu sustained a rapid fire of events: on April 2, 1975, he flew to Phan Thiet, to receive from General Pham Van Phu the remnant troops of II Corps, and I Corps who fled in disorder from the Center� But on April 4, President Nguyen Van Thieu who �dread even his own reflection and shadow� as described by General Vinh Loc, changing bedroom every night (according to Nguyen Cao Ky), after having assigned General Hieu to the position of III Corps Forward Command Post, realizing suddenly a danger (still obsessed by the death of President Diem who was assassinated twelve years ago) in handing troops to a clever and courageous officer, he changed his decision: General Hieu must immediately relinquish his post to General Nguyen Vinh Nghi, the IV Corps Commander who had lost his position for corruption a couple of months before. Furthermore, in the morning of April 6, President Nguyen Van Thieu summoned General Nguyen Van Hieu to the Presidential Palace. In the morning of April 8, pilot Nguyen Thanh Trung flew a F5E combat jet and bombed the palace. President Thieu�s fear materialized. On the same day the 8th, Brigadier General Le Trung Tuong, former 23rd Infantry Division Commander last month in Ban Me Thuot, after a period of convalescence (due to a minor bruise on his leg), and now assigned to the position of III Corps Chief of Staff, lead a contingent of soldiers (coming from II Corps) to replace the Military Police guards at the headquarters. Gun shots were heard coming from the office of General Hieu, two not one, according to an unexpected witness (LTC Vinh Ho coming from II Corps, while waiting to see General Toan in a room next to General Hieu�s office). General Hieu�s family got the news in the evening (7:00 p.m), that he accidently shot himself while cleaning his pistoal (from around 5:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.). This crime was not so mysterious to be difficult to comprehend. Let us relive the minutes and hours of the last moment of our Man who had died along with the Destiny of the Country by reviewing the witnesses and the circumstances at III Corps headquarters, in Bien Hoa, on April 8, 1975.

1. The Core Witnesses (by order in reference to the unfolding of the event):

-General Nguyen Van Toan, III Corps Commander, immediate superior of Major General Nguyen Hieu, Deputy Commander. According to the account of Captain Do Duc, General Toan�s attach�: �There was a 100 percent base camp curfew. All day long, General Toan worked in his office at the 3rd Corps Headquarters. I sat on duty in the adjacent room. My room faced General Hieu's office. I recall that day General Toan did not meet with General Ly Tong Ba, 25th Division Commanding General, because whoever wanted to see General Toan had to go through me. At 5:30 p.m., General Toan had me called up his car to go back to his residence, located next to the Bien Hoa Administration Building, a mere 10-15 minute drive with a siren police military escort.� After dropping off General Toan's briefcase, I went out drinking in the company of Air Force Major Luong, who had recently been transferred to the 3rd Corps from the 2nd Corps at my recommendation, and Air Force Major Cuu (still in Vietnam), who was well known as pilot of several Commanding Generals of the 3rd Corps. After 10 to 15 minutes into partying, we were told that General Toan had hastily returned to the Headquarters with his bodyguard. I dropped everything and speeded back to the Headquarters. When I arrived, the place was already crowded with military policemen working at the scene. General Toan had ordered General Hieu's office cordoned.� Also in relation to General Toan (after 5:30 p.m. on April 8 as narrated above), at the crime scene: �Colonel Khuyen, Colonel Luong and General Toan strolled together into General Hieu's office. M.P.'s were sketching the crime scene. One M.P. climbed up a ladder to look for the bullet who had reached the ceiling; but he did not find it. Suddenly General Toan exclaimed:"Here it is, here it is, I found the bullet!" In his letter dated March 10, 1999 addressed to author Nguyen Van Tin, General Toan wrote: ��But a surprise happened on (which day I don't recall), I was returning from an airborne operation when I got the news of Major General Hieu's death in his office. I immediately flew to Major General Hieu's office and saw he had died from a pistol bullet piercing through his eye and exiting the top of his head, causing him to die right at his desk.�

-Brigadier General Le Trung Tuong, III Corps Chief of Staff recounted: ��I remember the day the unexpected event occurred as you already knew, Hieu upon returning from a mission came into my office to invite me to have dinner together. At that moment I was too busy with paperworks and told him that after I finished reading the officials documents I would go to his office to invite him to go to dinner. He went back to his office, which was located about 30 meters away. After about 15 minutes, a gun shot was heard, Hieu's staff members came over to my office to announce that a gun shot was heard coming out of Hieu's office. I immediately gave order to call the Judicial Military Police to come to open the door to investigate. After a few minutes, the Judicial Military Police arrived; they opened the door and saw Hieu lying nearby his desk with a pistol. The bullet went through his head, the gun shot wound was too serious and caused him to die on the spot.�

Pertaining to this matter, Le Trung Tuong had the following action. On April 8, 1975, a group of soldiers in combat outfit commanded by Brigadier General Le Trung Tuong came to III Corps headquarters, chased away the regular contingent of Military Police. This detail has been revealed by LTC Quyen, III Corps Military Police Chief (to the author) on January 23, 1999.

- Colonel Ta Thanh Long, Head of Vietnamese Delegation, member of the 4-Party and 2-Side Combined Military Committee (in Bien Hoa area; a 3rd Class classmate of Major General Hieu) stated: �That evening, I attended the meeting and General Hieu presided. I was told that General Toan, Commanding General, was busy at the Forward Command Post stationed at Go Dau Ha, Tay Ninh. During the meeting, General Hieu sat in the middle. At his left: General Dao Duy An, chief of Staff and Colonel Phan Huy Luong, Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations. At his right: Mr. Peter, the Consul General of Bien Hoa and I. The back row was occupied by Officers of the General Staff. After the meeting, General Hieu, General An and I walked into the guest room to have tea. General Hieu told me in General An's presence: "My Pistol Collection has reached the number of 37, I just got a P.38, and had the grooves redone by the Equipment Unit, let me go get it and show it to you." At that point, Colonel Luong stepped in to invite General Hieu to go to supper. General An and I stood up and excused ourselves. My car took me to Hotel de la Piscine, Bien Hoa (the office of the International Committee), I visited there for about 20 minutes to brief about Communists' breaches with the Colonel Chairman Member. Afterwards, I went home. Upon reaching my office (still in my car), Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Thang, my deputy reported to me: "Colonel Luong needs to see you immediately, General Hieu just died." I returned to the Corps headquarters and saw Military Police cordoned the headquarters. I asked Colonel Luong: "What happened?" Colonel Luong answered: "After supper, General Hieu went back to his office, a few minutes later a gun shot was heard, guards went in and saw General Hieu covered with blood slumped at his desk, and sounded up the alarm. I invited you to witness so that the proper authority could investigate the cause, because you and General Hieu were classmates and you were the closest to him in this headquarters."

- Colonel Phan Huy Luong, III Corps Assistant to Deputy Commander/Operations (in a phone conversation with Tin Nguyen in July 1999): ��around 5 or 5:30 p.m., General Hieu, Brigadier General Le Trung Tuong (3 Corps Chief Of Staff) and Colonel Luong, as a daily routine, chatted unofficially in the Chief Of Staff's office while awaiting for supper time; Colonel Luong invited General Hieu to go to supper; General Hieu went back to this office to pick up something; a moment later, a gun shot was heard in the Deputy Commander's Office; some Military Police soldiers ran in and came out to announce the news of General Hieu being shot; a moment later General Toan appeared; Colonel Luong said he was too upset by the tragic event to pay attention to what happened afterwards. He stated that he did not make any phone calls to anybody to communicate the news, and only knew that Madam the General came to III Corps headquarters around 9 or 10 p.m�

- Colonel Nguyen Khuyen, Chief of III Corps Military Security Office said: ��The event happened nearly a quarter of a century, but I still remember vividly its development as following: I still recall that morning I had a meeting with General Hieu at 10:00a.m. in his office. The meeting lasted until around 12:00 noon then ended. I went back to my office, which was not too far away from the Command headquarters, about only 10 minutes drive. I was preparing to have lunch with some friends who had come down from Saigon to visit me, when the Security Office called to let me know that General Hieu killed himself with a pistol in his office. I was dazed and surprised because it was just unbelievable. I just departed with him 15 minutes ago, after the meeting. I found him to be jovial as usual, and there was no sign whatsoever of a despondent man. I apologized to my friends from Saigon and hurried to drive back to the Command headquarters. When I arrived the Red-Cross ambulance had taken General Hieu's body to the hospital. I did not know what to do but to go in to see Colonel Phan Huy Luong who was the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Corps. According to Colonel Luong's account, around 12 o'clock noon everybody near General Hieu's office heard the sound of a pistol in his office. Colonel Luong ran in and saw General Hieu lying immobile in his armchair next to the desk. A blood streamed effusively down his face and chest. A bullet had pierced his forehead and went straight up to the brain. The bullet found force to reach up to the ceiling, and perforated it. As it was shown by the fact, the bullet terminated immediately General Hieu's life. In other words, he died immediately, without feeling any pain. He held in his hand a pistol. There was no one present in his office at that time.

The first thing Colonel Luong did was to call in the Doctor of the 3rd Corps to come and try to see if it was still possible to rescue him and then to advise the Military Police unit of the 3rd Corps. Colonel Luong took precaution to have General Hieu's office cordoned, not to admit anybody in before the Military Police could record the crime scene and start the investigation process. When I entered General Hieu's office I saw some M.P.'s sketching the crime scene. One M.P. climbed up a ladder to look for the pistol bullet which had reached up there. Blood and pieces of brain splattered on the wall! There was no sign of struggling.� (Letter of Colonel Nguyen Khuyen sent from San Jose, July 18, 1998 to Tin Nguyen). Colonel Khuyen added: �There was no proof that General Hieu was assassinated or killed himself. Not too long prior to that, somebody gave him as a gift a pistol, of a rare type. He cherished this pistol but what bothered him was that it was trigger happy. He had given it to be repaired by the Supply Command unit 3 times in the past. This information was provided to me by Colonel Khang, Head of the Supply Command unit.�

-LTC Quyen, Head of III Corps Military Police. On January 12, 1999, LTC Quyen stated to me (Tin Nguyen): �General Hieu died sometimes after 6:30 p.m. He recalled that day, the Military Police guards under his command was chased away from the 3 Corps Headquarters by Brigadier General Le Trung Tuong accompanied by a group of soldiers in combat outfit. That evening, after taking a 6:30 p.m. shower, he passed by the Headquarters and saw General Hieu still sitting at his desk in his office. He added that when he had to assume the investigation of the crime, he was afraid for the life of the investigators under his command and had to resort to a scheme to bring in the Police group of Captain Thinh Van Phuc, and the POLWAR group of Colonel Nguyen Hung Khanh, to alleviate the responsibilities of his investigation team and the pressure coming from higher authority.�

- LTC Ly Ngoc Duong, MD, Chief of Cabinet of General Nguyen Van Toan (Phone conversation on August 31, 2004): �I still recall vividly the events happening on the day of General Hieu�s death. It was a hectic day because that morning the Presidential Palace was bombed and I was busy with the drafting of a radio announcement to be delivered by General Toan regarding the bombing to reassure the public. Around 6:30 p.m., General Toan walked into my office to announce he was leaving and going to his residence located in Bien Hoa. I gathered my papers in view to finish the drafting of the said document and joined him in his car to go back to his residence; Captain Do Du, his attach� was riding also in the car. On my way out, I saw General Dao Duy An hurrying up to go home in his jeep which sped up in roar. I heard General Hieu inviting General Le Trung Tuong to go to dinner together, to which General Tuong responded: �Let me take a shower first.� At General Toan�s residence, the phone rang. I picked up the phone, at the other end of the phone line, General Tuong said: �Hieu is dead.� I ran into General Toan's bedroom to break the news. General Toan was still untying his shoes. We hurried back to the Headquarters. Captain Do Duc accompanied us in the car. In entering General Hieu�s office, I cautioned General Toan not to touch anything so as not to leave his finger prints. I saw General Hieu sitting on his chair, his head slumping on the desk, his left arm resting on the desk, his right arm dangling above floor, and a pistol lying next to his hand on the floor. I noticed that the bullet went from his neck � uh � uh � uh�no, it was not so, let me say it again, from the right hand side jaw to the left hand side temple. General Toan did not come near, he stood with an arm leaning on the door frame, and I witnessed him crying. That was the second time I saw him cry..

2.Peripheral Witnesses:

- Doctor Ly Khanh Tri, III Corps Physician. He suffered a stroke, and when author Nguyen Van Tin asked him about the wound inflicted to General Hieu, he did not recall anything. Therefore, he can only quote Doctor Ly�s words he told a relative of the family when they came to visit the body thirty years ago (1975): �The bullet upon entering the chin, encountered the jaw bone which was too solid for it to go straight up to the top of the head, and had to veer down and exited to the back of the skull, resulting in an instantaneous death, with no feeling of pain.� Pertaining to the location of the wound and the path taken the bullet, author Nguyen Van Tin stated: �Based on my own observation when I visited my brother�s body, the bullet pierced the left hand side chin then exited behind the top of the skull slightly toward the right.� Or: �I observed the bullet only left a tiny black dot at the left hand side of the chin, 1cm from the left corner of the lips, and about 45 degree pointing down. The bullet also left a tiny black dot at the top of the head to the right (and at the back of the skull as Doctor Tri reported to a relative).� Also on this issue of wound location and bullet path, Colonel Ton That Soan, a former Marine Corps Brigade Commander, Chief of Hau Nghia Province while looking at a pack of ten photos depicting the crime scene shown to him by LTC Police Pham Khac Dat, Hau Nghia Police Commander wondered: General Hieu was a right hand man, why was that the wound seemed to be produced by a left hand man.� (Encounter on October 2, 2004 in New Jersey).
- Brigadier General Ly Tong Ba, 25th Infantry Division Commander: Recently, in a phone conversation with General Ba, I (NVT) asked: Is it General Toan who shot my brother: He (General Ba) answered: �I doubt it was General Toan, because at that moment I was meeting with him. After the meeting, on my way to the helipad, I heard the soldiers talking about General Hieu being found dead in his office. Because I had to hurry up to join my troops in the battlefield, I did not have time to linger to get more information.�
- Colonel Nguyen Van Y, Chief of Central Intelligence Agency: Whe he met me in New York (1986) he stated: �It was nobody other that General Toan.�; and �What a pity, General Hieu died before he got the chance to have his lunch.�
- Captain Do Duc, attach officer of General Nguyen Van Toan: General Toan had ordered General Hieu's office cordoned, and so, I did not get to see the crime scene. What I am certain of is that General Toan could not have shot General Hieu, because I was with him all day long until he went home after 5:30 p.m. If General Toan stated that he heard General Hieu's accident news while in the air, he erred due to his diminished health condition as a result of a by-pass operation. Both his two pilots, Major Luong and Major Cuu, were partying with me; he could not have been up in the air at that moment.� Captain Duc added: �If General Hieu was assassinated, then the assassin had to be someone who was very familiar with the maze inside the 3rd Corps Headquarters building. Even after been there 2, 3 months, I still got lost when I had to go from one office to another one.

- Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho , (G3 Joint General Staff). End August, 1998, while present in Virginia, I (NVT) paid a visit to Brigadier General Tho. He stated: �General Hieu died at noon. I recalled quite clearly, that noon I was about to have a late lunch, I received a phone call from Colonel Luong.�
- Colonel Le Khac Ly, II Corps Chief of Staff: General Toan told him (Colonel Ly): �General Hieu died at noon time.�
- Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi, III Corps Assault Task Force Commander: In a conversation in June 1999, he (BG Khoi) stated: �General Hieu died around noon time, because I recall on that day, General Hieu met with me at 8:30 a.m. in Go Dau Ha; around 9:30, he flew back to Bien Hoa; a few hours later, I heard the news of his death.�
- Colonel Le Trong Dam, II Corps Police Force Commander: He was the only witness belonging to II Corps present at III Corps headquarters in the morning of April 8, 1975. Colonel Dam entertained the author (NVT) by phone that lasted 45 minutes (time and location unknown-pnn): He (LTD) said the morning General Hieu died, he was present at III Corps headquarters and went home in Saigon that morning. That evening, LTC Duong, MD, broke the news of General Hieu�s death to him by phone. When I (NVT) said: �Colonel Khuyen stated that General Hieu died around noon time�, Colonel Dam firmly contradicted immediately: �Colonel Khuyen was not correct because I was still present at III Corps at 2:00 pm.�
Conclusion

We can now stop talking about the story of our Hero General Nguyen Van Hieu and come to a final conclusion about his death, which signaled the painful final moment of the entire South Vietnam, of each one of the ARVN soldier. We obviously do not have to find an answer (which is rather fairly easy for specialized crime investigation agencies or officials, even for those with some basic knowledge on this specialty, despite the fact the witnesses have thrown out a smoke screen grenade of discordant and contradictory details): who had ordered to kill him? Who was the assassin that shot him? He died at noon, or in the evening, by which type of weapon? All is senseless since The Soldier had died. Unfound and cheap arguments to cover up the assassination, such as: General Nguyen Van Hieu committed suicide; or, General Hieu accidentally shot himself while cleaning his pistol?!!, cannot convince anybody, because he was a devoted catholic and he was a first class marksmanship. And, the entire military-civilian population was at the decisive moment of the Vietnam War with the fate of the country threatened by the minutes. Furthermore, that morning the Presidential Palace was bombed. We hold in our hand this fact with the following consequences: the Presidential Palace was bombed, President Thieu panicked in the thought a coup d�etat was triggered. He ordered the assessment of the locations of all high ranking officers in the entire four military regions and was reported by the intelligence agency of General Quang (Dang Van Quang, political advisor) everybody was at his usual location, except General Hieu who was at Go Dau Ha having a meeting with Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi, III Corps Assault Task Force. President Thieu immediately suspected these two were fomenting a coup, because the fact General Minh (former III Corps Commander) had reported a coup plot in the past (June 1971), while these same two officers joint forces during the retreat of Snoul. The situation in April 1975 was much more critical with the ready plan (not just an vague intention) of Nguyen Cao Ky, using the Air Force, the Airborne, the Marine Corps and the Armor units which �only need to take control of the presidential palace, the joint general staff, the radio station and the television station in order to control the entire South Vietnam�� Ky did not hide this plan. He discussed it openly with generals and high ranking officers close to him like Le Nguyen Khang, Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Phan Phung Tien, etc� (and later even directly to President Huong) to the point the CIA Chief Station in Saigon (Eric Von Marbord) had to negate support (Olivier Todd; Cruel Avril Robert Lafont, Paris, 1978 pp 326-349). The President obviously knew it, therefore he �shredded the Airborne Division into pieces� without mercy (according to Le Quang Luong � narrated by Le Ba Chu in How Did Thieu Broke up the Airborne Division into Pieces? Tap Chi Hon Viet, CA, 1972). Furthermore, April was the month Thieu was obsessed by the death (after his father�s tomb in Ninh Chu Village, Phan Rang was destroyed by the military and civilian populace). The individual named Nguyen Van Thieu could not let his life terminated in the way that tragically happened to President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu in the hands of generals whom he knew too well their dark side in the plot in which he took part to take over the power and gain interest since 1963 until now. In order to preserve his life, Nguyen Van Thieu had to act first and Our Hero Nguyen Van Hieu had to die.

To back up this line of thoughts, I can advance concrete and objective elements that have been proven during the dark days of South Vietnam in April some thirty years ago. They were: If Major General Nguyen Van Hieu were not killed, it is certain after Nguyen Van Thieu stepped down as President, President Tran Van Huong would select Major General Nguyen Van Hieu to be Chief of Joint General Staff of the ARVN. This is not a hypothesis because the political front revealed a solution with France and Red China (principal members of 1954 Genera Accord) with members sympathizers of France such as former Prime Minister Tran Van Huu, of Red China such as the Chairman of South Vietnam Liberation Front Nguyen Huu Tho whom Red China introduced as The President of the Republic of South Vietnam to the people and the government of African nations all along the primary phase of Paris Agreement signed on January 27, 1973. This political solution did not please Hanoi nor the United States because the only polical trend these two countries would want (or solve the situation in Vietnam around April 1975-pnn) was to collaborate with Moscow (Kissinger ibid p 542). And if Major General Nguyen Van Hieu was Chief of Joint General Staff, it was certain that the military situation would unfold in another direction, leading to a different polical outcome. And individuals like Nguyen Van Thieu and Tran Thien Khiem would not be able to peacefully leave the country even if the American Embassy would have provided maximum security. Therefore, Nguyen Van Hieu was not allowed to survive.
To conclude, we can summarize the following elements: He was born in Tsiensin and grew up in Shanghai, living in a French Concession. When he came back to Vietnam (in 1949), he still spoke Vietnamese with a French accent; former student of Aurore University; after graduation at Dalat Military School, Lieutenant Nguyen Van Hieu worked at the office of Chief of Staff Tran Van Don (a graduate from a French Military School). And his father, Mr. Nguyen Van Huong was Director of Police and Security Bureau in the North before 1954. These elements certainly were not ignored by the French Embassy in Saigon with a high degree of interest. Major General Nguyen Van Hieu intervewed directly in Chinese Chinese businessmen implicated in the Military Pension Fund affair.

We belong to the next generation of the individuals in above-mentioned tragedy. We are not tainted by subjectivity, self interest as those implicated in power grabing and interest seeking in that tragedy. Nowadays with the age 60, after a long existence of thirty years, we certainly have learned the Meaning of life and death. Therefore, we do not write about our Hero with the intention of accusing or judging anybody. This right is reserved to History. We merely want to express our tribute to our Hero whose Death was closely linked with the Unfortunate Destiny of the Nation.

Phan Nhat Nam

(24 thang 4, 1975-2005)

(Speech delivered in the Book Presentation in Little Saigon on 5/1/2005)

NEVER ON SUNDAY

2009-07-27T13:42:00.000-07:00

I always though Sunday was a good day not to run missions, especially when the target area was in the deadly Prairie Fire AO (area of operation).

However, for several days prior to 6 October 1968, the weather had been cloudy and uncertain, which prevented any Forward Operating Base (FOB)-1 teams in Phu Bai from launching into Laos AO. FOB-1 sat along Highway 1, north of Phu Bai airport, on the north side of an ARVN training compound, just south of the tiny village of Phu Luong, about 10 miles south of Hue.

When there were no teams on the ground, the brass in Saigon got nervous. Hence, in the mornings the first thing the team leaders did was to check the mountains west of Phu Bai. If they were clear, the brass would try to get a team or a Hatchet Force inserted in Prairie Fire.

On Saturday, 5 October 1968, the weather had broken enough for ST Idaho One Zero (U.S. team leader) Staff Sergeant Donald W “Don” Wolken to fly over a VR (visual reconnaissance) over the target area. Wile Wolken was flying, Sau (the Vietnamese team leader) and I inspected the team.

Sunday morning, the weather was crystal clear, nary a cloud in the sky. Wolken and Sau quickly inspected the team: each American carried a minimum of 25 magazines for their CAR-15s, the Vietnamese carried 20 magazines. Wolken and I both carried sawed-off M-79s, 21 HE rounds and one tear gas round. Wolken also carried a .22-caliber semiautomatic pistol with a suppressor. I carried the PRC-25 radio and a bunch of hand grenades, while Robinson and the Vietnamese carried several claymore mines and extra batteries for the PRC-25. Sau and all Americans carried URC-10 emergency radio also.

Shortly before we left, the team posed for a photograph, over the strong protests of Sau and our interpreter Hiep. They said we’d jinx the mission.

A few minutes later, we were on the H-34s flying west on the hour-plus flight to Laos. Those long flights to the target area were peaceful and memorable because we were flying high, where the air was cooler, looking at the dark, lush greens of the jungle. From 4,000 feet, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were beautiful. During these flights, I often thought about my grandfather’s farm in Belle Mead, New Jersey.

As the H-34s churned westward, my vision always seemed better, aided by the adrenaline that was flowing, anticipating the unknown. Once over Laos, the doorgunners test-fired their .30-caliber machine guns.

Then, the Kingbees went into a dying swan spiral, spinning madly toward the earth. The G-force pushed my stomach upward into my chest. At the last second, the pilot flared out and hovered a few feet off the ground. The right wheel of the Kingbee touched the bomb crater that was our LZ. While we were descending, Wolken sat in the door, looking at the LZ itself. I squatted behind him, with my hand on his left shoulder, watching the perimeter of the LZ for any enemy movement.

Now the blood was pounding through our veins.

As the Kingbee wheel again touched the lip of the bomb crater, Wolken jumped out and promptly disappeared in the elephant grass. I followed. When I landed on the crater, I started slipping down the outside lip. The angle alongside the hill was much steeper than I had realized and the ground was muddy and slippery. I started rolling down the hill, the same way Wolker had. Robinson and the Vietnamese successfully landed on the crater’s lip and laughed at Wolken and me. It took us several minutes to rejoin the team.

I radioed Sergeant First Class Robert “Spider” Parks, who was flying overhead in the 0-2 Covey, and told him that we were OK. Spider said he’d stand by for 10 more minutes before releasing the assets. Ten minutes later I broke squelch three times for the final team OK.

As we moved away from the LZ, Phouc was walking point, with Sau behind him. Wolken was third in line. I was behind him, Robinson was behind me while Hiep brought up the rear. We took a break as Phouc, Sau and Wolken applied mud to their bee stings.

About half an hour later, Phouc signaled that he heard a lot of activity in front of him. Within seconds we all heard the noise. At first, we thought it was an NVA regiment charging toward us. I got behind a log and pulled a pin from an M26 frag grenade, only to realize that we were being overrun by a chattering group of monkeys.

After being overrun, we went into the standard move-10 minutes, wait-10 minutes pace, on the principle that in the jungle you can learn more from hearing than seeing. Then around noon, we heard the first shot fired by an enemy tracker. By 1400 hours they sounded like they had located our trail. By dusk, the trackers had moved through the thick jungle quicker than we had and were closing in on us. We kept moving until last light, then we finally set up our RON (Rest [Remain] Over Night) site. As I moved out to place a claymore mine on our eastern perimeter, the tracker startled us b firing one last round, which sounded like he was less than 10 meters from our southern perimeter.

Because the trackers were so close, we didn’t eat until midnight, after I radioed a team OK to the airborne command center that flew over Southeast Asia 24 hours a day. Sau and Hiep went right to sleep. Between 2000 hours and 0200 hours the next morning, I listened to the tracker skirt our team, ending his travel in front of my claymore mine.

I wasn’t sure if he had located it or not, so I detonated it and woke up the team and half the jungle with the explosive roar. For the rest of the night, there was no more movement around our perimeter.

At first light, we moved on. When Spider flew over, I gave him a quick sitrep (situation report). Through the morning, we heard no more tracker shots or any obvious enemy movement. The only thing that concerned me was the fact that Sau’s eyes began to get bigger as the day progressed. By that time, he had been running missions for five years. He could smell the NVA. During one break, he said, “Beaucoup VC, beaucoup VC.” That scared me, because I hadn’t heard or seen anything to corroborate Sau’s intuition.

At noontime, I gave Spider a team OK, but told him Sau was nervous. Spider reminded me to trust Sau’s instincts and said he’d return at 1600 hours.

By now, Sau and Hiep had swapped places, with Sau in the rear and me in the number five slot next to him. Around 1300 hours, I heard Sau hiss like a snake. Across a ravine, on the hill we had just descended, were two NVA soldiers, armed with AK-47s and smiles.

Smiles!!

What kind of game was this?! They didn’t raise their weapons or make any hostile moves. They just smiled at us.

Because they were no more than 45 yards away, I pulled out my sawed-off M79, indicating to Sau I’d like to permanently wipe the smiles off those smirking faces. Sau said, “no, beaucoup VC, di, di! (go, go).”

I told Wolken what happened and immediately we headed by high ground. Within an hour, we were atop a knoll big enough to hold ST Idaho. Wolken told me to get the PRC-25 and get Spider back over us ASAP.

By now, Sau’s eyes were bigger than saucers. I put the long antenna on the PRC-25 and made several calls on the primary, secondary and alternate frequencies, to no avail. I turned on the emergency beeper on the URC-10. That distress signal was on a channel which was supposed to be monitored at all times by all aircraft flying over the Prairie Fire AO.

No one responded. I opened a can of apricots and was sipping the sweet nectar when all hell broke loose.

Suddenly, the green jungle around us erupted with deafening full-automatic blasts from NVA-held AK-47s. Sau, Phouc, Hiep and Wolken responded instantly.

The crack of AK-47 rounds never sounded louder or closer. All I could see from our perimeter was the smoke, the red and orange blasts coming from the darker-than-ever green jungle, and green AK-47 tracers, which were flying over our heads.

The thunderous fury of dozen of men blasting away at each other on full automatic, within 10 or less feet of each other, kills all sounds. Numbs all eardrums.

Then, just as suddenly as the roar had begun, it stopped.

Everybody ran out of bullets, except for me, and I emptied my magazine toward the most intense area of enemy fire.

The only sounds audible through hurting ears were the metallic clicks of magazines being slammed into hot rifles and gunbolts sliding shut to resume the apocalyptic death roar.

ST Idaho won the reload race. Nobody was faster than Sau and Phouc at getting the first magazine out and the second one in. Within seconds we had gained fire superiority. At that instant, at the peak of the fire-fight, those brief, tense adrenaline-pumping seconds made all the other games in life seem like patty-cake. You miss your man here and you die.

The majority of the enemy firing was coming at us from the south and west parts of the small knoll. Wolken and I chucked a couple of M26s down the side of the knoll, in between blasts of full auto on our CAR-15s.

As soon as we gained complete fire superiority, I turned on the URC-10 beeper and started screaming into the PRC-25.

The small knoll saved us. The jungle was so thick and the knoll so small, only a score of NVA could rush us at once.

Soon they were stacking bodies and firing at us from behind their dead comrades. A lot of NVA soldiers died in those first few minutes of hell on earth.

For more than an hour, my cries and screams into the radio and URC-10 beeps went unanswered as the NVA mounted more mass attacks.

But the hill, the jungle and our CAR-15s worked against them as they continued to pile up or drag away more bodies. With no help around, conserving ammo while keeping Charlie back became a top priority.

Waiting several hours for help in the Prairie Fire AO after making contact with the NVA was not unusual. In fact, any time a team got help in less than an hour or two, people boasted about it as though it were a minor miracle because the AO was so far from Vietnam.

Finally, I heard Spider on the radio. He said an F-4 Phantom returning from a bombing run in Northern Laos had heard the beeper and called him.

I told Spider we had a “Prairie Fire Emergency,” which diverted all airborne assets in the AO to our target, including any F-4s that were heading north. Spider also said he had called the Judge and the Executioner--an Americal Division gunship team that was temporarily attached to our operation. Within minutes, Spider was over our position. He told me to pop smoke, Spider said he saw two yellows, which meant the NVA were monitoring our frequency.

We changed frequencies and I popped a violet smoke. A few minutes later, the first A1E Skyraider arrived on target and made a gun run on the western perimeter. He made his first napalm run on the south side and said, “Put your heads down. I’m going to make you sweat.”

He brought it so close we could feel the heat from the deadly jell. A few seconds later we smelled burning flesh. As he dove toward us a third time, the pilot said, in a quite Southern drawl, “It’s crispy critter time.”

When the NVA heard the old World War II plane making another run, they charged us in a desperate attempt to get close to us in order to avoid the Skyraider’s deadly ordnance.

Then we blasted away and pushed them back down the hill, and the Skyraider pushed them back toward us, like a death dance. Right then and there I thanked the Lord for Uncle Sam’s Air Force.

By now, each team member had developed lanes of fire down the hill. At one point when I was talking to Spider, I though I saw something moving in my lane of fire. All I could see was the ass of an NVA soldier crawling up the hill. I told Spider, “Wait one” (second). Then the NVA stuck up his head to se where he was, and the last thing he might have seen was a puff from my CAR-15 as his head exploded like a coconut.

For the next few hours, Spider and I worked numerous fast movers and A1Es, hitting the southern and eastern perimeters hard. The Air Force dumped thousands of mini-gun rounds, 20mm rounds, several 500-pound bombs, numerous napalm and CBU (Cluster Bomb Unit) canisters on the dauntless NVA troops. In between gun runs, Wolken and I would fire our M79s upward, like mortars, thorough one small opening in the jungle canopy.

About half an hour before dusk, Spider told us the Kingbees were on their way. And by that time, the Judge and Executioner had refueled and reloaded and were returning with them.

Ten minutes before the Kingbees arrived, Spider was like a master conductor, running F-4s and A1Es around our perimeter.

The Judge and the Executioner led the Kingbees into and L which was about 10 yards west of our perimeter. Spider had spotted a little ridge from our knoll to a knoll covered with elephant grass and small trees. The Kingbee could not land, but Captain Thinh roared in, chopping the tops off several small tress, and hovered 10 feet off the ground.

ST Idaho ran to the chopper. That wasn’t as easy as it sounded. It took us 10 minutes to cover those 10 yards.

The ground was wet and muddy. The elephant grass between 6 and 10 feet tall and thick. Because the grass was so thick I went first, trying to blaze a trail through it. When I fell, Wolken ran, literally ran over me, and plowed forward. When he fell, I returned the favor.

As we moved slowly toward the chopper, the activity around us heightened to a frenzy. The NVA knew what the Kingbee was doing. The NVA knew that they knew we were vulnerable. He directed the Judge and Executioner through gun runs along the eastern perimeter while the Kingbee hovered on the western edge.

Sau and Hiep covered our frantic, desperate drive to the chopper. As the Kingbee hovered about 8 feet above us, Wolken and I threw the other four members into the chopper. At some point during that craziness, I looked up at Capt. Thinh, and he was sitting there as cool as a Rocky Mountain breeze, keeping the aging H-34 hovering while taking numerous hits (the next morning, the maintenance crew counted 48 holes int he ancient ship).

Finally, Wolken told me to get in. By now, my adrenaline was roaring through my body like a berserk subway. I grabbed Wolken by his fatigue jacket and threw the 220-pound staff sergeant into the Kingbeee. Then I threw my rucksack and jumped up onto the ladder, where Wolken grabbed me by the shoulder while telling the gunner to get the hell out of there.

As Capt. Thinh lifted the Kingbee, Hiep and Sau blasted away out of the port windows, Phouc and Robinson blasted away out of the starboard window and Wolken and I emptied our last magazine into the dark jungle, which had dozens, if not hundreds, of muzzle flashes lighting up the darkness. As we ascended skyward, I fired my last M79 round and dropped my white phosphorous grenade, which looked spectacular against the quickly fading jungle.

Seconds later, the hell and fury and death of the LZ were behind us.

Suddenly, the cool night air hit us, as Wolken and I watched the final fleeting moments of the sweetest sunset we had ever seen in our lives.

We had survived. How many NVA hadn’t survived?

Capt. Thinh flew us back to Phu Bai. Before he returned to his base at Da Nang, I climbed up to the pilot’s seat and thanked him for saving our lives and told him he never had to pay for a drink in the FOB-1 club again.

Because it was late, I went to the mess hall and got some chow for Sau, Hiep and phouc and ate with them. Sau appeared as though nothing unusual had happened. I had never been so close to thunderous death before. Our meal was somber. Later I went to the club, where an Australian floor show was in progress. A lot of the guys wanted sex. I was happy to be alive. Later, when talking to a friend, I realized I had killed a man, perhaps more than one. The line from an old Doors song surfaced in my mind: “The war is over for the unknown soldier...bullet struck the helmeted head.” Silently, I thanked the Lord for sparing me, again.

SPIKE TEAMS, HATCHET FORCES, AND SLAM COMPANIES:

Mention of the U.S. Army’s Special Forces in Vietnam usually conjures up images of A-Teams in remote outposts training and fighting with the Meo and Montagnard tribesman. After all, the Green Berets’ primary mission before Vietnam was the support of guerrilla and partisan forces behind enemy lines. But as American’s ground war in Vietnam expanded, so too did the role of Special Forces.

A major departure from their pre-war mission was strategic ground reconnaissance. These missions were conducted under the guise of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), a subordinate command of Military Assistance Command (Vietnam). Ground Studies Group (SOG 35), one of eight operational commands within SOG, was charged with ground operations and had responsibility for cross-border missions. Operating from Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) located at Phu Bai (FOB-1), Kontum (FOB-2), Khe Sanh (FOB-3), Da Nang (FOB-4), Ban Me Thout (FOB-5), and Ho Ngoc Tao (FOB-6), Green Berets detached from 5th Special Forces ventured into the border areas of Cambodia and Laos and often beyond.

Frequently, intelligence provided by the recon teams (known as Spike Teams, usually consisting of two to three SF troops and nine indigenous personnel) was exploited by SOG as well. Battalions consisting of four SLAM (Search-Locate-Annihilate-Monitor) companies operated from the same four FOBs as the Spike Teams.

Spike Teams were tasked with linear, point, area and route reconnaissance; road, trail and river watch; route mining, interdiction and ambushes; capture of prisoners; bomb damage assessments; the direction of air and artillery strikes on targets of opportunity; crash site inspection; allied prisoner recovery and limited ground combat, SLAM companies were made up of Hatchet (later Hornet) Force platoons. These platoons were tailored to specific missions which included rapid engagement of recon-produced targets, reconnaissance-in-force, route interdiction, ambushes and raids, security of temporary patrol bases, short-term area denial, cache destruction and allied prisoner recovery.

After reorganization in November 1967, SOG 35 operations included Command and Control South (CCS), headquartered in Ban Me Thout, Command and Control Central (CCC) located at Kontum, and Command and Control North (CCN) in Da Nang. The border areas in which the teams operated were divided into three “projects”: DANIEL BOONE (further divided into three smaller zones), which ran from the southern border of Vietnam on the Gulf of Siam to the tri-border region; PRAIRIE FIRE, which ran from the DANIEL BOONE area to just north of the border with North Vietnam, and NICKEL STEEL, which ran astride the western half of the DMZ. CCS operated in PRAIRIE FIRE and the Alpha zone of DANIEL BOONE, and CCN operated in the PRAIRIE FIRE and NICKEL STEEL areas.

If you aren’t confused yet, stand by. It should be noted that all three of the “projects” were assigned different names during different periods of the war. PRAIRIE FIRE was originally known as SHINING BRASS , and after April 1971 was changed to PHU DUNG. DANIEL BOONE was renamed SALEM HOUSE and later changed to THOT NOT. NICKEL STEEL was originally DOUBLE CROSS.

From September 1966 until April 1971, Special Forces personnel assigned to SOG conducted more than 1,500 missions into Laos and Cambodia, providing tactical and strategic intelligence for those directing the war from Saigon and Washington. In the spring of 1971, Congress passed the Cooper-Church Amendment, which prohibited Special Forces from conducting missions across the border, and although the missions continued for some time after that, Vietnamization and the withdrawal of U.S. forces eventually brought the operations to a halt. The sustained unconventional warfare activities of SOG 35 represented not only a broadening of Special Forces’ pre-war role, but at the same time it was the Army’s most successful deep-penetration campaign.

--G. B. Crouse

NVA Hits Spike Team Idaho in Laos
By: John “Tilt” Stryker Meyers

Target: E-4.

Command and Control: MACV-SOG.

Area of Operations: Laos.

Codename: Prairie Fire

Mission: Primary--General recon.

Secondary--Find major NVA POW underground complex where U.S. POWs are held.

Complex located near major intersection of Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.

Alternate--Cancel mission if opportunity to capture live NVA soldier arises.

Target Team: Spike Team (ST) Idaho.

Date: 6 October 1968

Launch site: Phu Bai, FOB #1, South Vietnam

Insertion Aircraft: Vietnamese-piloted Sikorsky H-34 helicopters. Kingbees.

Lead Ship: 10-U.S. team leader, 11-U.S. assistant team leader and 01-Vietnamese team leader.

Second Ship: 12-3rd American, 02-team interpreter and 03-point man, Vietnamese team.

Third Ship: Backup.

Assets on site: two A1E skyraiders, one 0-2 covey, two UH-1B Huey gunships and Phantom F-4s on call.

SOG: An Overview

2009-07-27T13:34:00.000-07:00

Of the many military activities reported during the Second Indochina War, little has been written about the United States cross-border ground reconnaissance operations conducted in Laos and Cambodia. Despite this absence of data, the participation of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam’s (MACV) Studies and Observation Group (SOG), and its ground reconnaissance component, Operations 35 (OPS-35), in strategic intelligence gathering is a historical fact. Although little has been written about the SOG and its troops, a picture of the unit’s activities can be reconstructed and studied from several of the verbal and written sources that have been made public.1

OPS-35 Mission and Composition

In keeping with security practices that required compartmentalization for classified activities, SOG’s ground reconnaissance element OPS-35 was, but one of its many secret component forces. Other components such as OPS-31, 32, 33 and 34 were responsible for conducting other unconventional and conventional warfare activities such as psychological operations (PSYOPS), maritime operations, and the training and direction of agent-operatives destined for infiltration into North Vietnam.

The conduct of cross-border ground reconnaissance and its incumbent intelligence requirements were the purview of OPS-35. In addition to this mission, OPS-35’s task also included locating and freeing friendly personnel captured or missing in action, assisting in the conduct of PSYOPS, and performing other tasks such as prisoner apprehension and equipment retrieval. The subordinate agencies within OPS-35 responsible for the conduct of these activities were its three field elements: Command Control North (CCN), Command Control Central (CCC), and Command Control South (CCS) located at Danang, Kontom, and Ban Me Thuot.

To provide anonymity for the organization and its personnel, OPS-35 had an administrative affiliation with the U.S. Army’s 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (5th SFGA).2 Under this arrangement all of the OPS-35’s U.S. Army personnel were listed on the 5th SFGA’s rolls. The affiliation was a convenient cover for their personnel since most of the members of OPS-35 had served in the 5th SFGA during earlier tours of service in South Vietnam. Just as OPS-35’s American personnel had an earlier affiliation with the 5th SFGA, so had its Asian mercenary force, usually with the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), the Mobile Strike Force (MSF) (sometimes called the Mike Force), or the Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF). There always appeared to be a special category of men who, in the words of one U.S. Army officer, “repeatedly sought out the tough and dangerous work with the Mike Forces (MSF), the special projects and the classified missions (SOG).”3 Therefore it would seem that the transition from duty with the CIDG to the classified and dangerous missions conducted by the SOG was a rite of passage.

Between 1964 and 1972, the SOG’s OPS-35 was said to have had a strength of 2,000-2,500 U.S. personnel and 7,000 to 8,000 indigenous troops, most of whom came from South Vietnam’s Montagnard, Cambodian (Khmer Krom), and Nung ethnic minorities. Although OPS-35’s primarily concerns were with strategic reconnaissance, on special occasions its teams would conduct raids, prisoner apprehension missions, or seek-locate-annihilate-and-monitor (SLAM) missions.4 Frequently the teams were sent into Laos to the home villages of ethnic minority team members to induce the villagers to aid in establishing “in country” bases for future operations. On other occasions, their task was to tap North Vietnamese Army (NVA) telephone lines or to plant acoustic and seismic sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Leaping Lena and Prairie Fire Operations

The first series of U.S.-sponsored cross-border operations took place in 1964 under the code name “Leaping Lena.” The South Vietnamese Government under the supervision of the Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA) conducted these activities. Unfortunately, Leaping Lena was a failure and was terminated.5 When created in 1964, the SOG benefited from the Leaping Lena experiences and established a policy that called for the use of both indigenous and U.S. personnel for operations conducted in Laos and Cambodia. An analysis of the Leaping Lena operations had shown that if a team was to accomplish its mission and meet the high standard of intelligence- gathering and reporting required by the SOG, it would have to be with U.S. supervision and leadership. The presence of the U.S. personnel on the teams insured accurate and reliable intelligence.

The Montagnards of Vietnam’s Central Highlands were especially helpful in the cross-border operations since their tribal affiliations crossed international boundaries. This factor was particularly useful when the OPS-35 teams conducted patrols in Laos and northern Cambodia, both countries having sizable Montagnard populations along the South Vietnamese border. To a lesser degree, Cambodians born in South Vietnam (called Khmer Krom) fulfilled the same purposes when SOG conducted operations in certain regions of Cambodia. At one SOG site (Hobarge Tours), an entire reaction company of Khmer Krom was never to participate in an operation in Cambodia according to official policy. Official policy notwithstanding, Khmer Krom troops may have engaged in OPS-35’s cross-border operations just as they did in other unconventional activities. Another of the minority groups used by OPS-35 in its cross-border operations was the Nungs, mercenaries who were one of the most effective of all the ethnic-minority paramilitary forces.

To provide the SOG and the United States some form of plausible denial (albeit weak) for personnel who might be captured, the SOG units frequently had maps printed with distorted international boundary lines. In a further effort to conceal the nature of its operations, it was SOG’s policy to report its casualties as having occurred in South Vietnam. To ensure operational security, American personnel conducted the planning activities for OPS-35. The OPS-35 element had no counterpart relationship like that between the 5th SFGA and the Vietnamese Special Forces, Lac Luong Dac Biet (LLDB).

The name of the first series of SOG patrols into Laos was “Shining Brass” (later renamed “Prairie Fire”) conducted between 1965 and 1969. These patrols began when intelligence reports indicated that the Ho Chi Minh Trail was expanding to meet the increasing demand for men and material in the South.6 To determine the nature and location of these activities in Laos, the OPS-35 forces conducted reconnaissance missions with units known as “Spike Teams” comprising six to twelve men (two to four U.S. personnel and four to eight indigenous personnel).

The U.S. Congressional Record of September 1973 revealed the increasing frequency of Prairie Fire missions when it disclosed that between September 1965 and April 1972, SOG conducted 1,579 reconnaissance patrols, 216 platoon-sized patrols, and three multi-platoon-sized operations in Laos.7 These missions deployed from U.S. Special Forces CIDG camps such as Kham Duc, Khe Sanh, and Kontum. The camp at Khe Sanh was particularly valuable. It was an important facility that regularly supplied vital information on North Vietnamese activity in Laos.

The North Vietnamese did not overlook the importance of Khe Sanh. They were well aware of the patrols sent into Laos to monitor their activities. In 1968, North Vietnamese forces had nearly overrun Khe Sanh and Kham Duc. From these and other camps along the border, American-led teams of Indochinese mercenaries regularly infiltrated into Laos. These units had assigned missions in zones that extended 20 kilometers into the Laotian interior. The terrain in these areas was extremely difficult, and they measured their movement in meters not kilometers. Using the least accessible regions as points of infiltration enabled the OPS-35 teams to enter the target areas with less chance of discovery by enemy patrols. After a team had infiltrated the area, it then moved to its specific reconnaissance site. Occasionally the team monitored its target for as long as ten days in order to gather maximum intelligence.

To support its ground reconnaissance activities, the SOG maintained a communications site 20 kilometers inside the Laotian border. The teams used the outpost to transmit and relay messages between launch sites and the teams in the Laotian countryside.8 The site’s radio capability permitted the SOG teams to conduct their missions at the extreme limits of their 20-kilometer target zones and still have communication with the OPS-35 command, regardless of the terrain and distance. With the extended communications capability the teams could call on fighter bombers to engage targets of opportunity anywhere in the operational area, and it permitted the teams to call for extraction when they were in a tenuous situation.

Although there are no available records that indicate which of the Indochinese ethnic groups constituted the largest portion of SOG’s mercenary force, it is likely that the Montagnards comprised the majority of the indigenous personnel. Montagnard mercenaries were regularly employed on SLAM operations.9 These operations were risky affairs that frequently brought heavy casualties to friends and foes alike.10 In September 1970, 150 indigenous troops and 10 U.S. SOG personnel infiltrated into Laos near the Ho Chi Minh Trail with the mission of luring several NVA battalions into an area where fighter-bomber aircraft could attacked them. The operation was a success and allegedly, the Communist forces lost 500 men killed in the battle. The SOG force lost a dozen men killed and 40 to 50 others wounded. The New York Times reported the details of the action and revealed, for the first time, that the United States was conducting secret military operations in Laos. The article noted that the Department of Defense (DOD) had denied that such activities were taking place and had declared, “There are no United States ground troops in Laos.”11 Four months later these same sources admitted that reconnaissance teams were operating inside Laos...“but only in an intelligence-gathering role.”12

Salem House Operations

Concurrent with the Prairie Fire operations were the SOG’s missions in northeastern Cambodia. These operations, originally named “Daniel Boone,” were later redesignated “Salem House.” These missions provided intelligence on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong bases located in Cambodia. Another objective of the Salem House operations was to determine the level of Cambodian Government support for the NVA and Viet Cong.13

The Salem House operations had a number of restrictions that affected their activities in Cambodia. Many of the restrictions were modified or withdrawn and new restrictions imposed; the pattern of change in the restrictions presents an interesting picture of the war’s development in Cambodia. In May 1967, the Salem House missions were subject to the following restrictions:

Only reconnaissance teams were to be committed into Cambodia and the teams could not exceed an overall strength of 12 men, to include not more than three U.S. advisers.
Teams were not to engage in combat except to avoid capture.
They did have permission to have contact with civilians.
No more than three reconnaissance teams could be committed on operations in Cambodia at any one time.
The teams could conduct no more than ten missions in any 30-day period.14

By October 1967, SOG’s teams had permission to infiltrate the entire Cambodian border area to a depth of 20 kilometers. However, their helicopters were only permitted ten kilometers inside Cambodia. In December, the DOD, with the Department of State’s concurrence, approved the use of Forward Air Controllers (FACs) to support SOG operations. The FACs had authorization to make two flights in support of each Salem House mission.

In October 1968, SOG teams received permission to emplace self-destructing land mines in Cambodia. The following December, the depth of penetration into northern Cambodia was extended to 30 kilometers; however, the 20-kilometer limit remained in effect for central and southern Cambodia. The final adjustment in Salem House operations made in 1970 during the incursion into Cambodia permitted reconnaissance teams to operate 200 meters west of the Mekong River (an average distance of 185 kilometers west of the South Vietnamese border). However, the SOG reconnaissance teams never ventured that far west, due to the lift and range limitations of their UH-1F helicopters. Thus from the initiation of SOG’s Cambodian operations in 1967 until 1970, there was a progressive expansion of the zones of operation and OPS-35 patrols within Cambodia. The enlargement of the areas of operation and the increasing number of Salem House missions, gives an indication of how seriously the Johnson and Nixon Administrations viewed the NVA’s use of Cambodian base areas. It was also indicative of the U.S. military’s growing awareness of the role of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and its deleterious effect on the war in South Vietnam.15

From 1967 through April 1972, OPS-35 conducted 1,398 reconnaissance missions, 38 platoon-sized patrols, and 12 multi-platoon operations in Cambodia. During the same period, it captured 24 prisoners of war.16

Deactivation of SOG and Congressional Hearings

In mid-1972, SOG deactivated. Despite this fact, its cross-border program came under attack in 1973 from the U.S. press and the U.S. Congress. Newspapers such as The New York Times and the Saint Louis Post-Dispatch indicated that despite the prohibitions imposed by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, U.S. military personnel had participated in cross-border operations in Cambodia during 1972. This revelation also indicated that the House of Representatives and the Senate Appropriations Committee had had briefings on the SOG’s activities, functions, and casualties since 1966. A series of Congressional hearings held in 1973 also revealed that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad had also known of the SOG’s activities, costs, and casualties. The Congressional hearings disclosed that the SOG’s Top Secret budget was in the U.S. Navy budget NOP 345, carried as a classified project.17

The focus of the Congressional inquiry was the military’s disregard of the Foreign Assistance Act and the War Powers Act, which forbade the use of U.S. advisers or US. funds to support our ground forces in countries that bordered South Vietnam. Several witnesses gave testimony that they had participated in operations in Cambodia during 1972, evidence that supported the charge that the Acts had been violated.18 Other than disclosing the fact that the SOG and the U.S. Government had conducted covert operations in Cambodia in violation of Congressional legislation, the hearings did little to end the war in South Vietnam or to ease its trauma in the United States. The entire maneuver was a political exercise between the congressional doves and hawks; it had little constructive value.

Assessing the SOG’s Contributions

It is difficult to make a complete assessment of the SOG’s contributions to the Vietnam war effort. However, from the data that is available, such as the U.S. Congressional Record, comments from SOG veterans, and in the remarks of a North Vietnamese journalist, one can attempt some analysis.

The NVA journalist, Tran Mai Nam, indicated that the NVA had a particular dread of the “unpredictable brushes with the enemy’s Special Forces” and was concerned about capture on the Ho Chi Minh Trail by “commando raids.”19 However, the fear and stress exhibited by NVA troops cannot form the sole basis for an evaluation of the SOG. One U.S. Department of Defense document that does comment on the SOG’s activities is A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. The study indicates that—

SOG operations provided a considerable amount of intelligence data to Washington and Saigon on North Vietnamese troop movements along those portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that were patrolled by the OPS-35 forces. Because of these reconnaissance efforts, U.S. planners had a fairly clear picture of enemy forces in the sanctuaries and along the trail by early 1969.20

Another factor to consider in evaluating OPS-35’s operations in Laos and Cambodia were the political constraints that determined what they could do. The Prairie Fire operations were always subject to the approval or disapproval of the U.S. Ambassador in Laos, William H. Sullivan.21 Sullivan’s behavior and actions earned him some enmity from the U.S. military, and he was frequently referred to as “the field marshal.” General William Westmoreland noted an example of the difficulties experienced with the Ambassador when he said, “Bill Sullivan had a tendency to impose his own restriction[s] over and above those laid on by the Department of State. (We sometimes referred to the Ho Chi Minh Trail as Sullivan’s Freeway).”22 Regarding Ambassador Sullivan and the SOG’s operations in Laos, one U.S. Special Forces officer commented that “often when intelligence would develop leads suggesting operations into certain areas, requests for authority to insert teams would be denied on the grounds that the CIA had teams in the area.”23 When asked for a report on the area of interest, the CIA and Sullivan gave the SOG nothing. Sullivan’s concern about the SOG’s operations stemmed from his desire to ensure that civilians did not become casualties from any misdirected attacks. He was also concerned about how the Soviet Union might interpret America’s military actions. Sullivan enjoyed a close personal relationship with the Soviet Ambassador to Laos, Boris Kornissovsky.24

The Salem House operations were also subject to constraints due to the Department of State and Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk’s desire to avoid incidents that might risk Cambodian lives. Although Sihanouk had severed diplomatic relations with the United States in 1965, informal contacts with the Cambodian leader continued. In 1968, Sihanouk told U.S. Presidential Emissary Chester Bowles: “...We are not opposed to hot pursuit in uninhabited areas. I want you to force the Viet Cong to leave Cambodia....”25 Even with Sihanouk’s tacit approval for hot pursuit, combat operations in Cambodia were also governed by a concern that public exposure of these activities would bring international protest and strengthen the anti-war movement in the United States.

Conclusion

A final judgment of the SOG’s activities would suggest that OPS-35’s cross-border operations were an unqualified success. This success was in part due to the fact that most of the U.S. and Asian troops were already combat veterans when they joined the SOG. A second factor was the peculiar nature of the OPS-35 missions. Although the missions were hazardous, they were of short duration (usually five days) and each team conducted only one mission per month. This system afforded the team greater recovery time and training opportunities to develop higher skill levels for its members. Another comment regarding these types of operations is that despite technological advances in surveillance equipment there is no substitute for the “man on the ground,” for intelligence requires judgment as well as observation.

Historically, the SOG’s activities were especially interesting because they were politically sensitive and clearly went beyond the scope of traditional U.S. Army missions. Moreover, SOG’s operations present the student of military history with a rare example of the successful employment and management of mercenary and regular forces in the role of strategic intelligence collection. SOG’s activities were of some importance to the Free World forces that fought in the Second Indochina War.

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Turkoly-Joczik, Ph.D. (USA, Retired)

Endnotes

1. Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, First Session July 16, 23, 25, 26, 30 and August 7, 8, 9, 1973 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pages 231-255. U.S. Congressional Record, Senate (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September 1973), pages 29046-29052. Stanton, Shelby I., Vietnam, Order of Battle (Washington: U.S. News Books, 1981), pages 239-253. Also see the following: Schemmer, Benjamin F., The Raid (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1976), pages 39-47, 71, and 117-118.

2. Stanton, page 243.

3. Simpson, Charles N., Inside the Green Berets (Navato, California: Presidio Press, 1983), page 135.

4. Stanton, Vietnam, Order of Battle, page 251. Sutton, Horace, “The Ghostly War of the Green Berets,” Saturday Review, 18 October 1969, page 25. See also Westmoreland, William C., A Soldier Reports (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), page 107. Maitland, Terrence, Weiss, Stephen (Editors), The Vietnam Experience, Raising the Stakes (Boston, Massachusetts: Boston Publishing Company, 1982), pages 144-145.

5. Colby, William, Honorable Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), pages 165 and 220.

6. Hearings: Committee on Armed Services, Senate, pages 231-255. Also see Meyer, Gerald, “U.S. Forces Operate in Laos,” St. Louis Post- Dispatch, 3 November 1972, page 1.

7. U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, 10 September 1973, pages 29051-29052. BDM, The Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam (McLean, Virginia: BDM Corporation, 1979), Volume 6, pages 8-38.

8. Meyer, Gerald, ”Former Green Berets Verify Raids in Laos,” Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, 10 November 1972, page 1. See also Westmoreland, pages 107-108.

9. Meyer, Gerald, “Report Killings, Sabotage in Raids by U.S. in Laos,” Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, 6 November 1972, page 1.

10. Branfman, Fred, The War is Not Over (Washington: The Indochinese Resource Center, 1973), page 57.

11. The New York Times, 26 October 1970, page 1.

12. Ibid, 12 February 1971, page 4.

13. McChristian, Joseph A., The Role of Military Intelligence (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), page 109.

14. U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, 10 September 1972, page 29051. For details on Salem House missions, see Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Ninety-Third Congress: Bombing Cambodia; July 16, 23, 25, 26, 30 and August 7, 8, 9, 1973, pages 231-255.

15. BDM, The Strategic Lessons, Volume 6, pages 4-43 to 4-54.

16. Shawcross, William, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), page 24. Hearings: Committee on Armed Services, Senate, July-August 1973, page 236. U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, 10 September 1973, page 29052. U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, 25 July 1973, page 25881.

17. U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, 10 September 1973, page 29051. Hearings: Committee on Armed Services, Senate, July-August 1973, pages 232-255.

18. Hearings: Committee on Armed Services, Senate, July-August 1973, pages 232-255.

19. The New York Times, 27 July 1973, page 3. Also see MacLean, Michael, The Ten Thousand Day War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), page 214. Tran Mai Nam was a journalist for Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People’s Army) and spent several months on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1967. During that time, Hanoi published his dispatches.

20. BDM, The Strategic Lessons, Volume 6, pages 6-43, 9-18, and EX-19.

21. United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1982 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1982), page 140.

22. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, page 196.

23. Simpson, Inside the Green Berets, page 149.

24. Arthur J. Dommen, “Laos in the Second Indochina War,” Current History, December 1970, page 327.

25. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), pages 250-252. See also BDM, The Strategic Lessons, Volume 6, page 4-43.

Lieutenant Colonel Turkoly-Joczik (U.S. Army Retired) is now assistant professor of history at Johnson and Wales University, Charleston, South Carolina. Most recently, he served in the Middle East as a Civilian Observer for the Camp David Accords. He is a veteran of the Korean War and served as a Special Forces battalion commander in Vietnam’s Delta (IV CTZ). LTC Turkoly- Joczik holds a Doctor of Philosophy degree in International Politics from the University of Wales, United Kingdom. He is an Arab linguist and a Command and General Staff College graduate. Readers may contact him via E-mail at tjoczik@awod.com.

History STD

2009-07-16T10:43:00.001-07:00

NHA KY THUAT

THE STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE

AND

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES

In early 1956 the French built Commando School at Nha Trang was re-established with US military assistance to provide physical training and ranger instruction for up to 100 students. Early the following year President Ngo Dinh Diem ordered the creation of a special unit to conduct clandestine external operations. Initial parachute and communication training for 70 officers and sergeants was conducted at Vung Tau; 58 of these later underwent a four month commando course at Nha Trang under the auspices of a US Army Special Forces Mobile Training Team. Upon completion, they formed the Lien Doi Quang Sat so 1 (I Observation Unit) on I November 1957 at Nha Trang. The unit was put under the Presidential Liaison Office, a special intelligence bureau controlled by President Diem and outside the normal ARVN command structure. The commander was Lt. Col. Le Quang Tung, an ARVN airborne officer and Diem loyalist. Many of the Unit's members came originally from northern Vietnam, reflecting its external operations orientation.

In 1958 the Unit was renamed the Lien Doan Quang Sat so 1, or I Observation Group, reflecting its increase to nearly 400 men in December. By that time the Group was seen as an anti Communist stay behind force in the event of a North Vietnamese conventional invasion; however, because of its privileged position the Group stayed close to Diem and rarely ventured into the field.

By 1960 it was apparent that the main threat to South Vietnam was growing Viet Cong insurgency; the Group abandoned its stay behind role and was assigned missions in VC infested areas. Operations were briefly launched against VC in the Mekong Delta, and later along the Lao border.

In mid 1961 the Group had 340 men in 20 teams of 15, with plan for expansion to 805 men. In October the Group began operations into Laos to reconnoiter North Vietnamese Army logistical corridors into South Vietnam. In November the Group was renamed Lien Doan 77, or 77 Group, in honor of its USSF counterparts. Over the next two years members were regularly inserted into Laos and North Vietnam on harassment and psychological warfare operations. Longer duration agent missions, involving civilians dropped into North Vietnam, also came under the Group's auspices.

The Group's sister unit, 31 Group, began forming in February 1963. Following criticism of 77 Group's perceived role as Diem's 'palace guard', both groups were incorporated into a new command,, the Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB) or Special Forces, on 15 March 1963. In theory the LLDB would work closely with the USSF in raising irregular village defense units. This cosmetic change still kept the Special Forces outside of ARVN control, however, and did little to change the performance of Col. Tung's troops. In August, LLDB members attacked Buddhist pagodas across South Vietnam in an effort to stiffle Buddhist opposition to the Diem regime. At the time LLDB strength stood at seven companies, plus an additional three 'civilian' companies used by Diem on political operations. Because of such missions the LLDB became despised and, when anti Diem military units staged a coup d'etat in November, the 'revolutionary' forces arrested Col. Tung and quickly neutralized the LLDB. (Tung was later executed.)

The LLDB after President Ngo Dinh Diem

In the wake of the coup the Presidential Liaison Office was dissolved and its function assumed by the ARVN. The LLDB was put under the control of the Joint General Staff and given the mission of raising paramilitary border and village defense forces with the USSF. External operations were given to the newly formed Liaison Service, also under the JGS. The Liaison Service, commanded by a Colonel, was headquartered in Saigon adjacent to the JGS. It was divided into Task Force 1, 2 and 3, each initially composed of only a small cadre of commandos.

In 1964 the JGS also formed the Technical Service (So Ky Thuat), a covert unit tasked with longer duration agent operations into North Vietnam. Commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, the Technical Service comprised Group 11 (Doan 11), oriented toward agent operations in Laos and eastern North Vietnam; Group 68 (Doan 68 Thang Long), another infiltration unit; and the Coastal Security Service, a maritime commando group at Da Nang attached to the Technical service with its own contingent of PT boats for seaborne infiltration.

The post Diem LLDB was restructured for its proper role as a source of counter insurgency instructors for paramilitary forces. By February 1964, 31 Group had finished training and was posted to Camp Lam Son south of Nha Trang. In May the Group became responsible for all LLDB detachments in I and 11 Corps. A second reorganization occured in September when 31 Group was renamed III Group and given responsibility for the Special Operations Training Center at Camp Lam Son. Now 77 Group, headquartered at Camp Hung Vuong in Saigon, became 301 Group. In addition, 91 Airborne Ranger Battalion, a three company fast reaction para unit, was raised under LLDB auspices in November. Total LLDB force strength stood at 333 officers, 1270 non commissioned officers and 1270 men. The LLDB command at Nha Trang was assumed by Brig. Gen. Doan Van Quang in August 1965.

By 1965 the LLDB had become almost a mirror image of the USSF. LLDB Headquarters at Nha Trang ran the nearby Special Forces Training Center at Camp Dong Ba Thin. LLDB 'C' Teams, designated A through D Company, were posted to each of South Vietnam's four Military Regions; each 'C' Team had three 'B' Teams, which controlled operational detachments at the sub regional level; 'B' Teams ran 10 to 11 'A' Teams. 'A' Teams were colocated with USSF 'A' Teams at camps concentrated along the South Vietnamese border, where they focused on training Civilian Irregular Defense Force (CIDG) personnel.

In addition, the LLDB Command directly controlled the Delta Operations Center with its Delta teams and the four company 91 Airborne Ranger Battalion, both were used by Project Delta, a special reconnaissance unit of the US Military Assistance Vietnam Studies and Observation Group (MACVSOG), which operated deep in VC/NVA sanctuaries.

On 30 January 1968 the Communists launched their TET general offensive across South Vietnam. Caught celebrating the lunar New Year, the Saigon government was initially ill prepared to counter the VC/NVA attacks. When Nha Trang was hit on the first day the LLDB Headquarters was protected by 91 Airborne Ranger Battalion, recently returned from one of its Project Delta assignments. At only 60 percent strength the Airborne Rangers turned in an excellent performance, pushing the major Communist elements out of Nha Trang in less than a day. The battle, however, cost the life of the battalion commander and wounded the four company commanders.

After a four month retraining in Nha Trang three companies from 91 Airborne Ranger Battalion were brought together with six Delta teams and renamed 81 Airborne Ranger Battalion. In early June the new battalion prepared for urban operations in Saigon after a second surge of Communist attacks pushed goverrunent forces out of the capital's northern suburbs. On 7 June the Airborne Rangers were shuttled into Saigon and began advancing toward VC held sectors around the Duc Tin Military School. After a week of bloody street fighting, much of it at night, the Airborne Rangers pushed the enemy out of the city.

Following the Tet Offensive 81 Airborne Ranger Battalion was increased to six companies, and continued to be used as the main reaction force for Project Delta; four companies were normally assigned Delta missions while two remained in reserve at LLDB Headquarters.

The Strategic Technical Directorate

In late 1968 the Technical Service was expanded into the Nha Ky thuat (Strategic Technical Directorate, or STD) in a move designed to make it more like MACVSOG, the US joint services command created in 1964 which ran reconnaissance, raids and other special operations both inside and outside South Vietnam. Despite internal opposition the Liaison Service was subordinated to the STD as its major combat arm. Like SOG, the STD also had aircraft under its nominal control, including 219 Helicopter Squadron of the Vietnamese Air Force. By the late 1960s the size of the Liaison Service had increased tremendously. Task Forces 1, 2 and 3, commanded by lieutenant colonels and larger than a brigade, were directly analogous to MACVSOG's Command and Control North, Central and South. Each Task Force was broken into a Headquarters, a Security Company, a Reconnaissance Company of ten teams, and two Mobile Launch Sites with contingents of South Vietnamese Army and paramilitary forces under temporary Liaison Service control. Although the Liaison Service was a South Vietnamese unit, all of its operations were funded, planned and controlled by MACVSOG, and recon teams integrated both MACVSOG and Liaison Service personnel.

In December 1970, in accordance with the 'Vietnamization' policy, all CIDG border camps were turned over to the South Vietnamese government and CIDG units were incorporated into the ARVN as Biet Dong Quan, or Ranger, border battalions. No longer needed as a CIDG training force, the LLDB was dissolved in the same month. Officers above captain were sent to the Biet Dong Quan; the best of the remaining officers and men were selected for a new STD unit, the Special Mission Service. At the same time 81 Airborne Ranger Battalion was expanded into 81 Airborne Ranger Group consisting of one Headquarters Company, one Recon Company and seven Exploitation Companies. The Group was put under the direct control of the JGS as a general reserve force.

During 1970 the Liaison Service had staged numerous cross border missions into Cambodia in support of major external sweeps by the US and South Vietnamese forces against Communist sanctuaries. Early the following year the Service sent three recon teams into the 'Laotian Panhandle' two weeks before the ARVN's February Lam Son 719 incursion.

In February 1971 the STD underwent major reorganization in accordance with Vietnamization and its anticipated increase in special operations responsibilities. Headquartered in Saigon, STD command was given to Col. Doan Van Nu, an ARVN airborne officer and former military attache to Taiwan. As STD commander, and a non voting member of the South Vietnamese National Security Council, Nu took orders only from President Nguyen Van Thieu and the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam JGS.

The expanded STD consisted of a headquarters, a training center, three support services and six combat services. The training center was located at Camp Yen The in Long Thanh: Yen The, significantly, was the name of a resistance movement in northern Vietnam during the 11th century. Airborne instruction was conducted at the ARVN Airborne Division's Camp Ap Don at Tan Son Nhut. The three support services were Administration & Logistics; Operations & Intelligence; and Psychological Warfare, which ran the 'Vietnam Motherland', 'Voice of Liberty', and 'Patriotic Front of the Sacred Sword' clandestine radio stations. The combat services were the Liaison Service (Loi Ho), the Special Mission Service (Hac Long), Group 11, Group 68, The Air Support Service and the Coastal Security Service.

The Liaison Service (So lien Lac), commanded by a colonel in Saigon, was composed of experienced Loi Ho recon commandos divided among Task Force I (Da Nang), Task Force 2 (Kontum) and Task Force 3 (Ban Me thuot).

The Special Mission Service (So Cong Tac), also commanded by a colonel, was headquartered at Camp Son Tra in Da Nang. It remained in training under US auspices from February 1971 until January 1972. Unlike the shorter duration raid and recon missions performed by the Liaison Service, the SMS was tasked with longer missions into North Vietnam and Laos. It was initially composed of Groups 71, 72 and 75, with the first two headquartered at separate camps at Da Nang. Group 75 was headquartered at Plei Ku in the former LLDB B Co. barracks, with one detachment at Kom Tum to provide a strike force for operations in Cambodia and inside South Vietnam.

Group 11, an airborne infiltration unit based at Da Nang, and Group 68, headquartered in Saigon with detachments at Kom Tum, was soon integrated under SMS command. Group 68 ran airborne trained rallier and agent units, including 'Earth Angels' (NVA ralliers) and 'Pike Hill' teams (Cambodian disguised as Khmer Communists). A typical Earth Angel operation took place on 15 December 1971, when a team was inserted by US aircraft on a reconnaissance mission into Mondolkiri Province, Cambodia. Pike Hill operations were focused in the same region, including a seven man POW recovery team dropped into Ba Kev, Cambodia, on 12 February 1971. Pike Hill operations even extended into Laos, e.g. the four man Pike Hill team parachuted onto the edge of the Bolovens Plateau on 28 December 1971, where it reported on enemy logistics traffic for almost two months. Pike Hill operations peaked in November 1972 when two teams were inserted by C-130 Blackbird aircraft flying at 250 feet north of Kompong Trach, Cambodia. Information from one of these teams resulted in 48 B-52 strikes within one day.

The STD's Air Support Service consisted of 219 'King Bee' Helicopter Squadron, the 114 Observation Sqn., and C-47 transportation elements. The King Bees, originally outfitted with aging H34s, were re-equipped with UH-1 Hueys in 1972. The C-47 fleet was augmented by two C-123 transports and one C-130 Blackbird in the same year. All were based at Nha Trang.

The Easter Offensive 1972

During the 1972 Easter Offensive the combat arms of the STD saw heavy action while performing recon and forward air guide operations. Meanwhile, 81 Airborne Ranger Group was tasked with reinforcing besieged An Loc. The Group was heli lifted into the southern edge of the city in April, and the Airborne Rangers walked north to form the first line of defense against the North Vietnamese. After a month of brutal fighting and heavy losses, the siege was lifted. A monument was later built by the people of An Loc in appreciation of the Group's sacrifices.

In October 1972, the SMS was given responsibility for the tactical footage between Hue and the Lao border. In early 1973 US advisors were withdrawn. The Air Support Service soon proved unable to make up for missing US logistical support, sharply reducing the number of STD external missions. STD personnel, as well as Lien Doan Nguoi Nhai SEALS, were increasingly pulled into President Thieu's Office for special assignments. Later in the year the Liaison Service's Task Force 1, 2 and 3 were redesignated Groups 1, 2 and 3; and Camp Yen The was renamed Camp Quyet Thang ('Must Win'.)

Following a brief respite in the wake of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, the STD was back in action against encroaching NVA elements in the countryside. In September 1973 two Liaison Service Loi Ho recon teams were inserted by helicopter into Plei Djereng, a key garrison blocking the NVA infiltration corridor down the Western highlands. They were unsuccessful in rallying the defenders after an NVA attack, however. In late 1974 the NVA increased their pressure; especially hard hit was the provincial capital of Phuoc Long in Military Region 3. After several weeks of NVA tank, artillery and infantry attacks the Phuoc Long defense started to crack. In an effort to save the city the government ordered 81 Airborne Ranger Group to reinforce the southern perimeter. After two days of weather delays one company was heli lifted east of the city on the morning of 5 January 1975; and by early afternoon over 250 Airborne Rangers were in Phuoc Long. After a day of relentless NVA assaults most of the original garrison fled; contact was lost with the Airborne Rangers as the NVA began to overwhelm the city. Early the next day Aiborne Rangers stragglers were spotted north of the city. A four day search eventually retrieved some 50 percent survivors.

By March 1975 the NVA had increased pressure on the Central Highlands, prompting Saigon to begin a strategic redeployment from the western half of II Corps. Although the Liaison Service's Groups 2 and 3 provided security for the withdrawing masses the redeployment soon turned into a rout. In the hasty withdrawal Group 2 had forgotten two recon teams in Cambodia; these later walked the entire distance back to the Vietnamese coast. After the fall of the Central Highlands government forces in I Corps began to panic, sparking an exodus to the south. In the confusion Group I of the Liaison Service attempted to provide security for the sealift to Saigon. Meanwhile, the SMS boarded boats on 30 March for Vung Tau.

With the entire northern half of the country lost, Saigon attempted to regroup its forces. 81 Airborne Ranger Group, which had arrived from II Corps in a state of disarray, was refitted at Vung Tau. The Liaison Service was posted in Saigon, with Groups I and 3 reinforcing Bien Hoa and Group 2 protecting the fuel depots. The SMS also reformed in Saigon.

On 6 April 1975 SMS recon teams sent northeast and northwest of Phan Rang discovered elements of two North Vietnamese divisions massing on the city. An additional 100 SMS commandos were flown in as reinforcements, but were captured at the airport as the North Vietnamese overran Phan Rang. A second tak force of 40 Loi Ho commandos was infiltrated into Tay Ninh to attack an NVA command post; the force was intercepted and only two men escaped. By mid April 81 Airborne Ranger Group was put under the operational control of 18th Division and sent to Xuan Loc, where the unit was smashed. The remnants were pulled back to defend Saigon. By the final days of April the NVA had surrounded the capital. Along with other high officials, the STD commander escaped by plane on 27 April. On the next day 500 SMS commandos and STD HQ personnel commandeered a barge and escaped into international waters. The remainder of the Liaison Service fought until capitulation on 30 April.

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

NAVAL SPECIAL FORCES

In 1960 the South Vietnamese Navy proposed the creation of an Underwater Demolitions Team to improve protection of ships, piers and bridges. Later in the year a navy contingent was sent to Taiwan for UDT training; the one officer and seven men who completed the course became the cadre for a Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (LDNN), or Frogman Unit, formally established in July 1961. The LDNN, with a proposed strength of 48 officers and men, was given the mission of salvage, obstacle removal, pier protection and special amphibious operations.

Soon after the creation of the LDNN a second unit was formed: Biet Hai, or 'Special Sea Force', paramilitary commandos under the operational control of Diem's Presidential Liaison Office and given responsibility for amphibious operations against North Vietnam. US Navy SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) commando teams began deploying to South Vietnam in February 1962 and initiated in March a six month course for the first Biet Hai cadre in airborne, reconnaissance and guerrilla warfare training. By October, 62 men had graduated from the first cycle. A planned second contingent was denied funding.

In early 1964 the LDNN, numbering only one officer and 41 men, began special operations against VC seabome infiltration attempts. Six Communist junks were destroyed by the LDNN at Ilo Ilo Island in January during Operation 'Sea Dog'. During the following month the LDNN began to be used against North Vietnamese targets as part of Operation Plan 34A, a covert action program designed to pressure the Ha Noi regime.

In February a team unsuccessfully attempted to sabotage a North Vietnamese ferry on Cape Ron and Swatow patrol craft at Quang Khe. Missions to destroy the Route I bridges below the 18th Parallel were twice aborted. In March most of the LDNN was transferred to Da Nang and colocated with the remaining Biet Hai conunandos. During May North Vietnam operations resumed by LDNN teams working with newly trained Biet Hai boat crews. On 27 May they scored their first success with the capture of a North Vietnamese junk. On 30 June a team landed on the North Vietnamese coast near a reservoir pump house. Ile team was discovered and a hand to hand fight ensued; two LDNN commandos lost their lives and three 57mm recoiless rifles were abandoned, but 22 North Vietnamese were killed and the pump house was destroyed.

In July a second class of 60 LDNN candidates was selected and began training in Nha Trang during September. Training lasted 16 weeks, and included a 'Hell Week' in which students were required to paddle a boat 115 miles, run 75 miles, carry a boat for 21 miles and swim 10 miles. During the training cycle team members salvaged a sunken landing craft at Nha Trang and a downed aircraft in Binh Duong Province. Thirty-three men completed the course in January 1965 and were based at Vung Tau under the direct control of the Vietnamese Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations).

In 1965 the LDNN was given responsibility for amphibious special operations in South Vietnam. Maritime operations against North Vietnam were given exclusively to the Da Nang based Biet Hai commandos and Hai Tuan boat crews, both incorporated into the new seaborne component of the STD, the So Phong Ve Duyen Hai (Coastal Security Service or CSS). The CSS, a joint services unit, was headed by an Army lieutenant colonel until 1966, then by a Navy commander. CSS missions focused almost entirely on short duration sabotage operations lasting one night, and had a high success rate. The CSS relied heavily on special operations teams temporarily seconded from other services. Teams on loan from the Vietnamese Navy considered most effective, were codenamed 'Vega'. Other teams came from the Vietnamese Marine Corps ('Romulus') and Army ('Nimbus'). The CSS also controlled 40 civilian agents ('Cumulus') until the mid 1960s. Unofficialy, the term Biet Hai was used for all CSS forces, regardless of original service affiliation. CSS training was conducted at Da Nang under the auspices of US Navy SEAL, US Marine, and Vietnamese advisors. Further support was provided by the CSS's Da Nang based US counterpart, the Naval Advisory Detachment, a component of MACVSOG.

By the mid 1960s US Navy SEAL teams were being rotated regularly through South Vietnam on combat tours. Specialists in raids, amphibious reconnaissance and neutralization operations against the VC infrastructure, the SEALs worked closely with the LDNN and began qualifying Vietnamese personnel in basic SEAL tactics. In November 1966 a small cadre of LDNN were brought to Subic Bay in the Philippines for more intensive SEAL training.

In 1967 a third LDNN class numbering over 400 were selected for SEAL training at Vung Tau. Only 27 students finished the one year course and were kept as a separate Hai Kich ('Special Sea Unit,' the Vietnamese term for SEAL) unit within the LDNN. Shortly after their graduation the Communists launched the Tet Offensive most of the LDNN SEALs were moved to Cam Ranh Bay, where a fourth LDNN class began training during 1968. During the year the Vietnamese SEALs operated closely with the US Navy SEALS. The LDNN SEAL Team maintained its focus on operations within South Vietnam, although some missions did extend into Cambodia. Some missions used parachute infiltration.

LDNN after Tet

In 1971, in accordance with increased operational responsibilities under the Vietnamization program, the LDNN was expanded to the Lien Doan Nguoi Nhai (LDNN), or Frogman Group, comprising a SEAL Team, Underwater Demolitions Team, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team and Boat Support Team. Headquarters remained in Saigon. For the remainder of 1971 the SEALs operated in 12 18-man detachments on neutralization operations and raids inside South Vietnam. SEAL launch sites included Ho Anh, north of Da Nang, Hue and Tinh An.

During the 1972 Easter Offensive the SEALs were transferred to Hue to conduct operations against NVA forces holding Quang Tri; after Quang Tri was retaken some of the SEALs went to Quang Ngai to resume VC neutralization operations. After US Navy SEAL advisors were withdrawn in late 1972 the LDNN SEAL Team, now 200 strong, took over training facilities at Cam Ranh Bay; training, however, was cut in half, with only one fifth given airborne training. The SEALs had been augmented by ten graduates out of 21 LDNN officer candidates sent to the US for SEAL training in 1971.

When the Vietnam ceasefire went into effect in 1973 the SEALs returned to LDNN Headquarters in Saigon. At the same time the CSS was dissolved, with the Navy contingent given the option of transferring to the LDNN.

In late December 1973 the government reiterated its territorial claim to the Paracel Island chain off its coast and dispatched a small garrison of militia to occupy the islands. By early January 1974 the Chinese, who also claimed the islands, had sent a naval task force to retake.the Paracels. On 17 January 30 LDNN SEALs were infiltrated on to the western shores of one of the major islands to confront a Chinese landing party. The Chinese had already departed; but two days later, after SEALs landed on a nearby island, Chinese forces attacked with gunboats and naval infantry. Two SEALs died and the rest were taken prisoner and later repatriated.

During the final days of South Vietnam a 50 man SEAL detachment was sent to Long An; the remainder were kept at LDNN Headquarters in Saigon along with 200 new SEAL trainees. During the early evening of 29 April all SEAL dependents boarded LDNN UDT boats and left Saigon; a few hours later the SEALs departed the capital, linked up with the UDT boats, and were picked up by the US 7th Fleet in international waters.

By Ken Conboy